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FAO: His Honour Judge Mark Lucraft QC

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Dear Sir,

Re: The Fishmonger Hall and London Bridge Terror Attack

1. The following response is provided in accordance with the Coroner's direction at the conclusion of the inquests into the deaths of Saskia Jones and Jack Merritt and in response to the submissions filed by their families.
2. The attacks at Fishmongers' Hall and the deaths of Saskia Jones and Jack Merritt deeply affected the officers involved and those who work in counter-terrorism policing. West Midlands Police reflected before, during and after the inquest to ensure that lessons have been learned and changes made. Considerable changes have taken place since 2019, many of which were investigated by the inquest (as recognised at paragraph 1 of the submissions of Jack Merritt's family). Details of these have not been repeated here.¹ The Chief Constable of WMP welcomes the opportunity to respond to the further matters of concern and recommendations raised by Interested Persons.
3. The following responses respond to the matters raised in the submissions of Saskia Jones's family. They cover only matters on which WMP have taken or can take meaningful action (no response is offered if another partner would be responsible for example). The matters of concern and recommendations are repeated for ease of reference using their original numbering.

Matter of Concern 15:

The evidence of multiple MAPPA attendees, including the OM and Part 4 Notification managing officer, was that the event at Fishmongers' Hall was regarded positively and as of rehabilitation value on the basis that it was connected with Learning Together and Cambridge University. There is a concern that a lack of critical analysis of the value of the association with that organisation was actually providing, a lack of inquiry into what specifically Khan had done or was doing which was positively contributing to his rehabilitation and progression on licence, took hold amongst those supervising and managing him. In fact, Khan had actually

¹ The evidence of ACC Ward and ACC Jacques [see T/27/34 and WS5074 respectively] covered these matters in detail.



not been completing any educational work in the long period since June when he was supplied a chromebook for that purpose. His contact since release had been generally limited to providing a video and interview to Learning Together for its own presentation and research purposes in March 2019, and telephone contact of a general nature. There was a proposal for a one-day course attendance in April 2020. There was no appreciation or consideration at MAPPa or in licence management of the absence of engagement in positive work with Learning Together that gave structure or meaning to his day or lifestyle. This treatment of his involvement with Learning Together was distinct, for example, from the inquiring consideration of the opportunity for him to participate in, Intensive Engagement or the risks of employment involving the use of a dumper-truck vehicle by a TACT offender, even if that could result in a protective employment factor being supplied. The jury found a failing that contributed to the killings to be a blind spot to Khan's unique risks due to his 'poster boy' image (referring to his involvement with the Learning Together programme). The jury also found that a contributing cause of the deaths of Saskia and Jack was the failure to complete an event specific risk assessment by any party. It is also a related matter of concern that several witnesses described the approach taken to attendance at the Fishmongers' Hall event as an all-or-nothing decision, and that if risk mitigation measures had been deemed appropriate then the decision would be not to allow attendance rather than to allow attendance and implement mitigation of risk steps to accompany attendance. This is wholly inappropriate to risk management of a TACT offender. If it is deemed appropriate for a relaxation of licence conditions or permission thereunder to be granted so that a rehabilitation objective is met, it is of obvious importance that there be specific risk assessment and consideration of that event so that appropriate consideration is given to mitigation steps, and where appropriate those steps then be taken to minimise or control risk. This indicates a training and/or guidance and policy issue of concern for risk management of TACT offenders. Potential risk mitigation or precautionary measures for example might include in relation to an event attendance:

- i. Notifying the local police force to the area;
- ii. Contact made with the organisation(s) staging or hosting an event to discuss or ascertain security measures to be in place, including potential to request or require bag searches or metal detector use;
- iii. Accompaniment or escort of the offender to the event, including the potential for attendance of the escort at the event as well as during travel;
- iv. Visit arranged for the preceding day or days to the home address to check on the offender, including identifying any raising of risk concerns apparent;
- v. Arranging for an unexpected spot check by police during the journey, and ensuring such officers understand properly the empowerment to search an individual if reasonable suspicion arises from for example refusal to account for an item or allow inspection of a closed bag;
- vi. Ensuring enhanced covert surveillance of the offender during a trip or event.

Recommendation 15:

- i. That it be made a specific requirement that before relaxation of a licence prohibition the OM undertake an appropriate risk assessment of the specific proposed event or activity and steps which should be taken to mitigate risk.
- ii. That consideration be given to specific training for those probation and police officers involved in managing TACT offenders to enable guarding against feigned engagement and averting the risk of manipulation and deceptive compliance.
- iii. Risk management training, and guidance, for probation staff and CT police should be reviewed to establish whether it sufficiently covers ways to manage risk by implementing measures short of rejecting requests, particularly in relation to the management of TACT offenders.

Response to Matter of Concern and Recommendation 15:

4. The National Police Chief's Council Counter-Terrorism Coordination Committee has responsibility for devising and driving national Counter Terrorism ('CT') strategic policy through the UK National CT Policing Headquarters. It reports to the NPCC and to the government. The CT Coordination Committee's members include senior police officers, senior representatives of government departments and other agencies including the Security Service. The current Chair is AC Matt Jukes, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Service. This response only relates to policies and changes that have been devised or implemented within WMP.
5. Steps have been taken to develop the training for those responsible for policing Part 4 and licence conditions. Training for officers managing TACT nominals under Part 4 (henceforth 'CT nominals') has been developed nationally. Since June 2021, this training has been rolled out; it includes specific week-long training in the management of CT nominals.
6. WMP, as the lead police force for the regional Counter-Terrorism Unit (and like forces nationally), now has a Counter Terrorism Lead Responsible Officer ('CTLRO') appointed at the rank of Detective Chief Inspector. The Project SEMPER National CT Nominal Management: Manual Of Guidance² ('the Manual') describes the role as follows (at [1.8]):

The CTLRO forms part of the CT(I)U [CT (Intelligence) Unit] Senior Leadership Team at the rank of Chief Inspector or Superintendent. The CTLRO is a unique role to lead CTNM [Counter-Terrorism Nominal Management] staff locally, champion the desistance agenda in their region, and therefore take responsibility for CTNM arrangements and performance in their CT(I)U region. The CTLRO is the main senior 'docking point' for national CTNM functions, capability lead, and other partners for CTNM work in their region.

Key responsibilities to include-

- *Figurehead for the nominal management community of practice in the region*
- *Overseeing the list of Nominals requiring Overt Management on behalf of CT Head*
- *Owning strategic relationships with HQ nominal management coordination and represent region at CTP nominal management capability board;*
- *Owning strategic relationships to local delivery partners (for example Forces, YOTS, MAPPAs, HMPPS CT Networks);*
- *Assuring of the CTNM national approach in their region, including embedding relevant organisational learning;*
- *Co-chairs central CT MAPPAs with NPS lead where in existence;*
- *Convening a monthly CTNM coordination meeting with key stakeholders considering partners such as HMPPS.*

Key meeting attendance/oversight will include -

² DC7596.

- *Monthly CTNM Coordination Meeting*
- *CT Nominal Management Capability Board*
- *CT MAPPA Meetings⁴*
- *Strategic MAPPA Board meetings / updates*

7. It is the responsibility of the CTLRO to ensure that systems are in place for decisions and actions to be taken and recorded on police indices (visible to the Intelligence Management Unit) for each CT nominal in scope for overt management regarding:

- The Case Management Plan.
- Ongoing proportionate management and other statutory obligations (for example safeguarding).
- Rationale for cessation of CTNM activity.

8. In addition, WMP has appointed a separate CT Nominal Management Lead ('CTNML') in accordance with the Manual ([1.9]). This is an Inspector who leads the CT Nominal Management Team and is responsible for ensuring day-to-day operational delivery under the direction of the CTLRO. The CTNML role includes assuring adherence of regional officers to guidance and processes contained in the Manual and other relevant policy (for example MAPPA guidance and ensuring that regional Nominal Management is appropriately resourced with trained staff).

9. Again, in accordance with the Manual ([1.10]), WMP has appointed a Sergeant as the CT Nominal Management Supervisor ('CTNMS') who line manages the team of Nominal Management Officers. The CTNMS is responsible for:

- Supervising cases;
- Ensuring allocation of CT Nominal Managers;
- Providing guidance and support to effective case management planning;
- Ensuring compliance with standards set out in the Manual;
- Providing quality assurance to work;
- Acting as a first point of operational escalation;
- Proactively managing the performance, attendance and wellbeing of police officers and staff against the required standards to ensure they are dealt with and supported in accordance with the correct policies and procedures;
- Supervising and evaluating information relating to regionally managed CT nominals;
- Employing effective responses and strategies to manage risk;
- Supervising the CTP regional nominal management team;

- Maximising the effectiveness of resource deployment to mitigate risk in collaboration with the forces throughout the region and where applicable nationally;
- Supervising the subject management and risk assessments and plans to determine and approve in line with the risk profile.

10. Finally, CT Nominal Managers, at the rank of constable, are responsible for the day-to-day overt active management of their allocated CT nominals within the region (see [1.11] of the Manual). They work in partnership with UKIC and other partners as well as ensuring interdepartmental liaison and managing tasking to ensure the efficient use of resources to provide an effective service throughout the region. They report to a Nominal Management Supervisor. Their key responsibilities include producing and maintaining risk management plans in sanitised or un-sanitised form and disseminating them to those with responsibility for management of those nominals. They attend case conferences and meetings with colleagues, partners and other professionals to ensure information is appropriately shared and agreed interventions delivered to appropriate quality and timeliness. They are also responsible for being fully conversant with the relevant IT including Case Management systems (for example NCIA, ViSOR) and updating them accordingly.

11. In line with agreed National Counter-Terrorism Nominal Management key principles and as set out in the Manual ([1.1(2)]), every CT nominal in scope has a record of decisions and actions taken in relation to their active nominal management recorded on police indices visible to the Intelligence Management Unit ('IMU'). Where a nominal is taking part in an activity within the control of West Midlands Police, any risks are carefully considered and risk mitigation measures are taken to ensure that visits can be made and events attended safely. Techniques such as those set out under the Jones Family's list of matters of concern can be – and when necessary are – deployed. Where for example a CT nominal is to make a journey outside of the West Midlands force area to attend an event for which he has had to seek permission to vary his licence conditions, officers will inform the local police force as well as probation and the MAPPA Panel. They now frequently engage with the venue and organisers and put in place a structured plan to manage the visit.

12. Where it is assessed that the police should take no overt nominal action, or no further action, then the rationale for this decision must be recorded. Any such decision is made on the basis of the assessed national security risk combined with the needs and vulnerabilities of the

individual, and not simply because of a particular milestone where their management arrangements may change, for example the end of the licence period.

13. Risk assessments within the CT Nominal Capability are currently being actively developed by Project SEMPER following recommendations from various post attack reviews (see [1.4] of the Manual). These will be implemented within West Midlands Police once they have been developed.
14. For the avoidance of any doubt, however, the police would have no power to search an offender as suggested in Matter of Concern 15(v). It would be unlawful for an officer to seek to search an individual by consent where there was no power to search.³ Furthermore, an officer could not use a CT nominal's refusal of the search (without more) as giving rise to reasonable suspicion for a lawful search. There could be any number of reasons why a CT nominal might not want a police officer to search his/her bag on a train, none of which relate to anything unlawful. To use a refusal alone as grounds for reasonable suspicion would mean that the police had the power to stop and search every CT nominal at any time. This would undermine the legislative safeguards provided by the various legislative stop and search regimes and, in particular, the requirement of reasonable grounds for suspicion under s1(3) Police and Criminal Evidence Act.⁴

Matter of Concern 19:

There was (a) a lack of clarity of understanding as to the role and function of the police in the management of Khan on licence; and (b) a concern over the suitability of Prevent officers to undertake the role of Part 4 management in conjunction with the probation management of the licence. The jury's findings include that a contributing factor to the deaths of Saskia and Jack was insufficient experience and training. The Prevent team considered themselves to be inadequately trained to

³ Police and Criminal Evidence Act Code A provides:

1.5 An officer must not search a person, even with his or her consent, where no power to search is applicable. Even where a person is prepared to submit to a search voluntarily, the person must not be searched unless the necessary legal power exists, and the search must be in accordance with the relevant power and the provisions of this Code....

⁴ Were the Coroner to consider the current legislative provisions insufficient, an alternative might be to require CT nominals licence conditions to include consenting to being searched by a police officer when in a public place or to amend Part 4 Counter Terrorism Act 2008 notification requirements to allow RTOs to be searched by police officers in a public place without reasonable suspicion. Such changes could not be implemented by West Midlands Police: they would require changes to the legislation itself. They would, however, potentially mirror the Serious Violence Reduction Orders legislation being piloted nationally to allow the search of known knife crime offenders for possession of bladed weapons without reasonable suspicion.

manage TACT offenders (and differences to the work done by Team 7 in the CTU at West Midlands for example). Linked to this is the lack of clarity surrounding what, precisely, the role of the Prevent team was. PS Forsyth maintained that his duties were confined to overseeing Khan's Part 4 notification requirements, and not to assess risk, whereas others including Mr Skelton understood his role to be more active management. PS Forsyth also pointed out that Prevent were not equipped to manage the workload. It is a matter of concern whether or not the Prevent police officers involved in management of Khan had sufficient training and/or guidance and/or competence to fulfil the role of public protection in the monitoring and management of him. The allocation of Khan to the Prevent officers of Staffordshire Police was in circumstances where it was known or ought to have been known that:

- i. They had received no training in the management of Part 4 offenders (there being no such training in place locally or nationally at that time);*
- ii. The team brought no counter-terrorist investigative experience;*
- iii. They would be the wrong side of the "sterile corridor" and not have access to the full intelligence picture. There would be no-one in the offender management team sighted of the relevant intelligence and aware of the covert investigation or its details; and,*
- iv. They were to work closely with an offender manager (from NPS) who was inexperienced in the management of terrorist offenders in the community and the likely practical need to contribute advice or information to matters of management well outside the strict policing of the Part 4 conditions.*

While it is understood that Prevent no longer manage TACT offenders in the wider West Midlands region, and there is now some training being rolled out in relation to Part 4 management, it is unclear what the new system is, and whether the management of TACT offenders in all areas of the country shall in future only be undertaken by adequately trained and supported CTU specialists.

Recommendation 19:

That police management of TACT offenders should only be undertaken by adequately trained and supported CT specialists and not Prevent officers.

15. Since April 2020, Staffordshire Prevent officers have come under the direction and control of CTP West Midlands CTU. They are no longer responsible for management of CT nominals; this is led by the CT Nominal Management Team. They are still responsible in the management of those at risk of radicalisation via Channel and Prevent Multi-Agency Panels. Their local knowledge and community awareness will continue to be used by the wider CT Policing network on a regular basis.
16. There is no question that the police management of CT nominals should only be undertaken by those with adequate training and supported by CT specialists. Within WMP, the officers who conduct and police these offenders' licence conditions are part of a single team responsible for the regional area. They are specially selected on the basis of their skills, knowledge, aptitude, previous training and experience (known collectively as the 'SKATE' principles; these are nationally recognised principles developed for assessing the suitability of an officer to undertake a specialist/high risk role).

17. As is set out above, the team uses a very clear line management structure with detailed oversight for risk-management, supervision and a new national training programme. Officers attend and actively participate in the MAPPa process whilst using the National Decision Making model or THRIVE model to assess and mitigate risk. The dropping of conditions falls within this process and is risk-assessed and documented prior to any changes.

Matter of Concern 20:

Concerns arise as to the monitoring and regularity of visits by police to Khan. Prevent visits reduced in regularity very significantly, at as [sic] time when mentoring had ceased after August 2019. However, MAPPa did not know this. Even PS Forsyth was not aware of the scale of reduction in such visit frequency, believing the visits to be fortnightly. There was a concerning infrequency of visits by Prevent police officers after the move to private accommodation on 24 September 2019. There was a 5-week gap between the move from the AP to private premises and the next visit on 31 October 2019. He was then visited once in the middle of November 2019. It appears that no active decision was taken to reach that level of infrequency. This in turn meant that those managing Khan at MAPPa were not aware that the withdrawal of mentor support coincided with a dramatic reduction in Prevent visits. Had they known they could or should have been more concerned by his social isolation and more alert to his risk factors. The visits themselves were no more than 10 minutes long. It was apparent that the experienced CT officer DS Stephenson felt that increased regularity to weekly visits was required in light of the risk factors present in November 2019.

Recommendation 20:

The quality, frequency and purpose of visits by police should be actively discussed and specific approval obtained from MAPPa before the frequency of visits is reduced, to ensure that those managing TACT offenders have a complete picture of the support structure in place, and risk can be accurately assessed.

Response to Matter of Concern and Recommendation 20

18. There is no statutory framework providing for regularity of visits to be set within Part 4 conditions or licence conditions. There is good reason for this as each CT nominal will have different requirements and what might be reasonable and proportionate for one CT nominal might unjustifiably infringe the human rights of another.
19. WMP agree that police visits should be actively discussed at MAPPa and the MAPPa panel's input sought and given; this is the process in place in the WMP area. Part 4 visits, however, are police operational responsibility (and a matter for police officers' professional judgement). This allows decisions to be made in quick time, as and when the need arises. MAPPa therefore offers expert advice and guidance but is not placed to *approve* the frequency, duration or content of the visits. Furthermore, MAPPa Panels do not convene with sufficient

regularity to be able to respond to changing demands: officers are much better suited to make and implement quick decisions where necessary which can later be discussed at meetings with the MAPPA Panel and recalibrated if necessary. Regular reviews ensure that the frequency of visits are reasonable and proportionate. The new structure and process for offender management decisions to be documented, as set out above, ensures that senior leadership are sighted on the frequency and substance of visits and those managing CT nominals (and the MAPPA Panel when applicable) have a complete picture of the support structure in place.

20. The new risk-assessment tool being introduced through Project SEMPER will add information to the overall picture (the tool specifically looks at the CT nominal's needs thereby feeding into their risk profile). WMP are awaiting further national guidance on this point. One possibility might be for the frequency of visits to be a standing agenda item for MAPPA meetings.

Matter of Concern 21:

There are concerns over the sensitive information sharing between state agencies, including between MAPPA personnel including the Chair; the managing police unit; and the Offender Manager. When asked to identify whether there was any omission or failure in the sharing of information and guidance by agencies responsible for monitoring or investigation of Usman Khan which may have contributed to the deaths of Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones, the jury found that a causative factor in the deaths of Saskia and Jack was a missed opportunity for those with expertise and experience to give guidance.

Recommendation 21:

- i. *A review be conducted of the computer systems in use for information sharing to ensure that the police and probation and prison staff who require specific access to terminals, and specific database systems, to contribute effectively to the appropriate sharing of intelligence are enabled to do so.*
- ii. *A review to ensure that there is (where appropriate) streamlining of the use of IT systems so that these are correctly used for common sharing of intelligence between different organisations as appropriate, and with appropriate access for all relevant personnel.*
- iii. *A review to identify the correct location of a sterile corridor between overt and covert investigations and management, so that there is the correct line drawn for the sharing of intelligence to those who require it for decision-making to manage risk.*

21. Insofar as WMP is concerned, systems are already in place to ensure that information sharing between police and partner agencies can take place effectively:
- a. The ViSOR system is accessible by the police, probation and others (whether individuals in other organisations are trained and cleared to use ViSOR is a matter for them: the necessary WMP police officers are trained and cleared).
 - b. The WMP CTU nominal management team also inputs communication with other agencies into a running log and the NCIA system which is then shared with the Security Service.
 - c. As set out above, CT Nominal Managers are responsible for being fully conversant with NCIA and ViSOR and updating them.
 - d. In CT Nominal Management cases involving CTP intelligence sharing considerations (including at MAPPA Panel meetings) where CTP intelligence is required, the CTNM supervisors work with the WMP Operational Intelligence Management Unit ('OIMU') and Fixed Intelligence Management Unit ('FIMU') to discuss intelligence disclosure and agree a form of words for onward disclosure.
 - e. Finally, there is a very close working relationship between WMP and the Security Service especially within the OIMU and FIMU which again leads to the smooth transfer of information within WMP and beyond.
22. The correct 'location' of the sterile corridor between overt and covert operations will depend on each case. It is primarily a matter for the Security Service or, on some occasions, the owner of any covert equity. Such matters are sensitive and often involve delicate judgement calls by those with relevant expertise: there is no 'one size fits all'. As the Manual fairly summarises, 'It is noted that in the National Security environment this is often more complicated by information holdings by UKIC at Secret and Top Secret, which need to be worked through on a case by case basis to inform effective case identification, risk assessment, and case management planning in the overt partnership space' ([1.19.0]).
23. In the case of Usman Khan, an individual failing rather than a systemic failing led to an unknown third party not passing on or 'breaking out' a piece of intelligence. There appeared to be some confusion about who was responsible for ensuring that the relevant intelligence reached the correct parties (whether the MAPPA Panel or CT nominal managers). The new command structure would prevent any such confusion; it makes it clear that responsibility lies with the CTLO to ensure that relevant intelligence sharing is taking place and is enacted by the CTNM Lead and CTNM Supervisor.

Matter of Concern 22:

It was apparent that there is particular joint working between CT Police and the security services where the latter has an open Priority investigation. In the course of the inquest it became apparent that (a) there was a time lapse between the request for a JOT meeting made at 11am on 6 November and its occurrence on 18 November 2019; and (b) no response given, or rationale for any decision taken, in relation to a request by DS Jon Stephenson for an assessment by the Behavioural Science Unit. Concern arises as to the speed with which the JOT was convened (which in this case also meant it did not precede the MAPPA meeting on 14 November 2019); and as to the processing of the request for a BSU assessment to assist the CT police and any other bodies in liaison with CT police in managing the risks posed by Khan.

Recommendation 22:

- i. *That procedures be reviewed to identify the appropriate speed with which JOT meetings should convene. [...]*

Response to Matter of Concern and Recommendation 22:

24. This is primarily a matter for the Security Service but insofar as WMP are regular attendees at JOTs and call for them to be convened, they can be – and frequently are – called urgently and convened at very short notice. It is important not to judge the events of the Inquests with the benefit of hindsight. At the time that the JOT was requested on 6 November 2019, there was no urgency anticipated. It was a routine meeting arising due to a handover in police staff and not as a result of anything arising from intelligence or Usman Khan's activities, management or forthcoming risk. It does not reflect how JOT meetings can be convened where they may be time-sensitive.

Matter of Concern 27:

The MAPPA agencies were all made aware of the fact that Khan would be attending at a central London location, involving two conditions of his licence being relaxed for the purpose. Each organisation was also aware of some intelligence that he intended to return to old ways (and some were aware he also was said to be planning an attack upon his release from prison); and aware of the facts that, by November 2019, Khan (a) was living away from the probation hostel; (b) remained unemployed; (c) no longer had visits from mentors; (d) had reportedly become increasingly socially isolated; and (e) had not been doing any actual educational work with Learning Together. The jury found there to have been an omission or failure in the sharing of information and guidance by agencies responsible for monitoring / investigation of Usman Khan which contributed to the deaths of Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones in the missed opportunity for those with expertise and experience to give guidance. Despite this knowledge and expertise and experience there was no implementation of risk mitigation or precautionary measure taken, including any of:

- i. *Notifying the local police force(s) in London;*
- ii. *Contact made with the organisation(s) staging or hosting the event to discuss or ascertain security measures to be in place, including potential to request or require bag searches or metal detector use;*
- iii. *Accompaniment or escort of Khan to the event, including the potential for attendance of the escort at the event as well as during travel;*
- iv. *Visit arranged for the preceding day or days to the home address to check on Khan, including identifying any raising of risk concerns apparent;*
- v. *Arranging for an unexpected spot check by police during the journey, and ensuring such officers understand properly the empowerment to search an individual if reasonable suspicion arises from for example refusal to account for an item or allow inspection of a closed bag;*
- vi. *Ensuring enhanced covert surveillance of the offender during a trip or event.*

Recommendation 27:

Whenever a TACT offender is to be permitted to attend at a venue or event where the public are present the Probation and Police officers responsible for the risk management of the offender ought to make contact with the organisation concerned to discuss and ascertain the specific security measures in place for the event and venue, and offer appropriate advice and guidance to strengthen the same where appropriate, and to assist in the safety of those working at or attending the event to which the offender is to be permitted to attend.

Response to Matter of Concern and Recommendation 27:

25. This matter of concern and recommendation repeats much of that raised in MoC/R 15 above and the corresponding response at paragraphs 4 to 14 above applies.

26. The term 'venue' or 'event' is not sufficiently clear to make this recommendation practical. For the avoidance of doubt, CT nominals have freedom to attend anywhere that does not breach their licence conditions (including outside the West Midlands Police force area). They do not need to 'clear' such attendances with the police or probation if no change to their conditions is needed. This means they can frequent such locations as supermarkets, shopping centres, the gym or cinemas where members of the public will be present. It will not be possible or practical to contact all organisations of this nature. The police would not necessarily be aware of the CT nominal's plans in advance, nor would the police be well-placed to act as security advisers for such locations. Indeed, to insist on advance notice each time the CT nominal left the house and/or to inform all such locations in a blanket manner might breach the CT nominal's human rights.

27. That said, as covered at paragraph 11 above, appropriate steps are taken by WMP where necessary.

Conclusion

28. WMP hopes that the response above assists the Coroner by setting out, beyond the evidence given at the Inquests, what procedures are in place to ensure that future deaths are prevented. WMP takes the lessons learnt from the events of November 2019 and from the Fishmongers Hall Inquests very seriously and is keen to put in place all steps that can practically and effectively ensure the safety of the public. If there are any further questions or we can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to get in touch.

Yours sincerely,



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Force Executive Team

