

OPUS2

Fishmongers' Hall Inquests: Inquest concerning the death of Usman Khan

Day 36 - UKI Day 6

June 7, 2021

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1 Monday, 7 June 2021
 2 (10.08 am)
 3 (In the absence of the jury)
 4 MR HOUGH: Sir, I understand that following on from
 5 a discussion we had on Friday that you have received
 6 a letter from Sky News over the weekend?
 7 JUDGE LUCRAFT: I have, indeed. It came by email, and it is
 8 quite clear that they had looked very carefully at the
 9 transcript of the interchange on Friday and what I will
 10 ask is for Ms Lester again to send it on to all IPs.
 11 But, particularly for the benefit of Ms Barton, it's
 12 a very clear apology, it's a very clear acceptance of
 13 the nature of the order that I had made, and a clear
 14 acceptance of the understanding of the seriousness of
 15 the order that was made in relation to showing images
 16 that had not been properly pixellated. So I'm very
 17 grateful to Mr Lowe, so the email came through on
 18 Saturday afternoon and it's very clear that they have
 19 given it serious thought.
 20 MS BARTON: Thank you, sir.
 21 MR HOUGH: Thank you, sir.
 22 (In the presence of the jury)
 23 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Good morning, very nice to see you all.
 24 Mr Hough, I think we're going to pick up in fact
 25 where we had got to on Friday?

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1 MR HOUGH: Yes, the first two witnesses today are the two
 2 remaining control room officers from whom the jury will
 3 be hearing. The first of those is TC82.
 4 INSPECTOR TC82 (affirmed)
 5 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Good morning, officer.
 6 A. Good morning, sir.
 7 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Please do feel free to sit or stand,
 8 whichever you would prefer, whilst giving evidence.
 9 A. Thank you, sir.
 10 JUDGE LUCRAFT: And it's very likely that some images will
 11 be shown to you. They will appear on the small screen
 12 to your left, but they'll also appear on the larger
 13 screen, so please look at whichever one is easiest to
 14 look at.
 15 A. Thank you, sir.
 16 MR HOUGH: If the officer will just bear with me for
 17 a moment. Sir, in respect of this witness and the next
 18 today, orders have been made granting anonymity and
 19 special measures, the effect of which is that the
 20 witnesses will only be known by their alphanumeric
 21 ciphers. No question may be asked tending to identify
 22 the officer, and there may be no publication of any
 23 information tending to identify the officers, including
 24 photographs, in connection with the subject matter of
 25 these proceedings. That's an order, the latter order

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1 that you made under the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
 2 Sir, that's just to confirm those orders for the
 3 benefit of anyone listening in and the press attending.
 4 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Thank you.
 5 Questions by MR HOUGH QC
 6 MR HOUGH: Officer, you have made your affirmation. Can you
 7 please confirm that you are the officer being known in
 8 these proceedings as TC82?
 9 A. I am, sir, yes.
 10 Q. You understand that I'm asking you questions first on
 11 behalf of the Coroner, and you have made a witness
 12 statement dated 3 December 2019, to which you may refer
 13 as you wish?
 14 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.
 15 Q. Would you please tell the jury your rank and the force
 16 in which you serve?
 17 A. I'm an inspector by rank, and I serve with the
 18 Metropolitan Police Service.
 19 Q. Are you accredited as a tactical firearms commander?
 20 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
 21 Q. What is, in summary, the role and function of a tactical
 22 firearms commander?
 23 A. It's to manage any firearms incidents that take place on
 24 a spontaneous basis within the
 25 Metropolitan Police Service district. I manage, oversee

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1 and provide tactical advice to firearms officers in
 2 regards firearms incidents.
 3 Q. Were you on duty on 29 November 2019 in the
 4 Metropolitan Police special operations room in Lambeth?
 5 A. I was, sir.
 6 Q. Were you working alongside inspector WA30, from whom the
 7 jury heard on Friday, another tactical firearms
 8 commander?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Were you also working alongside Sergeant S157,
 11 an officer from whom the jury will hear later today,
 12 a tactical firearms advisor?
 13 A. That's correct, yes.
 14 Q. How did your role work in relation to theirs when you
 15 were on duty that day?
 16 A. So my role and the other inspector's role is the same
 17 role. Due to the vast business of the
 18 Metropolitan Police district, we usually have two
 19 tactical firearms commanders on duty at any one time,
 20 and then the sergeant provides us with the tactical
 21 options that are available to us, should we declare
 22 a firearms incident needing firearms officers.
 23 Q. And is this right: that a tactical advisor is typically
 24 an officer who has some experience as an armed policing
 25 officer, and has, in addition, done the necessary

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1 training to provide tactical advice to those directing
2 firearms teams?
3 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
4 Q. Were you working in a part of the special operations
5 room known as the firearms pod?
6 A. Yes, that's correct.
7 Q. We've heard that the specialist operations room is
8 a very large room, perhaps as large as this room, and
9 that the pod is perhaps around the size of this stage
10 part of the room?
11 A. Yes, that's correct.
12 Q. What other types of officers were assisting in the pod
13 and what were they doing?
14 A. Usually we'll have two police constables, also in the
15 pod. They're usually firearms officers as well, they
16 usually would carry out any administrative tasks for us,
17 so making call—backs to informants, doing admin tasks
18 for us in regards any firearms calls, but on that
19 particular day, we had two extra police constables, we
20 had four in total, because a couple of them were new,
21 a couple of them were just seeing how the command centre
22 worked, obviously for their own benefit, for their own
23 experience.
24 Q. How many screens did you have access to and what would
25 they be showing typically?

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1 A. So I usually have access to two screens, which is
2 basically the reports that come through, through 999
3 calls or 101 calls, so I'll have two screens in front of
4 me.
5 But beside me there was a much larger screen which
6 basically has CCTV images from different boroughs, it
7 also has the helicopter down link, should the helicopter
8 be up and above. So I was sitting next to a larger
9 screen which is basically for the use of the whole of
10 the SOR. But my specific role, I only have two normal
11 screens, so exactly the set—up you have at the moment to
12 look at in regards firearms calls.
13 Q. So two standard computer monitor sized screens?
14 A. That's right, yes.
15 Q. What would they typically be showing, what sort of
16 information?
17 A. Just 999 calls that come through, that get sent to us.
18 Obviously they go to a central command centre. Because
19 they're firearms calls they get sent through to us and
20 then I'll have all the information on there, who the
21 caller is, their details, telephone number, what the
22 incident is and so forth. We have it over two screens,
23 I guess it is just for ease, just because of the volume,
24 I guess.
25 Q. Moving to the events of the afternoon of

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1 29 November 2019, were you in the firearms pod at around
2 2.00 pm when events began to develop?
3 A. Yes, I was, sir.
4 Q. What first happened to make you aware of an incident
5 unfolding in the London Bridge area?
6 A. Which was a report appeared on one of my screens,
7 a report that we refer to as a CAD, that's a computer
8 aided dispatch, that's the name of the report that comes
9 through. The first thing I saw was "Two shots fired"
10 written in red — written in red.
11 Q. May we have on screen {DC5977/1} and you will see
12 a printout of CAD 4195. Was this the computer aided
13 dispatch log which came up on your screen that
14 afternoon?
15 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.
16 Q. First of all we can see on the very first page that the
17 location identified is London Bridge. And if we go to
18 {DC5977/5} at the bottom, please, we can see that the
19 first entry made around 2.04 that afternoon, was that
20 shots had been fired, and the reference is TC2. That,
21 I think, is Trojan City 2, one of the armed response
22 vehicles of the City of London Police?
23 A. That's correct, yes.
24 Q. Shortly after that, we see further entries coming up on
25 the system:

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1 "Male has an IED strapped to his body"
2 At 14.04.12. And 14.05.52:
3 "Male has device strapped to him — he is on the
4 floor — moving".
5 When this CAD first came up on your screen, what
6 parts of the log could you see, what entries?
7 A. I saw "Shots fired" in red, that's what come up, which
8 is quite unusual because it's usually in white, from
9 recollection, so coming red obviously sprung straight to
10 my attention. That's the first thing.
11 Q. So you got that information before anything else?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. What did you then do?
14 A. I established what channel that was being run over.
15 I established that was being run over an Intop channel
16 which is usually a traffic channel used by traffic
17 officers for any chases that we have where people are
18 failing to stop. Again, that was unusual, usually it's
19 a borough, it's either in Lambeth borough, Southwark
20 borough, so we go to that local channel, because we are
21 a Met—wide resource, we are not specific to a borough.
22 So that was a bit unusual, it being run on a traffic
23 channel, but in my mind I was thinking maybe it was
24 a chase and shots had been fired from the car between
25 the suspect — obviously a lot of things were running

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1 through my mind at the moment, so I just went onto the
2 channel.
3 But as I started reading down, the IED, the strap,
4 I started thinking counter-terrorism, terrorist
5 incident, that was going through my mind. So I went on
6 to the channel and made contact with the officers.
7 Q. So looking at things from your perspective, you've
8 initially got a message about shots being fired in the
9 London Bridge area, that could be any number of
10 different situations?
11 A. Absolutely, yes.
12 Q. You're identifying the channel, and meanwhile, further
13 entries are coming through on your screen telling you
14 that an IED has been identified on the man, which makes
15 you think that this may well be a terrorist incident?
16 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
17 Q. What did you then do?
18 A. I patched into the channel, which I believe was Intop
19 channel, and made contact with the officers initiating
20 this report.
21 Q. May we have on screen, please, {DC6520/1} and we'll see
22 here, I hope, a transcript of radio communications, and
23 we see an initial entry from control about four or five
24 lines down.
25 "All units from Metro Alpha, can I just confirm..."

1 Is this you making contact on that afternoon?
2 A. Yes, that was myself, yes.
3 Q. We see you then ask whether units have a CAD number and
4 you asking for confirmation that the suspect is still on
5 the scene?
6 A. That's correct, yes.
7 Q. Then if we go down the page, we can see information
8 coming back from the scene confirming that the male on
9 scene is incapacitated, and then this entry:
10 "We're just trying to get everyone back as far as we
11 can. He's got some sort of device strapped to him, he's
12 lying on the floor still moving. Two shots have been
13 fired, over."
14 And you then ask the question, do you:
15 "That's all received, can you just confirm where the
16 shots are fired from please?"
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And if we go further down the page we see this entry:
19 "Yeah all units can we just keep it to a minimum
20 from Metro Alpha, this is a firearms incident, can
21 I speak to the officers on scene please with eyes on the
22 suspect."
23 Was that you once again giving those initial
24 instructions?
25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. What did you mean by the instruction "This is a firearms
2 incident"?
3 A. To make it quite clear that this will be a firearms
4 incident to be dealt with by firearms officers.
5 Q. And thus also authorising those firearms officers to use
6 their primary weapons?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. You were saying "Can we just keep it to a minimum". Was
9 that an instruction to reduce radio traffic to only what
10 was essential?
11 A. Absolutely. It got pretty manic quite quickly, for
12 obvious reasons, so it was just to keep it simple, only
13 a few people on the radio to speak.
14 Q. Then you asked to speak to the officers on scene with
15 eyes on the suspect. Why did you want to speak to those
16 officers straightaway?
17 A. Start getting a report from them, information about what
18 they've got in front of them, just to start building
19 a picture of exactly what we have. Obviously all we've
20 got is radio communication, we've got no video footage
21 or anything like that so everything is being done
22 through radio communication, so I wanted them to start
23 building a picture for me so I can start getting
24 tactical advice and making a decision.
25 Q. And then you have a response from the officers at the

1 scene, and we see right at the bottom of the page you
2 asked them to confirm their call sign. Is that correct?
3 A. That's correct, yes.
4 Q. Then over the page, please {DC6520/2}. I think this may
5 be a transcription error. It says we've got Trojan 51
6 and Trojan 52. Should that be Trojan City 1 and Trojan
7 City 2?
8 A. Yes, I believe so, because they were on scene.
9 Q. And then you asked for confirmation that there's no
10 other suspects and members of the public and that the
11 members of the public are as far away as possible?
12 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
13 Q. Again, it may be obvious, but why were you trying to
14 establish those facts?
15 A. Purely from — could there be another suspect? From
16 experience obviously terrorist incidents could involve
17 several suspects, so just trying to get my head around
18 how many suspects there were, and obviously my sole
19 purpose, my primary responsibility are members of the
20 public, so getting them away, getting police officers in
21 between them and the terrorists is my priority.
22 Q. At this point, did you actually know precisely where the
23 suspect with the IED was?
24 A. I believed he was on London Bridge, yes, because from
25 the initial — on the first page, "Incident location:

1 London Bridge", so I believed they were on
 2 London Bridge.
 3 Q. Having asked about getting members of the public out of
 4 the way, you then receive, according to this transcript,
 5 a message saying that officers at the scene are just
 6 trying to move people out of the way; is that right?
 7 A. Yes, sir.
 8 Q. Then the transcript records you as saying:
 9 "Just confirm there's no other suspects and members
 10 of the public are as far away as possible and you guys
 11 got containment from cover."
 12 First of all, did you say that?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And, secondly, what did you mean by asking for
 15 confirmation that the officers had containment from
 16 cover?
 17 A. So obviously members of the public come first, then it's
 18 my officers, so by telling them to go into a containment
 19 position means getting behind ballistic cover, getting
 20 to a far-away distance from the suspect, the IED,
 21 whatever. Obviously one of my options could be that we
 22 negotiate with this person, with the terrorists,
 23 obviously to try and put all my -- to get all my options
 24 available to me, so I asked the officer to get into
 25 a containment from cover position.

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1 Q. Ideally, how far ought officers to be away from a person
 2 with a suspected improvised explosive device?
 3 A. I would say a minimum 100 metres, but obviously in this
 4 incident on London Bridge I guess that wasn't
 5 achievable, but yes, 100 metres minimum.
 6 Q. So that's the ideal position, but in this situation, as
 7 in some others, not possible?
 8 A. No, sir.
 9 Q. Then we see the question attributed to you:
 10 "Right, the IED strapped to the body, is that
 11 a viable? Can you make that assessment?"
 12 Was that the next question you asked of the officers
 13 on the scene?
 14 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
 15 Q. How would you expect the officers to be able to make
 16 an assessment of that kind?
 17 A. Just through visual inspection. I guess it was a quite
 18 tough question to ask them because it's asking them to
 19 put them in harm's way, but obviously it paints
 20 a picture for me to make an assessment of what I need to
 21 do moving forward. So...
 22 Q. Are officers, particularly firearms officers, trained by
 23 being shown example IEDs to give them some sort of frame
 24 of reference to answer that question?
 25 A. Yes, it is our world of work, this is part of our role

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1 as armed officers is to deal with potential terror
 2 incidents, so we do get exposures about IEDs, what they
 3 look like, and obviously through learning from Europe
 4 and all over the world, there is some form of exposure,
 5 yes.
 6 Q. And then we see a response:
 7 "So we need to request assessment on the approach,
 8 we can see wires and honestly I thought I could see it
 9 looks like a viable device but I'm no expert."
 10 Do you recall receiving that response from the
 11 officers at the scene?
 12 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.
 13 Q. Then we have a further entry recording you saying:
 14 "How far are members of the public away from this
 15 device?"
 16 So were you continuing to try to satisfy yourself
 17 that members of the public were out of danger?
 18 A. That's correct, sir.
 19 Q. Now, at around this point, did you become aware that
 20 there was imagery from a helicopter, an NPAS helicopter
 21 overhead, available to you?
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.
 23 Q. Was that on the large screen in the pod?
 24 A. Yes, that was patched into the larger screen that's
 25 available to everybody within the SOR.

15

1 Q. What could you see on that screen at that moment?
 2 A. I could see the gentleman on the bridge lying on the
 3 floor, rolling around.
 4 Q. May we take the current document off screen and put on
 5 screen {DC8000/88}. May we focus in on the bottom left
 6 image. Now, the jury have seen this NPAS footage
 7 multiple times. We can see here a still from that
 8 footage. Is this the kind of image you saw coming
 9 through on the large screen that day?
 10 A. Initially it was a lot further out, obviously it took
 11 a little bit of time to zoom in, but yes, eventually
 12 that's what I was looking at.
 13 Q. What do you recall noticing particularly about the man
 14 at that time?
 15 A. Obviously on the floor and the items strapped to his
 16 stomach area.
 17 Q. Were you able to get any clear view on it to form your
 18 own assessment of whether it was realistic or viable?
 19 A. From that view, yes, I was very concerned about what he
 20 had on his stomach.
 21 Q. Did you consider that it looked like a viable device?
 22 A. Yes, sir, I did.
 23 Q. At this point, so after the instructions you've just
 24 described, were you aware of Inspector WA30, your TFC
 25 colleague in the pod, giving instructions?

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1 A. Yes, I could hear him having the conversation with the
2 sergeant, the tactical advisor, about this incident
3 whilst I was doing all the radio communications with
4 these officers on the ground, yes, sir .
5 Q. Did a time come when he took over the role of Metro
6 Alpha, giving instructions to the officers at the scene?
7 A. Yes, that is correct .
8 Q. May we put on screen once again {DC6520/2}. If we look
9 towards the middle of the page at the bottom of what we
10 can see now, we can see this:
11 "All units from Metro Alpha this is containment call
12 out from cover while he's on the floor."
13 Was that a communication given by your colleague,
14 WA30?
15 A. That's correct, sir , yes.
16 Q. So from this point on, he takes over as Metro Alpha on
17 the radio?
18 A. Yes, he does.
19 Q. The jury have heard about his thought process over this
20 period from him.
21 While he was taking over, what were you doing or
22 saying in the pod?
23 A. I was obviously still watching the monitor, making my
24 own assessment, but usually in these circumstances, when
25 one of us has a command over a counter-terrorism

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1 incident, the other one starts looking at business as
2 usual, so everything else around that could happen. And
3 obviously, as mentioned before, we're always thinking
4 secondary suspects working, other people involved,
5 secondary devices, so we just kind of put that plan into
6 place.
7 Q. Did you also ask a question about anything the suspect
8 had in his hands around this period?
9 A. Yes, I did. I was quite concerned that he was trying
10 to -- holding onto one of his hands. I made the
11 assumption that could that be a trigger on his hands
12 that he's waiting to set off, so the IED explodes.
13 Q. If we go down the page, please, on {DC6520/2}, we see
14 these words:
15 "Yes, yes at the moment that is the case. Trojan
16 officers with the suspect on the bridge, has he got
17 anything in his hand, a trigger or anything like that?"
18 Now, was that a question asked by WA30 or by you, as
19 far as you recall?
20 A. I recall I asked a question about the trigger in his
21 hand.
22 Q. So it may be that there was some overlap with your
23 initial --
24 A. Yes, absolutely, yes.
25 Q. -- involvement. So you were asking about the suspect

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1 having a trigger because of the movements you could see
2 with his hands. At that point what did you think was
3 the immediate source of danger to officers or the
4 public?
5 A. The IED detonating. Obviously because he's on a bridge,
6 that bridge could collapse and I could see members of
7 the public walking -- just going about their day-to-day
8 business underneath the bridge.
9 Q. At this point we have seen on the footage WA30 instructs
10 the camera to take a broader view, and he told us that
11 was to understand where people, members of the public,
12 were in the area; do you recall that point in the
13 sequence?
14 A. I do, sir , yes.
15 Q. And also as we have seen that at the moment that the
16 camera panned out, Usman Khan, the suspect on the
17 bridge, began to sit up; do you recall that?
18 A. Yes, that's correct .
19 Q. May we have on screen {DC8000/88} and look at the lower
20 middle image. Now, this is the image of the moment at
21 which Usman Khan sat up, just before the camera began to
22 pan out and take a broader view. What did you think
23 when you saw Usman Khan sitting up?
24 A. That he's ready to detonate, probably an adrenaline
25 rush, he got energy from somewhere, and obviously

19

1 sitting up or standing up, the impact of an IED
2 exploding will be more effective than lying down, so my
3 concern levels were certainly slightly out the roof by
4 this stage.
5 Q. Could you hear or see anything at that moment about what
6 was going on at the scene?
7 A. Just the fact that he was, yes, sitting up and then
8 moving around, and then I believe firearms officers --
9 shots were fired, I heard on the radio.
10 Q. Meanwhile, what was WA30 doing or saying nearby?
11 A. I heard him give tactical advice over the radio, sir .
12 Q. And what was the nature of that advice?
13 A. I believe it was a critical shot was authorised.
14 Q. Now, we know that in fact the authorisation of
15 a critical shot came after some shots, after a number of
16 shots, and before the very final shot or shots.
17 Were you aware of shots being fired in response to
18 Usman Khan sitting up before the critical shot
19 authorisation?
20 A. I believe it was when he was sitting up that I heard
21 shots were fired on the radio, from recollection, sir .
22 Q. Do you recall that the critical shot authorisation which
23 you've described came after those shots, before or at
24 the same time?
25 A. The same time, I would say.

20

1 Q. Now, we have heard from WA30 and we've heard from the
2 NPAS footage the words he spoke were to tell the
3 officers that they had "top cover" and that the critical
4 shot was authorised. Was that something you recall
5 hearing at the time?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. What did you understand by the words "You've got top
8 cover"?
9 A. With a firearms incident, the College of Policing have a
10 command structure in place so everything is done
11 properly, efficiently, effectively, hence why we have
12 that structure. So I believe when you say "top cover",
13 you mean that there was a command structure in place,
14 that the officers on the ground have been supported by
15 the tactical firearms commanders within the pod who have
16 had that kind of training to deal with these kinds of
17 incidents.
18 Q. So although the officers could take the decision
19 themselves without a formal authorisation to fire
20 a critical shot, WA30, with those words, was signalling
21 that they had approval or endorsement --
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. -- based on what was known to those in the pod?
24 A. In the pod. It was a declared firearms incident with
25 a command structure in place.

21

1 Q. In the moments that followed, after you hearing that
2 shots had been fired, what did you see on the footage?
3 A. I saw Mr Khan lying flat on the ground, motionless, once
4 the shot's been fired. I actually saw -- I think I saw
5 one -- I think his face, around his face then I saw
6 quite a graphic image of that, which made me believe
7 that, okay, he more than likely would have been deceased
8 from that.
9 Q. May we look at the bottom right image on the same page,
10 so {DC8000/88}, bottom right image. Now, the jury have
11 seen the footage which shows a wound on his face.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. We can see it also here just to the upper left of the
14 crosshairs on the image. Is this the footage you were
15 seeing that made you take the view that Usman Khan was
16 dead?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. From that point on, what role did you take in dealing
19 with the incident?
20 A. I dropped into second in command, so I started just
21 managing all the other firearms incidents that were
22 being generated within the Metropolitan Police district.
23 Q. We can take the image off screen now. Over the period
24 of time that followed, was the level of firearms
25 requirement normal or abnormal?

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1 A. Completely abnormal.
2 Q. Why was that?
3 A. It's just obviously something like this, rightly so,
4 causes sheer panic amongst members of the public, so we
5 were just inundated with calls about everybody and
6 anybody acting suspiciously within London, so obviously
7 we still have a responsibility to respond to that, which
8 became my responsibility, so very quickly we became
9 overwhelmed and inundated with those calls.
10 Q. Particularly, and by way of example, did you have
11 a report of a group of men behaving suspiciously in the
12 Borough Market area, which was of course very close to
13 London Bridge?
14 A. Yes, in fact I had several reports of a similar nature,
15 males acting suspiciously in London Bridge, males on
16 a bus wearing a bomber jacket, could be a terrorist, so
17 having to deal with that, and there were several more
18 that -- as I said, something like this just causes sheer
19 panic and people do respond to that and we had to deal
20 with it accordingly.
21 Q. Did you have to direct armed officers to help with those
22 incidents?
23 A. Yes, all of them.
24 Q. While you were making those decisions at the time, were
25 you able to satisfy yourself in general terms that they

23

1 had no connection with the principal incident, the
2 Usman Khan incident?
3 A. Not until my officers got -- then gave me a report,
4 until then I'm pretty much open with my assumptions,
5 thinking there could be -- obviously from previous
6 experiences, London Bridge in 2005, Westminster,
7 London Bridge one, I have to keep my mind open and see
8 if there is any kind of other people working with
9 Mr Khan or any other secondary device and so forth. So
10 until I've got firearms officers there talking to me,
11 clearing that area, I'm not fully satisfied.
12 Q. Did it, however, turn out that in fact none of those
13 other incidents was related to Usman Khan's attack?
14 A. Thank God, yes, sir.
15 Q. Did you also have to play a role in the direction of
16 armed response vehicles who were arriving at rendezvous
17 points in accordance with the Plato procedures?
18 A. Yes, from all the county police services, we have
19 a standard operating procedure, so if there's
20 a counter-terrorism incident in London, they will supply
21 cars to us to support us with our incident.
22 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much. Those are all my questions.
23 I will look to see if others have any questions.
24 A. Thank you, sir.
25 MR HOUGH: No, I see not.

24

1 Thank you very much for your evidence, officer.
 2 A. Thank you, sir.
 3 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Just before you leave us, you spoke about
 4 what you called in a number of ways, I think, "business
 5 as usual", so you've got the two of you in the control
 6 room, obviously one principal focus on this incident --
 7 A. Yes.
 8 JUDGE LUCRAFT: -- but as you've explained, members of the
 9 public are making all sorts of reports, and just so
 10 members of the public understand that obviously it's
 11 very important they do make those reports.
 12 A. Absolutely, yes.
 13 JUDGE LUCRAFT: So you are inundated with calls but what you
 14 wouldn't want people to do is to not inundate you with
 15 calls at those particular times, because it may be that
 16 there is a wider thing going on than just the one
 17 incident.
 18 A. Hence why anything around that London Bridge area, any
 19 central hubs, Heathrow Airport, City Airport, through
 20 experience and training, obviously, caught my attention
 21 slightly quicker than an incident maybe in other parts
 22 of London, which I could believe could be linked to this
 23 incident.
 24 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Yes. Thank you very much.
 25 A. Thank you, sir.

25

1 MR HOUGH: The next witness is S157.
 2 PS S157 (affirmed)
 3 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Good morning, officer. Please do feel free
 4 to sit or stand, whichever you would prefer. It's very
 5 likely you will be shown some images, they'll appear on
 6 the screen to your left, but they will also appear on
 7 the larger screen, if that's easier to look at.
 8 A. Thank you.
 9 MR HOUGH: If the officer will bear with me for a moment,
 10 may I just reiterate that this officer has been the
 11 subject of an order for anonymity and special measures,
 12 the effect of which is as I summarised at the start of
 13 today.
 14 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Thank you.
 15 Questions by MR HOUGH QC
 16 MR HOUGH: Officer, you have given your oath, can you please
 17 confirm that you are the officer being known in these
 18 proceedings as S157?
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 Q. Officer, you understand that I ask questions first on
 21 behalf of the Coroner and you are aware that you may
 22 make reference to your witness statement made on
 23 3 December 2019?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Could you please tell the jury your rank and the force

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1 in which you serve?
 2 A. Yes, good morning, I'm a police sergeant within the
 3 Metropolitan Police Service.
 4 Q. When did you first join police service?
 5 A. 2006.
 6 Q. Have you been an armed response vehicle officer from
 7 around 2017?
 8 A. That's correct.
 9 Q. By November 2019, were you an accredited operational
 10 firearms commander and a tactical advisor?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. In that month, November 2019, were you working as
 13 a firearms tactical advisor in the firearms pod within
 14 the specialist operations room at Lambeth?
 15 A. Yes, I was.
 16 Q. On 29 November 2019, were you on duty in the pod from
 17 early morning?
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.
 19 Q. In the afternoon, we have heard that Inspectors WA30 and
 20 TC82, from whom the jury have heard, were tactical
 21 firearms commanders in the pod. What was your function
 22 as tactical advisor in relation to them?
 23 A. So the firearms tactical advisor in the pod is -- you're
 24 there to basically support the tactical firearms
 25 commanders. There's several roles within that,

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1 principally it's to provide firearms tactical advice to
 2 those commanders, suitable tactics to meet their working
 3 strategy, for whatever that incident may be, and on top
 4 of that, a whole host of other things, things like
 5 contingencies to those tactics, any kind of
 6 considerations, implications of those tactics, bearing
 7 in mind the firearms commanders are not necessarily in
 8 themselves firearms officers. So you are there to be
 9 the conduit between being a firearms officer out on the
 10 street and then giving that advice, and essentially they
 11 call it being a critical friend to the firearms
 12 commander.
 13 Q. On that day, 29 November, how had the morning been by
 14 comparison with a regular day in the pod, if there is
 15 such a thing?
 16 A. I think it's proved there's no such thing as a regular
 17 day, but essentially it had been a fairly calm morning.
 18 Typically you wouldn't expect that many calls in the
 19 early hours of the day and it tends to build as the day
 20 goes on.
 21 Q. Had there in fact been a table-top exercise running that
 22 morning in relation to a hypothetical terrorist attack?
 23 A. Yes, there had.
 24 Q. Moving to the afternoon, at or about 2.00 pm, were you
 25 made aware of an incident unfolding in the London Bridge

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1 area?
 2 A. Yes, I was.
 3 Q. How were you alerted?
 4 A. Initially it was just a shout across the floor,
 5 something to the effect of "Shots fired" by City
 6 officers which came out on one of our pan—London
 7 channels.
 8 Q. We've heard that was the Interops 1 channel used for,
 9 typically, pan—London pursuits?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. In the moments that followed, did computer aided
 12 dispatch logs begin to arrive on the system?
 13 A. Yes, sir.
 14 Q. Did you begin to review those logs?
 15 A. As best I could, yes.
 16 Q. May we look at a selection of them, to which you refer
 17 in your statement. First of all, {DC5983/1}, a log
 18 we've looked at before, for the location
 19 "Fishmongers' Hall", CAD 4170. And then if we go to
 20 {DC5983/5} at the bottom, we can see that the first
 21 entry, 13.59.42 an information indicating that:
 22 "... someone has been stabbed in the neck."
 23 That, I think, is the first timed entry in response
 24 to a call made at 13.58.58, the first emergency call.
 25 A. Purely chronologically, that's correct. I'm not sure

29

1 that's the first one I saw, but yes.
 2 Q. Then, please, {DC5977/1}, this is CAD 4195. The
 3 location of the last one was Fishmongers' Hall, this one
 4 is located at London Bridge. Page 5, please, at the
 5 bottom {DC5977/5}, we see the first entry:
 6 "[Trojan City 2] shots fired."
 7 At 14.04. This obviously comes rather late in time
 8 than the entry we looked at before; can you recall which
 9 first came to your attention?
 10 A. I believe it was this one first.
 11 Q. And then {DC5857/1}, please. This is CAD 4197, for
 12 Fishmongers' Hall on London Bridge. If we go to
 13 {DC5857/4} at the bottom, we can see an entry for 14.03,
 14 referring to a stabbing inside the building at
 15 Fishmongers' Hall. So those were three early CADs.
 16 According to your witness statement, those CADs all came
 17 to your attention very early on; is that right?
 18 A. That's right, yes.
 19 Q. Can you give us an impression, did all that information
 20 come to you at once or did it come in stages?
 21 A. I think the best way I can describe it is it almost —
 22 it felt like the world had just suddenly landed on my
 23 desk because the information flows were coming thick and
 24 fast from all manner of areas. Certainly the CADs or
 25 the incidents you see there, they would have just been

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1 popping up on the screen successively. You can only
 2 ever read one at a time, you can only read one whilst
 3 everything else is going on, so they all came in at the
 4 same time and I just looked at them as quickly as
 5 I could, the pertinent bits of information.
 6 Q. So what information, as you recall now, did you derive
 7 from that barrage of CADs in those first couple of
 8 minutes?
 9 A. So I think the things that stood out were clearly there
 10 had been some sort of stabbings, clearly there was some
 11 sort of an IED, I think one referred to semtex
 12 explosives, and shots fired, so those three things out
 13 of all the CADs stood out and I think fairly quickly it
 14 became — it was abundantly clear that we were dealing
 15 with quite a high—level incident, probably a terrorist
 16 incident at that point.
 17 Q. So the critical information was that somebody had been
 18 stabbed, shots had been fired, and that there was an IED
 19 present?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. What was your immediate view given your role of what you
 22 needed to be arranging or advising?
 23 A. So my immediate role at that point is obviously to start
 24 giving advice to the tactical firearms commander as to
 25 suitable tactics for the officers on the scene.

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1 Q. Did you consider immediately that this would require
 2 more armed police at the scene?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Did you become aware, as we've heard from the tactical
 5 firearms commanders, that first of all, TC82 came on the
 6 radio as Metro Alpha, as control, and then shortly
 7 afterwards, WA30 has come along.
 8 A. That's correct, yes.
 9 Q. Meanwhile, were you, like they, able to view footage of
 10 the scene which was starting to come up from around
 11 14.05 from the helicopter?
 12 A. Yes, I was.
 13 Q. What was the first image you can recall seeing on the
 14 screen broadcast by the helicopter?
 15 A. So where I was sat, I have — I have a number of screens
 16 in front of me, as well as big screens up on the wall,
 17 which I believe you've heard about. I think my
 18 attention was flicking between the two. The main image
 19 that was in my mind at the time and that I recall was
 20 quite a zoomed in image of our suspect lying on the
 21 ground, moving about, I think he was mostly on his back
 22 at that stage, and moving onto his side.
 23 Q. May we look at a sample image we looked at with the last
 24 officer, {DC8000/88}, and the bottom left image.
 25 I appreciate this may not have been the very first image

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1 precisely which you saw, but was this the sort of image
 2 you were watching as you first looked at the screen?
 3 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.
 4 Q. What was your immediate assessment, given your
 5 expertise, with your first look?
 6 A. Obviously the thing that you're drawn to immediately is
 7 the apparent device around his torso. I was aware that
 8 there may be an IED involved and as soon as you look at
 9 that, to me that's apparent that's a potential
 10 person-borne IED.
 11 Q. Watching the screen in those first minutes, how
 12 realistic or unrealistic did it look?
 13 A. Viewing it on a -- obviously remotely on a camera, it's
 14 hard to say, but looking at it as it is now and how
 15 I saw it, you can only assume that is a viable device
 16 until you know otherwise, and that's how we're trained
 17 to treat them. That certainly looks like a viable
 18 device, given my experience.
 19 Q. Now, you have told us that your role was to advise those
 20 who are actually making and communicating the decisions;
 21 did you at this point begin to start formulating and
 22 advising a strategy?
 23 A. I did, yes, correct.
 24 Q. Now, just in order to understand your thought process,
 25 may we please look at a diagram, which will be very

1 familiar to you. {DC7285/8}. We've heard reference to
 2 this once or twice already, the National Decision Model.
 3 Can you explain this model briefly to the jury?
 4 A. Yes, it's basically the National Decision Model, it's
 5 the model that police officers and, indeed, others use
 6 to come to a decision, so you work your way around from
 7 the top, initially assessing -- do you want me to go
 8 through all the stages?
 9 Q. Yes, please.
 10 A. Okay. And, apologies, would you like me to make that
 11 relevant to what we've heard or just are we talking
 12 generally?
 13 Q. Let's begin with the model with how it works in general
 14 terms?
 15 A. So looking at the top there "Gather
 16 information/intelligence", so you are looking to glean
 17 as much as you can from as many different sources as you
 18 can, be that CADs, be that camera images, be that
 19 officers' transmissions, as well as intelligence you
 20 might be running yourself in the background.
 21 Once you've gained as much of that as you can -- and
 22 this is always an ongoing process and it's always
 23 subject to review as you move through the model -- you
 24 then develop a threat and risk -- so you assess the
 25 threat and risk and develop what's called a working

1 strategy on the back of that. Invariably the tactical
 2 firearms commander will do that. Also you'll be
 3 developing your own one and you will also be critiquing
 4 the one that they've developed, and that is essentially
 5 ranking who is at the highest risk from the various
 6 threats, and on the back of that working strategy, you
 7 look to come up with tactical options.
 8 Obviously you also need to consider your powers and
 9 policies, as you can see there, make sure that what
 10 you're doing is legitimate, and at that point you can
 11 advise on a suitable option, so moving down to the
 12 bottom left corner, a suitable option to meet the
 13 working strategy. That's what you will initially put
 14 out and obviously there's always a number of
 15 contingencies you might need to consider, and then it's
 16 a case of taking action on the back of what you have
 17 advised.
 18 Q. Is this, in essence, a model devised to help people
 19 think in a structured way, including in very stressful
 20 situations?
 21 A. That's correct, yes. It could be all of that in
 22 20 seconds, it could be you've got the luxury of half
 23 an hour, this could be planned for days. So it's
 24 subject to time constraints.
 25 Q. Now, as you began to form your advice, you've told us

1 some of the information that you had received. What was
 2 the critical information to you in making your decision?
 3 A. There was quite a lot of sources, as I've said. So the
 4 critical information in terms of what I could see and
 5 what I could hear going on, and then the suspect's
 6 actions himself, so these were all feeding my decisions.
 7 Q. So this is somebody who appears to have perpetrated
 8 an attack, so he has intended to cause harm?
 9 A. That's correct.
 10 Q. And that he's got something on him which at least looks
 11 like an IED?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. What was your assessment of the threat given the device
 14 he appeared to have on him and the location in which he
 15 was?
 16 A. So based on the capability of both him and the device,
 17 I immediately had a high -- the threat was high, and it
 18 was high risk to any of those parties within the
 19 immediate vicinity of that, and that was members of the
 20 public, that was police, any responders and other
 21 victims.
 22 Q. What were the options you considered and ultimately the
 23 option you determined on at that very first stage?
 24 A. So at that very first stage before I had a wider picture
 25 of the environment, I advised -- the standard advice in

1 that situation is to identify, locate and confront,
 2 which I think was the first thing I said, and then
 3 I advised based on the IED that was being worn.
 4 I advised for our officers to contain him from
 5 a position of cover and put challenges in from there,
 6 purely on the basis of if I'm sending them forward to
 7 him and there's no need to, then I'm not maximising
 8 their safety. So that was my initial bit of advice,
 9 until I had a bigger picture of what was going on.
 10 Q. What sort of cover would you first of all want and
 11 secondly, expect those officers to achieve?
 12 A. Sorry, primarily ballistics cover, you've got options of
 13 cover from fire, cover from view, in this case cover
 14 from explosives, so you would want some sort of hard
 15 cover, you would want a suitable distance away, at least
 16 in this situation 100 metres, but at the same time
 17 you're trying to keep a line of sight to what's
 18 happening.
 19 Q. Now, in your witness statement you explain that two
 20 considerations were that containment from cover was
 21 feasible in the environment, and that containment from
 22 cover might reduce the apparent pressure on the suspect.
 23 Can you explain that latter consideration?
 24 A. Sorry, that -- I didn't quite hear that last bit,
 25 please.

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1 Q. That containment from cover might reduce the apparent
 2 pressure --
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. -- on the suspect. Can you explain that consideration?
 5 A. Yes, so as part of that tactic, that's one of the many
 6 considerations and kind of implications of that tactic.
 7 By backing off and giving a subject space, the pressure
 8 is naturally reduced on them. We would use that
 9 specifically for a lot of cases of mental health and
 10 things like that, but it gives him a chance to offer
 11 some sort of compliance if they're willing to accept
 12 that.
 13 Q. Did you therefore give the advice of containment and
 14 challenge from cover to the TFCs?
 15 A. That's correct, sir.
 16 Q. After you had given that initial advice, did you then
 17 turn to consider other aspects of the scene?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. What was your next concern?
 20 A. So our concern at that point was we had a very -- almost
 21 a bit of a false -- we were still desperately trying to
 22 understand the picture on the ground, because any advice
 23 you give out, it's only as far as it's achievable by the
 24 officers on the ground. So I was trying to get a better
 25 picture of what was actually happening, and I think we

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1 discussed, that's the point we asked for a zoomed out
 2 view to give us more of a -- effectively an overview of
 3 the whole situation, to decide if that tactic still met
 4 the working strategy or if I needed to reconsider.
 5 Q. Around the same time, were you also concerned about the
 6 possibility of there being more than one attacker and
 7 about what was going on in Fishmongers' Hall?
 8 A. Very much so. It's hard to kind of -- it's hard to put
 9 it into words, but at the time it almost felt like this
 10 one incident was possibly only, you know, a quarter of
 11 what was actually going on at the time with all the
 12 parallel incidents coming in, everything gave the
 13 impression that this was a multi-seated attack at that
 14 point.
 15 Q. So a multi-seat attack might be like the one in Mumbai
 16 involving multiple terrorists with weapons in different
 17 locations all running amok?
 18 A. Yes, or Paris would be a good example of that as well.
 19 Q. With that in mind, did you give consideration to having
 20 Fishmongers' Hall searched on an emergency basis?
 21 A. I did, correct.
 22 Q. And what are the criteria, or what's the justification
 23 for carrying out such an emergency search?
 24 A. So if you anticipate that there's immediate threat to
 25 life or serious injury within a premises, then armed

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1 officers can go forward to mitigate that risk,
 2 basically.
 3 Q. Did you give any advice on that subject to them?
 4 A. I did, so I advised an emergency search within
 5 Fishmongers'. Again, my understanding at that point was
 6 I couldn't rule out there weren't other suspects and my
 7 thought process at that time was there was, possibly,
 8 within the building.
 9 Q. Now, we have heard that the incident was declared
 10 Operation Plato, so the declaration was made that this
 11 was a marauding terrorist attack, triggering a series of
 12 emergency services responses. Was that a declaration
 13 you heard when it was made?
 14 A. Yes. That's correct.
 15 Q. If we go, please, to {DC5983/1}, and if we go through to
 16 {DC5983/6}, please. Sorry, {DC5983/7}, we need to run
 17 through a couple more pages. Please keep running
 18 through the pages until we get to the entry for 14.09.
 19 Yes, down at the bottom of {DC5983/13}, please. We can
 20 see an entry 14.09.17, stating that Operation Plato has
 21 been declared. We've heard that the firearms commander
 22 of the City of London Police made that declaration and
 23 communicated it by CAD so that it could get through to
 24 the Metropolitan Police specialist operations room as
 25 quickly as possible. Did that message get through to

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1 you at the time?
 2 A. I wasn't aware that City had done that at all, no.
 3 Q. But you became aware that Plato had been declared around
 4 that time?
 5 A. I believe that we declared it as well, from our
 6 operations room, if I am correct.
 7 Q. Now, you have said that a time came, and we know it's
 8 very shortly after this, that an instruction was given
 9 for the helicopter camera to pan out. At around that
 10 time, what did you begin to see on the helicopter
 11 footage?
 12 A. So it gave me a much better understanding of proximity
 13 and how sterile the environment was or not, I should
 14 point out. So straightaway, I think the thing that
 15 stood out for me most of all was immediately under where
 16 the terrorist was lying there a footpath underneath the
 17 bridge, and in my head the area was sterile at that
 18 point, and as soon as I saw a large number of members of
 19 the public standing and walking underneath him, that was
 20 the first thing that stood out for me: basically that it
 21 wasn't a sterile area and they were all well within
 22 blast radius.
 23 The second thing that stood out was how close --
 24 I didn't know where Fishmongers' was prior to this, and
 25 I hadn't heard of it, so I didn't realise how close that

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1 was to where the terrorist was lying on the floor.
 2 I also didn't appreciate that our armed officers were
 3 all considerably closer than I would want them to be,
 4 purely by the geography and their restrictions on the
 5 bridge and they had no choice. So that was all
 6 immediately obvious to me at that point, that everything
 7 I was hoping could have been in place, it just wasn't
 8 achievable.
 9 Q. Now, we know that events now moved quite quickly. At
 10 around 14.10 the camera pans out and you see that wider
 11 view of the scene and you appreciate those points you've
 12 just described. At around the same time, officers have
 13 been communicating, requesting critical shot
 14 authorisation; did you hear those requests?
 15 A. I was aware of them, yes.
 16 Q. What were you thinking over this period of time?
 17 A. So I was forming my own judgment as to whether
 18 a critical shot was necessary. It was completely in
 19 isolation to what came out of the radio, and I quickly
 20 was reaching that same conclusion, albeit through
 21 information I was assessing myself.
 22 Q. So you were thinking about the potential for a critical
 23 shot authorisation quite independently of the officers
 24 making those requests?
 25 A. Absolutely, yes.

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1 Q. We've heard this from others, but can you help us from
 2 your perspective. In what circumstances does the
 3 control room authorise a critical shot?
 4 A. So there's one of three specific criteria: first of all,
 5 being you're aware of information and you don't have
 6 sufficient time to brief a firearms commander on the
 7 ground. The second one being that the information or
 8 the source is too confidential to be -- to allow you to
 9 brief it out, and the third one is you are prevented in
 10 law for whatever reason from relaying that information.
 11 So there is three typical -- well, they are the three
 12 rationale.
 13 Q. As you were in the control room on that day, do you
 14 consider it that any of those did or might apply?
 15 A. The last two, not at all, the time one, 100%, that was
 16 my rationale, based on all the things I had available to
 17 me, I considered there would not be sufficient time
 18 given that a click of a finger was all it takes for that
 19 detonation to go off.
 20 Q. So you, unlike the officers at the scene, had the
 21 overview from the helicopter and you had the broader
 22 information from all the CADs which had come through?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. So that made you think that the circumstances might be
 25 right for you to consider making that sort of

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1 authorisation?
 2 A. Yes, there was other considerations as well, but they
 3 were some of them, yes.
 4 Q. What's the criterion for you in deciding whether
 5 a critical shot is justified?
 6 A. So a critical shot invariably -- a critical shot is only
 7 where if it's absolutely necessary basically to prevent
 8 a serious risk or serious kind of imminent threat to
 9 life, that's essentially why you would authorise
 10 a critical shot.
 11 Q. Because, as we've heard, a critical shot is a shot for
 12 the head, intended to incapacitate the subject instantly
 13 and therefore very likely lethal?
 14 A. Immediate, and incapacitation is the aim of a critical
 15 shot, yes.
 16 Q. Did you discuss the potential critical shot
 17 authorisation with WA30?
 18 A. Very briefly. I think we were forming the same opinion
 19 at the same time and it was a brief exchange of words,
 20 and that was my advice.
 21 Q. Can you recall what he said in that brief conversation?
 22 A. I recall him then putting it out. He basically agreed,
 23 based on what we were seeing, and then he put it out
 24 over the channel.
 25 Q. In your witness statement, this is at page 8 of the copy

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1 I have, you say that you discussed the possibility of
 2 a critical shot with WA30 who informed you that the
 3 suspect was now trying to stand up and trying to do
 4 things with his hands?
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.
 6 Q. Do you recall that? Now, we know that the suspect,
 7 Usman Khan, raised himself at 14.10, just about the time
 8 that the camera was panning out, and just after some of
 9 those requests for critical shot authorisation. So it's
 10 all happening very quickly; yes?
 11 A. Yes, that's correct. I was privy to that information.
 12 I could see that as well on the screen, but I think it
 13 was just rationalising it to me as well.
 14 Q. Accepting that you are making a decision instantly, what
 15 went through your head before giving the advice?
 16 A. Sorry, could you just clarify what --
 17 Q. What went through your head before giving the advice on
 18 whether to authorise a critical shot?
 19 A. In terms of why I was authorising it, sorry, or ...?
 20 Q. You are beginning to discuss critical shot authorisation
 21 with WA30?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. You have moments in which to consider it, having built
 24 up the information you've been building up, and having
 25 started to form the idea that such a shot may be needed.

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1 What went through your head in that moment before you
 2 actually gave the advice?
 3 A. In my head at that moment was: if we don't act now, then
 4 people are potentially going to die. That was my
 5 genuine thought process. It was almost a shiver down
 6 the spine moment when we'd got the true understanding of
 7 the picture, and my thought process was: we need to act,
 8 we need to do that, that's our only option available
 9 now, essentially to meet the working strategy and save
 10 life.
 11 Q. Can you remember in what terms you gave your advice to
 12 WA30, what you said as far as you can recall it?
 13 A. I believe it was just words to the effect of: I would
 14 support an authorisation of critical shot, I think
 15 that's what we need to achieve.
 16 Q. Did he then give the authorisation over the radio very
 17 quickly after that?
 18 A. He did, yes.
 19 Q. As he was doing that, what radio messages, if any, were
 20 you hearing from the officers at the scene?
 21 A. I was vaguely aware that shots were being fired.
 22 I think I've said in my statement it's unclear to me
 23 whether they were after we'd declared critical, I think
 24 officers were making the same threat assessment on the
 25 ground at the same time. I was aware further shots were

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1 being fired.
 2 Q. Yes. It wasn't clear to you whether, or indeed how many
 3 of those shots came after the authorisation?
 4 A. No.
 5 Q. What were the effects of those shots so far as you could
 6 hear from the officers or see on the footage?
 7 A. So eventually he seemed to -- all of his overt movements
 8 he was doing before seemed to cease and he became
 9 apparently -- or he became motionless eventually, which
 10 I explained as apparently lifeless, without knowing any
 11 more.
 12 Q. We know that that came within about a minute and a half
 13 of the shots being fired on this further occasion, the
 14 shots began to be fired from about 14.10.27--28, and that
 15 Usman Khan was motionless from 14.12.06.
 16 From that point, you could see that he was
 17 stationary, but what was your assessment of the threat?
 18 A. So he posed a threat in various ways. Obviously he was
 19 no longer capable of attacking with the knives he had,
 20 however, he still had the IED on him, we still had to
 21 treat that as viable, and equally, we couldn't entirely
 22 confirm he was dead at that point.
 23 Q. Did you therefore remain in position, giving advice on
 24 the firearms response at the scene around him?
 25 A. Yes, I did. As well as I was giving advice, I was on

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1 the phone to various specialist support functions, and
 2 then I was considering all the other parallel calls we
 3 had.
 4 Q. We're aware that first explosives dogs, two explosives
 5 dogs in sequence, and then EOD, explosives ordnance
 6 disposal officers, were sent to check Usman Khan out in
 7 the period that followed. Were you involved in the
 8 direction of any of that?
 9 A. It's something I had advised that we needed to do;
 10 I wasn't putting any direction out, per se.
 11 Q. Over the period that followed, did CAD messages continue
 12 to come through in large numbers?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. What sorts of incidents were they reporting?
 15 A. There were dozens, and I'm sure there's plenty I still
 16 haven't seen but there were about six that stood out for
 17 me that required my immediate attention. The ones I can
 18 recall were specifically reports of an explosion and
 19 stabbings at Borough Market, there were reports of
 20 suspicious males at London Bridge hiding from police and
 21 looking to evacuate the station. I had a suspicious
 22 lorry on London Bridge itself and a possible suspect
 23 package on that. I had reports of a knife, a male with
 24 a knife at Cannon Street -- all of these in obviously
 25 very close proximity. There were probably five or six

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1 that stood out immediately and had immediate attention
 2 as well as what was still happening in Fishmongers' Hall
 3 itself .
 4 Q. Is it true that most of those turned out to be false
 5 alarms, and none turned out to have any direct
 6 connection to Usman Khan?
 7 A. No direct connection in the end.
 8 Q. But did you remain in place advising on all of those
 9 matters in the pod until about 4.30 that afternoon?
 10 A. That's correct, yes.
 11 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much. Those are all my questions,
 12 I will look to see if anybody else has any.
 13 No, thank you very much. That's all we have for
 14 you.
 15 A. Thank you.
 16 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Thank you very much indeed.
 17 MR HOUGH: Sir, would that be a convenient moment for our
 18 mid-morning break?
 19 JUDGE LUCRAFT: We will do.
 20 Mr Hough, the jury, I think, can be told that today
 21 is likely, again, to be not a full day in terms of
 22 evidence, there are good reasons as to why that is the
 23 situation, but we're going to turn in fact to
 24 a different topic when we come back after the break, and
 25 we will deal with that which is going to relate to the

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1 IED.
 2 MR HOUGH: Yes.
 3 JUDGE LUCRAFT: We'll have a mid-morning break there, thank
 4 you.
 5 (In the absence of the jury)
 6 I'll rise .
 7 (11.24 am)
 8 (A short break)
 9 (11.48 am)
 10 (In the presence of the jury)
 11 MR HOUGH: Sorry, actually the next evidence will be read.
 12 Mr Middleditch will be...
 13 Sir, although we have our next witness at the
 14 witness table --
 15 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Yes.
 16 MR HOUGH: -- the next evidence we'll hear will actually be
 17 two statements from Gary Wright, the officer from the
 18 Explosives Ordnance Disposal unit, who dealt with the
 19 IED on the day. The reason we're taking things in this
 20 order is that the jury will hear from him about the
 21 disposal of the device, and then from Mr Middleditch as
 22 expert commenting on the device. So it seemed to us
 23 logical to deal with things in that order.
 24 Ms Wright will read the two statements from
 25 Mr Wright.

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1 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Thank you.
 2 MS WRIGHT: Thank you, sir. As you have heard, you are
 3 about to hear two statements, both produced by Gary
 4 Wright. They are dated 8 April 2020 and 8 January 2021,
 5 and the document references are {WS0597} and {WS0597A}.
 6 Sir, you will be admitting these statements under
 7 Rule 23 of the Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013. I've
 8 given the name of the maker of the statement, and the
 9 nature of the evidence has been conveyed to interested
 10 persons through disclosure on the electronic platform.
 11 They've seen a copy of both statements and they've had
 12 an opportunity to object to these statements being read
 13 and nobody has done so.
 14 Sir, the first statement, 8 April, 2021. The
 15 witness says:
 16 MR GARY WRIGHT (read)
 17 MS WRIGHT: "I am an explosives officer serving with the
 18 SO15 Counter Terrorism Command and have over 30 years'
 19 operational experience as an Explosives Ordnance
 20 Disposal operator [or EOD]. My role within the
 21 Metropolitan Police Service is to deploy to any
 22 incidents involving explosives or suspected explosives
 23 within London and the Metropolitan Police area.
 24 He says:
 25 "These incidents vary widely from the safe removal

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1 of historic air dropped weapons and ammunition up to
 2 terrorist attacks and the criminal use and possession of
 3 explosives.
 4 "Once deployed to an incident, I am solely
 5 responsible for the safety of the scene and to ensure
 6 the safe removal of the threat posed by the hazardous
 7 devices or materials."
 8 The witness says that:
 9 "Prior to my recruitment, I served as an ammunition
 10 technician in the British Army for 17 years and reached
 11 the rank of warrant officer class 1 before departing
 12 in April 2005 to join the Metropolitan Police Service.
 13 During my army service I qualified as an ammunition
 14 technician in 1989, following a 12-month course that
 15 covered every element of ammunition and explosives, from
 16 explosive chemical theory through to weapon design and
 17 manufacture to final disposal.
 18 "I further qualified as an ammunition technician
 19 class 1, a high threat improvised explosive device
 20 disposal operator, or IEDD, and an advanced manual
 21 neutralisation IEDD operator.
 22 "I have extensive experience from multiple
 23 operational tours in Iraq and Northern Ireland as both
 24 an EOD team member and leader. During operations in
 25 Iraq, I have experience of person-borne improvised

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1 explosive device [or] (PBIEDs). This includes the
 2 recovery of intact devices as well as the effects of
 3 them post-detonation.
 4 "On 29 November 2019, I was on duty at SO15
 5 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit. This unit is also
 6 referred to within SO15 CT Command as 'Expo'. At
 7 approximately 1400 hours, the EOD operations room
 8 received a telephone call from the SO15 reserve. We
 9 were informed that an attack had taken place in the
 10 London Bridge area during which a person armed with
 11 a knife had attacked a number of people."
 12 He says that it was also believed that the attacker
 13 was wearing a suicide vest.
 14 "'Suicide vest' is a popular name for any form of
 15 PBIED. At 1409 hours Operation Plato was declared.
 16 This triggers a large multi-agency response of which EOD
 17 forms part. I was tasked to attend the scene and, along
 18 with my number 2 assistant, PC Dean Steeples, we made
 19 our way directly to the rendezvous point.
 20 Upon arrival at the scene, I made my presence known
 21 to the tactical firearms commander. I was verbally
 22 briefed that a male had been shot and incapacitated by
 23 armed officers, and it was also believed that he was
 24 wearing a suicide vest. Due to the close proximity of
 25 a number of emergency service personnel who were dealing

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1 with casualties from the initial attack, as well as
 2 placing an armed containment on the male, I conducted
 3 a dynamic assessment and concluded that making a manual
 4 approach to clear the device was the most suitable
 5 method of ensuring the safety of all of those at the
 6 scene.
 7 "At this point it was not known if the suspect was
 8 dead. I asked for the protection of two armed officers,
 9 who would be responsible for dealing with the suspect
 10 should he present any further threat to me as I made the
 11 approach to deal with the device. Under the escort of
 12 these officers, I approached the suspect and could see
 13 that he had some sort of device around his body, which
 14 consisted of wiring and electrical components, as well
 15 as tubular shapes, which had the appearance of being
 16 an explosive charge."
 17 The witness says:
 18 "These items together had the appearance of being
 19 a person-borne improvised explosive device.
 20 "At this point the subject was showing no visible
 21 signs of life and after inspection of the vest I was
 22 able to remove the device from his body and away from
 23 him. I then carried out a recognised EOD technique to
 24 ascertain whether the device contained circuitry and
 25 items consistent with that of an improvised explosive

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1 device."
 2 He says:
 3 "It was only after these actions that I had a clear
 4 enough understanding of the device and I was able to
 5 confirm that it wasn't a viable PBIED. Prior to this,
 6 all actions taken were of the view that I was dealing
 7 with an IED. This was at approximately 15.15 hours.
 8 "I returned to the rendezvous point and handed the
 9 immediate area back to the tactical firearms commander.
 10 Simultaneously, I handed the scene of the hoax IED to
 11 Detective Constable Adrian Rushmer at approximately
 12 15.20 hours."
 13 The witness explains:
 14 "I then received a further tasking to clear
 15 a suspect vehicle on London Bridge, a white Ford Iveco
 16 van. This vehicle was cleared at approximately
 17 15.30 hours and was deemed unconnected to the attack and
 18 had been abandoned by the driver during the initial
 19 incident. PC Steeples and I remained at the scene until
 20 we were stood down by the firearms commander at
 21 17.49 hours. We then returned to our base at a police
 22 premises."
 23 Sir, that was the first statement. This is the
 24 second, dated 8 January 2021.
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1 MR GARY WRIGHT (read)
 2 MS WRIGHT: The witness says:
 3 "Further to my statement dated 8 April 2020 I have
 4 been asked to clarify the procedures that I undertook
 5 when dealing with the suspected suicide belt worn by
 6 Usman Khan on London Bridge on 29 November 2019.
 7 "On 7 January 2021, I was visited by DS James Woods
 8 who showed me a replica of the device worn by Usman Khan
 9 which had been constructed by the UK Bomb Data Centre,
 10 [or] (UKBDC). This was identified as exhibit MRS/1. He
 11 also showed me scene images contained within the UKBDC
 12 briefing note version 3.
 13 "I can confirm that when I approached Usman Khan he
 14 was lying on his back, he was not moving and his body
 15 was showing signs of trauma, in the form of blood and
 16 other fluids around the waist area as well as apparent
 17 significant damage to the head.
 18 "In order to establish and mitigate any potential
 19 explosive threat, I initially needed to cut the belt in
 20 two places either side of what appeared to be a battery.
 21 I then needed to remove the belt from Khan's body and
 22 made a further cut at the rear of his body and through
 23 the silver tape that was apparently wrapped around the
 24 entire circumference of his body. Having removed the
 25 belt from Khan I further searched his person and

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1 clothing to ensure no further explosive threat existed.
 2 I subsequently subjected the belt I had removed from
 3 Khan to radiographic examination in line with our
 4 standard operating procedures. On completion of these
 5 actions I could be satisfied that there was no explosive
 6 hazard present and I handed the scene back to police
 7 officers ."
 8 Sir, those are the statements of Gary Wright.
 9 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Thank you very much indeed. Thank you.
 10 MR HOUGH: Sir, after a false start, the next witness is
 11 Matthew Middleditch.
 12 MR MATTHEW MIDDLEDITCH (sworn)
 13 JUDGE LUCRAFT: It is just good afternoon, but good
 14 afternoon, Mr Middleditch. If you wish just to take
 15 a seat whilst giving evidence, that's absolutely fine
 16 with me. Sit or stand, whichever you prefer.
 17 A. Thank you, sir.
 18 JUDGE LUCRAFT: It's likely you will be shown some
 19 materials. They will appear on the small screen to your
 20 left but it may be easier to look at the larger screen
 21 in court.
 22 A. Thank you, sir.
 23 Questions by MR HOUGH QC
 24 MR HOUGH: Will you please give your full name for the court
 25 record?

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1 A. Matthew Middleditch.
 2 Q. Mr Middleditch, you appreciate I'm asking questions
 3 first on behalf of the Coroner, you may then have
 4 questions from others.
 5 What is your current role relevant to your evidence
 6 today?
 7 A. I'm currently head of unit for the SO15 EOD unit of the
 8 Metropolitan Police Service.
 9 Q. EOD stands for explosive ordnance disposal?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. In a sentence, or a few sentences, what are your
 12 responsibilities in that role?
 13 A. In that role, I'm in charge of the complete capability
 14 for explosive ordnance disposal within the
 15 Metropolitan Police Service.
 16 Q. What is your career history, both prior to service in
 17 the Metropolitan Police Service and within the
 18 Metropolitan Police Service relevant to your current
 19 job?
 20 A. So I served in the army for just short of 24 years
 21 before transferring or coming across to the
 22 Metropolitan Police Service. In the army, I was trained
 23 as an ammunition technical officer, which is an 18-month
 24 specialist course in all elements of ammunition and
 25 explosives, from explosive chemistry first principles

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1 through to ammunition design and manufacture, the
 2 surveillance, repair, storage and disposal of all
 3 ammunition.
 4 I was further trained as an advanced improvised
 5 explosive device disposal operator, and an advanced
 6 manual techniques IEDD operator and I've had extensive
 7 operational experience, serving in Northern Ireland,
 8 Iraq and Afghanistan as a high-threat IED operator, and
 9 I took a job with the Metropolitan Police Service in
 10 2019.
 11 Q. Based on your extensive experience, do you have
 12 considerable knowledge of the different variants of
 13 person-borne improvised explosive devices which have
 14 been used around the world, both in theatres of conflict
 15 and in terrorism attacks?
 16 A. Yes, I do.
 17 Q. With that expertise, have you been instructed to assess
 18 the hoax suicide belt that was found on Usman Khan?
 19 A. Yes, I have.
 20 Q. Just as context for your evidence, may we begin by
 21 looking at an image, {DC8000/97}. Can we see here
 22 an image of the actual device after it had been pieced
 23 back together, following being cut off Usman Khan in the
 24 way described by Mr Wright in those statements we heard
 25 read?

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And then {DC7421/37}, the lower image, please. We can
 3 see here a still from a body-worn camera showing
 4 Usman Khan in the moments before the first shot was
 5 fired at him, and we can get a view of where the belt
 6 was positioned on his body; yes?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And then {DC7421/47}, if we focus in. This is
 9 an overhead camera image taken from an NPAS helicopter,
 10 showing Usman Khan very shortly before he was subject to
 11 shots on the second occasion, timed at 14.10.12, and
 12 again we can see the view of the IED, or apparent IED,
 13 on his person as it would have been seen by officers in
 14 the control room?
 15 Now, I think we also have a replica of the device
 16 which has been produced. Could that, perhaps, be
 17 brought to the table next to you and positioned on that
 18 table first of all, facing out towards the jury but
 19 angled slightly. Thank you.
 20 Are you able to explain what this device is and who
 21 put it together?
 22 A. This is a replica that has been put together by the UK
 23 Bomb Data Centre.
 24 Q. Has the Bomb Data Centre also produced a situation
 25 report concerning the device?

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1 A. Yes, they have.
 2 Q. May we have that on screen. It's {DC5102/1}. Now,
 3 before we look at the detail of this report, may I just
 4 reassure the jury that they will be shown this up closer
 5 a little later in your evidence.
 6 May we move to the third page of this report
 7 {DC5102/3}, where the Bomb Data Centre provides analysis
 8 of the device; can you see that?
 9 A. I can, yes.
 10 Q. The Bomb Data Centre refers to noting in particular in
 11 the construction of the device that it was -- it
 12 appeared to be an elaborate hoax with what appeared to
 13 be some effort made to manufacture a reasonable
 14 facsimile of a suicide belt.
 15 What's your own view of that statement?
 16 A. I would agree with that entirely, the make-up of the
 17 belt as shown is a very good facsimile of a person-borne
 18 IED.
 19 Q. How does it compare with comparable hoax devices you
 20 have seen over the years?
 21 A. It compares, I would say, better with real devices I've
 22 seen in its construction, and -- when you first see it.
 23 Q. Point 2, the author of the BDC report refers to noting
 24 in particular "stick like items" on the device. Are you
 25 able to explain and elaborate on that comment?

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1 A. Yes, so for any improvised explosive device there are
 2 a certain number of elements that have to be present.
 3 One of those is the main explosive charge, and in
 4 a number of person-borne IEDs that I've had experience
 5 with on operations, these are often contained in
 6 separate compartments of a belt, however that belt or
 7 vest might be constructed, so it is quite common to have
 8 seen a device with numerous main explosive charges, and
 9 so on this example there are seven separate shapes that
 10 appear to contain a main charge or something made to
 11 look like a main charge.
 12 Q. The report goes on to describe wires appearing to
 13 interconnect those shapes or items.
 14 A. That's correct.
 15 Q. And it refers to the different colourings of the wires,
 16 green, white, red and black plastic-coated wire. What's
 17 the significance, if anything, of the different
 18 colouring of the wires?
 19 A. There would be no significance of the different
 20 colouring of the wires.
 21 Q. Point 3, the situation report, refers to other items
 22 included, amongst them an electronic circuit board and
 23 an item with the appearance of a battery pack.
 24 First of all, do you agree and, secondly, can you
 25 explain the significance of those items in the

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1 construction?
 2 A. Yes, I do agree. The significance of the battery pack,
 3 another element of an IED is a power source, because you
 4 have the electrical wiring suggesting that the means of
 5 initiation of those explosive charges would be
 6 electrical, you would therefore need a power source, so
 7 the appearance of something which replicates a power
 8 pack would then indicate that that would be a normal
 9 part of such an IED circuit.
 10 Moving on to the electronic circuit board, again,
 11 there are numerous ways of initiating an IED from the
 12 very, very simple switch, a push button, to more complex
 13 electronic switches, so the presence of an electronic
 14 circuit board again would not be uncommon in
 15 an improvised explosive device.
 16 Q. At point 6 in the report, the BDC refer to investigation
 17 of components of the device, and in particular to the
 18 discovery of items from Khan's home address, including
 19 the carcass of a battery charger, cling film, bandages,
 20 and Gorilla Glue. Were you made aware of those
 21 components having been found in Khan's home address?
 22 A. Yes, I was.
 23 Q. The report goes on to refer to a test sample of the
 24 battery charger having been obtained in order to make
 25 a comparison and identify what was used for the apparent

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1 battery pack of the device. What conclusion was reached
 2 on the basis of that investigation?
 3 A. That they looked identical.
 4 Q. So having established the source of the apparent battery
 5 charger, was the BDC, as we see in the remaining parts,
 6 able to identify how the apparent electronic parts of
 7 the device were constructed?
 8 A. Yes, they were.
 9 Q. Did they establish that in the main those parts came
 10 from a Microsoft Xbox 360 controller, and other Xbox
 11 components?
 12 A. That's correct, yes.
 13 Q. Point 12 in the report, did those examining the device
 14 also establish that the black elastic material backing,
 15 so the backing against which the various components are
 16 taped, was a -- from a Formfit brand, which could be
 17 used as a weightlifting type belt?
 18 A. I believe that's correct, yes.
 19 Q. May we please go to {DC5102/5} of the same document.
 20 May we see towards the top a photograph of the detail of
 21 the circuit board forming part of the hoax device? Yes?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. And then if we go further down the page, do we see
 24 comparisons between on the right photography of the hoax
 25 device and on the left, sample components obtained by

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1 the Bomb Data Centre to establish the origin of the
2 various parts?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And then {DC5102/6}, please, may we see in the top two
5 images, photography of the device at the scene with, in
6 the second photograph, a zoomed image showing some of
7 the wiring?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Then finally, {DC5102/7}, please. If we look at the
10 whole page, please, can we see in the middle of the page
11 an image of the Xbox 360 controller, USB charger and
12 battery pack which were incorporated into the device?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. So that's the construction of the device.
15 May we then turn to an overview of the appearance
16 and go back to our initial photo, {DC8000/97}. Now,
17 returning to the device and considering it in overview,
18 what did you note in particular about its construction?
19 A. What I noted when I reviewed this initially was the —
20 or what immediately stood out to me were the seven
21 separate compartments, all which at first look have what
22 appears to be a white substance contained within them,
23 and wires going to each one, and that for me, with my
24 experience of improvised explosive devices, looked very
25 realistic in terms of what you would expect to see: main

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1 charges with wires leading into them which you would
2 assume were leading to some form of initiation for the
3 device.
4 Q. So to your expert view, this was a relatively realistic
5 looking device, or a very realistic looking device,
6 because it had the apparent charges, the apparent power
7 source and the apparent controller all connected in
8 a plausible way with wires?
9 A. That's correct, yes.
10 Q. In your role, are you aware of the training which police
11 officers, and in particular, armed police officers,
12 receive concerning explosive devices?
13 A. I have some knowledge but not detailed knowledge.
14 Q. Would you expect police officers, in particular, armed
15 police officers working in central London, to be able to
16 differentiate between real and hoax devices?
17 A. No, I wouldn't.
18 Q. Would you expect any officer to be able to recognise
19 this device as a hoax device, whether by a close
20 inspection or by inspection from a distance?
21 A. No, I wouldn't, sir.
22 Q. If such a device had been real, can you explain to the
23 jury the different means by which it might have been
24 triggered?
25 A. Yes. There are a number of ways for a person—borne IED

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1 or any IED to be initiated. They can be initiated by
2 a timer, by a remote switch, so a radio—controlled
3 switch, or by a simple push switch or push release
4 switch, or indeed a combination of those switches.
5 Q. Now, the jury have heard about Usman Khan being seen
6 moving his hands repeatedly in the area of his body. Is
7 it sometimes the case that the operation of a trigger or
8 switch may fail initially, but may succeed after further
9 efforts?
10 A. Yes, that could be possible.
11 Q. Based on your knowledge of this case, is there anything
12 else you consider the jury ought to know about the
13 appearance or operation of a device of this kind?
14 A. Only that I, in answer to your question about whether
15 a police officer would be able to recognise it as
16 a hoax, with the experience that I have, I wouldn't be
17 able to recognise that as a hoax without having carried
18 out specific actions on it as an EOD operator.
19 Q. So if you had been a police officer looking at
20 Usman Khan up close, with all the knowledge that you
21 have, what would you have thought you were looking at?
22 A. I would have thought I was looking at a real
23 person—borne IED.
24 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much. Just before you cease
25 giving evidence, may we have the device taken forward

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1 and shown to the jury up close.
2 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Just whilst that's being done, Mr Hough,
3 that model will be staying here with us for the rest of
4 these hearings, so in fact, if the jury wanted to have
5 a closer look at it when they are deliberating, it will
6 be made available to them.
7 MR HOUGH: Thank you, Mr Middleditch, those are all my
8 questions. I see there are questions from at least one
9 of our advocates.
10 Questions by MS BARTON QC
11 MS BARTON: Good afternoon, Mr Middleditch, I represent City
12 of London Police whose officers attended the scene of
13 the incident, and I just want to ask you something about
14 the capability of person—borne IEDs, because when one
15 looks at the size of that, one might be led into a false
16 sense of security about its capabilities.
17 So we now know that the belt that was worn by
18 Usman Khan was not a viable device, but a viable
19 person—borne IED is capable of causing death and serious
20 injury, isn't it?
21 A. Yes, absolutely.
22 Q. And we are not, in this forum, going to go into the
23 detail of how devices or successful devices can be put
24 together, because we don't want to put that information
25 into the public domain, but whilst the size of the

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1 device is obviously one factor in how powerful it is,
 2 there are a number of other factors, including the
 3 nature of the explosive and how it is made, what other
 4 components might be within it; is that correct?
 5 A. That's correct, yes.
 6 Q. And so it would be a very dangerous course to take to
 7 say: well, that doesn't look very dangerous, it's not
 8 capable of blowing anybody up?
 9 A. Yes, it would be a very dangerous course.
 10 Q. And to put person-borne IEDs into some sense of context
 11 for this jury, there are many different types, but they
 12 were used in the London tube bombings; is that right?
 13 A. That's correct.
 14 Q. And in the course of those, more than 50 people were
 15 killed and over 100 people injured?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. And similarly in the Manchester Arena bombing more
 18 recently, 22 people were killed, and almost 70 injured.
 19 And so it would not be a safe course, would it, to
 20 simply look at that device and say: well, it will go off
 21 with a pop and the only person it will kill is
 22 Usman Khan?
 23 A. No, it wouldn't.
 24 Q. You would have to dissect the device in real detail to
 25 work out what the capabilities were if that had been

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1 a real device?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. And you have said that you don't know a great deal about
 4 the detail of training of armed officers, but are you
 5 aware that they are told in circumstances such as this
 6 to put cover and containment on from at least
 7 100 metres?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And in your experience, as someone who has dealt with
 10 IEDs for some many years now, that is a radius which is,
 11 in fact, necessary, isn't it?
 12 A. That is correct, yes.
 13 Q. Because it's not just the device itself, but the
 14 collateral damage that it causes that causes death and
 15 serious injury. So, by way of example, on London Bridge
 16 we had buildings with glass windows, vehicles made of
 17 metal, and masonry in the vicinity of Mr Khan which, had
 18 that device been real and gone off, were capable of
 19 themselves when the explosives got to them, of causing
 20 shrapnel and causing death and injury?
 21 A. Yes, that's correct.
 22 MS BARTON: Thank you.
 23 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Thank you very much.
 24 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much, Mr Middleditch, that's all
 25 the evidence we require from you. Thank you.

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1 A. Thank you.
 2 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Thank you very much indeed.
 3 Mr Hough, that brings us to a conclusion as to the
 4 evidence we're going to deal with today.
 5 MR HOUGH: Yes, it does.
 6 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Just to keep the jury fully in the picture,
 7 we've got, on my reckoning, really three major topics
 8 yet to deal with in terms of the evidence. Tomorrow the
 9 jury will hear from two firearms instructors, so that
 10 will be looking at the instruction that's been given --
 11 we've heard something about the training, but we'll deal
 12 with that as a topic.
 13 Then we will turn to what you set out at the
 14 beginning, which is that DCI Brown would return to deal
 15 with the investigation into what is known about the life
 16 and background of Usman Khan. Those two topics are
 17 likely to fill all of tomorrow.
 18 MR HOUGH: Yes.
 19 JUDGE LUCRAFT: And so we will have a full day of evidence
 20 tomorrow, and it may be that some of that material from
 21 DCI Brown in fact trickles into Wednesday, but also on
 22 Wednesday we will be hearing from Dr Ashley Fegan--Earl,
 23 who was the pathologist who carried out the post mortem
 24 on Usman Khan, and if we stick to our current timetable,
 25 the evidence will finish at some stage on Wednesday.

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1 Then on Thursday, after I've dealt with any issues of
 2 law that might arise, the jury will be hearing my
 3 summing-up and, all being well, beginning their
 4 deliberations in this Inquest.
 5 MR HOUGH: Yes.
 6 JUDGE LUCRAFT: So, members of the jury, I just thought
 7 I would tell you that's where we're going. It means --
 8 I can promise you this is not by design, but it's just
 9 that we are having a shorter day when the sun is
 10 shining, always better than when the rain is pouring,
 11 I know, but please do make the most of what might be a
 12 short blast of summer before the rain returns, but thank
 13 you for your attendance today. We'll look forward to
 14 seeing you all for 10 o'clock tomorrow. As I say, I've
 15 set out where the timetable is going for the next few
 16 days, I hope that's helpful to you. See you tomorrow
 17 morning.
 18 (In the absence of the jury)
 19 MR HOUGH: Sir, you have just addressed the remaining
 20 evidence in the case with the jury.
 21 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Yes.
 22 MR HOUGH: May I briefly address the timing of closing
 23 submissions. We intend, as Counsel to the Inquest, to
 24 circulate a document "Written submissions on
 25 determinations" by the end of tomorrow, Tuesday. I've

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1 given indication to key interested persons of what
 2 that's likely to say, based on the evidence we've heard
 3 so far at any rate. We would then ask that any
 4 interested persons wishing to put in any written
 5 submissions of their own do so by 4.00 pm on Wednesday,
 6 and we would suggest that you then sit a little early on
 7 Thursday to hear any legal submissions from interested
 8 persons and to hear our legal submissions, before
 9 sitting with the jury later that morning to sum up the
 10 case.
 11 JUDGE LUCRAFT: That looks fine. In terms of Wednesday,
 12 we've got Dr Fegan—Earl and, as I say, whatever is left
 13 of DCI Brown that we haven't covered tomorrow, but it
 14 seems to me likely, Mr Hough, that we may well not need
 15 the jury beyond midday or 12.30 on Wednesday, which
 16 would give people some of Wednesday to complete any
 17 written submissions they wanted to sit.
 18 MR HOUGH: Yes, it may well be that we'll finish even
 19 earlier than 12 noon on Wednesday with the evidence.
 20 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Yes, so at least people will have that time.
 21 Then, as I say, on Thursday, if we were able to, and
 22 sort of just giving people advance warning, if possible
 23 it may be that we sit at 9 o'clock on Thursday morning
 24 for legal submissions.
 25 I see a slight look of surprise by Mr Bunting. If

1 that's a tad early, we can always adjust it slightly .
 2 MR HOUGH: I think Mr Bunting is only worried about his lido
 3 swim and his flat white.
 4 JUDGE LUCRAFT: But, as I say, if it were convenient to
 5 others we would sit at 9.00 on Thursday and then have
 6 the jury in for either 10.00 or 10.30.
 7 Very good. I'll rise .
 8 (12.33 pm)
 9 (The court adjourned until 10.00 am on
 10 Tuesday, 7 June 2021)
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