

INQUESTS INTO THE DEATHS ARISING FROM THE FISHMONGERS' HALL AND LONDON BRIDGE TERROR ATTACK

Note from the IOPC on learning and preventing future deaths

Introduction

1. This document does not make formal submissions on behalf of the IOPC but is intended to assist the Chief Coroner by reminding him of the learning the IOPC identified from its investigations and the steps taken in relation to it.

Operation Richenda (Concerning the events of the 29 November 2019- IOPC Reference 2019/128705 and 2019/128689)

2. Learning from Operation Richenda is addressed at page 44 of the final report and explains that the IOPC lead investigator and decision maker met with the senior leadership team for NPCC armed policing on 27 February 2020 to discuss the early learning identified. Following that meeting the IOPC was advised in email correspondence from the College of Policing Specialist Firearms Lead that:
 - a. Revisions were made to the Authorised Professional Practice for armed policing, including some additional emphasis in the critical shot content regarding the distinction between a critical shot (as a concept or use of force) and the relationship between that type of shot and command authority. This was to reinforce the point that authority for a critical shot is only required in specific circumstances.
 - b. A training package for delivery to all AFOs was developed, focused on Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices and the associated considerations, challenges and options. It also explained the issue around when a critical shot should be authorised.
 - c. The annual firearms command and tactical advisor package was finalised. This package is given to forces for mandatory delivery to all levels of command and TAs during the training year. This package also reinforces the critical shot issue from the command perspective.
3. A debrief involving the key police witnesses, chaired by Chief Inspector Anna McCartney took place on 7 January 2020. The notes from that meeting identified 18 learning points with associated actions, covering topics including command and communication, equipment, tactics and first aid. These were to be taken forward through the Metropolitan Police Service and the City of London Police who may be able to update the Chief Coroner on their outcome.

**Op Aragon (Concerning police involvement in the management of Mr Khan)-
IOPC reference 2019/128766**

4. Learning from Operation Aragon is addressed at page 76 of the final report. On 26 March 2020 the IOPC made early learning recommendations under s10(1)(e) Police Reform Act 2002 to the National Police Chiefs Council, for the attention of National Lead for Counter Terrorism Policing concerning:
 - a. The training of police officers involved in managing convicted terrorist offenders released from prison.
 - b. Policies and procedures in place in relation to the police's involvement in managing convicted terrorist offenders.
 - c. Developing appropriate systems, to assist with the implementation of policies and procedures, and information capture regarding the management of convicted terrorist offenders.
 - d. Keeping a list of appropriate mobile devices that can be used by convicted terrorist offenders, depending on the conditions to which they are subject.
5. The National Lead responded to the recommendations in a letter dated 22 January 2021. For convenience the recommendations and the response are attached. In an email dated 15 March 2021 it was clarified that the training in relation to the first learning recommendation would be given from June 2021 onwards.
6. The report also identified that there had been no debrief or review of previous Staffordshire Police's management of another terrorist, who had gone on to commit a further terrorism offence (see paragraphs 58-68 and 435 of the final report). Consideration is still being given to whether a formal learning recommendation should be made in this regard.

Danny Simpson

Solicitor for the IOPC

28 June 2021

Section 10(1)(e) Recommendation Record

To	Assistant Commissioner Special Operations Neil Basu
Copied to	Tim Jacques, Paul Betts
Date sent	26/03/2020

Case name	Operation Aragon
Case type	Independent
Case reference	2019/128766
Recommendation from	Adam Stacey
Police case reference	Operation Bemadam

We have identified organisational learning for the National Police Chiefs Council and make the recommendations below.

Reference	Recommendation
2019/128766/001	<p>The IOPC recommends that the national policing lead for counter-terrorism should ensure that police officers involved in managing offenders released from prison following terrorism offences should be given appropriate and specific training in relation to the types of offenders that they are managing and the different risks that they pose.</p> <p>This follows an investigation in which officers from the Staffordshire Police Prevent team were involved in managing an offender convicted of terrorism offences, but received no specific training in order to do this.</p>

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	<p>This was a change in the type of person they were working with, from low risk people potentially at risk of becoming extremist, to high risk convicted offenders. This was identified by the Staffordshire Police officers as a concern when they took over the management of this type of offender.</p>
2019/128766/002	<p>The IOPC recommends that the national policing lead for counter-terrorism should ensure there are suitable policies and procedures in place in relation to the police's involvement in managing convicted terrorist offenders. These policies and procedures should distinguish between the different types of terrorist offenders and cover what the precise role and responsibility of the police force is, in relation to each type of offender. They should also include the duties of the officers in terms of the type of information they should be sharing with each agency that will be involved.</p> <p>This follows an investigation in which officers from the Staffordshire Police Prevent team were involved in managing an offender convicted of terrorism offences, but there were no policies or procedures in place for them to adhere to. The officer in the case copied policies from another force and changed information to make them Staffordshire Police documents, but they do not appear to have been reviewed or approved by anyone else.</p>
2019/128766/003	<p>The IOPC recommends that the national policing lead for counter-terrorism should ensure that police forces develop appropriate systems, to assist with the implementation of policies and procedures, and information capture regarding the management of convicted terrorist offenders. These systems should enable the accurate capture of data in relation to the different numbers and types of terrorist offenders, to support the effective management of CT offenders at a national level and between agencies.</p>

	<p>This follows an investigation in which officers from Staffordshire Police were involved in managing an offender convicted of terrorism offences. The IOPC has been made aware that there is no system for capturing data at a national level about the number and type of such offenders being managed by police forces.</p>
2019/128766/004	<p>The IOPC recommends that the national policing lead for counter-terrorism should ensure there is a list of appropriate mobile devices that can be used by convicted terrorist offenders, depending on the conditions to which they are subject, and not allow them access to any other mobile device. Particularly, police forces should ensure that convicted terrorist offenders are not given mobile devices that have access to the internet, if they are not allowed access to the internet.</p> <p>This follows an investigation in which officers from Staffordshire Police were involved in managing an offender convicted of terrorism offences. The offender was twice given a mobile phone which had access to the internet, despite not being permitted to access the internet.</p>

These recommendations are made outside the provisions of paragraph 28A of Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002 because we have decided that the contents of them should not be published at this time.

At a later date we may send any unpublished recommendations again (along with any additional recommendations we make at that time), in order to give you an opportunity to formally respond within the designated timescales.

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At such a time, these recommendations will be subject to the provisions of paragraph 28A of Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002¹, and will be published.

¹ In the case of contractors, Regulation 81 of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (Complaints and Misconduct) (Contractors) Regulations 2015 applies



OFFICIAL SENSITIVE

DAC Dean Haydon
SNC Counter Terrorism
5th Floor, New Scotland Yard
Richmond Terrace
Victoria Embankment
London
SW1A 2JL

SNC@met.pnn.police.uk

Dear Chief Constable

I write to draw your attention to a series of Section 10 recommendations issued as urgent organisational learning from the Independent Office for Police Conduct. These result from their investigation into the voluntary referral made by Staffordshire Police following the Fishmongers Hall terrorist attack in London on 29th November 2019.

In brief, there are four recommendations for forces pertaining to the overt management of convicted terrorist offenders. Principally the recommendations cover areas such as national oversight of data, operational policy and guidance, the provision of mobile phones to offenders in line with licence conditions, and training/accreditation for our staff. The IOPC have issued these recommendations ahead of completing their full investigation, due to the risk they believe it exposes. It is anticipated other ongoing reviews emanating from the attack, such as the serious case review, will make further recommendations for us to consider as the year progresses.


CTP recognises the learning and welcomes the IOPCs recommendations in moving this issue forward. Indeed, we had been engaging Government and other partners on these matters prior to this attack. Largely this has been through Project Semper we initiated as a result of our learning from the Multi Agency Centre Pilots (MAC) for "Closed CT Subjects of Interest", itself introduced by our 2017 Operational Improvement Review.

The MAC process is moving into business as usual from 1st April 2020 but in its present form covers only one of a wider number of "cohorts" believed to pose a violent extremist threat. There is little best practice or evidence base globally relating to the overt management of terrorist offenders and this challenging but necessary next step

in protecting our communities is the subject of much interest from across the world. Improvements in this area are being led and coordinated under our CTP change directorate through Project Semper, overseen by ACC Tim Jacques (Deputy SNC). Semper is on track to deliver phase one by Q2 2020/21 which will directly address the recommendations raised by the IOPC at the national layer; dealing with data, policy, guidance and training. Phase two will require working with CT regions and partners to concurrently co-design a more effective response to nominal management for implementation from Q3 onwards. There is likely to be a clear ask of government feeding into the integrated spending review for appropriate resourcing to allow us and partners to develop this capability.

We have been liaising directly with the IOPC on these recommendations and how we are currently addressing the issues raised within them through Project Semper. This letter is therefore for your information only at this time.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Dean Haydon". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Dean Haydon
Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Senior National Coordinator Counter Terrorism Policing