

# OPUS2

Fishmongers' Hall Inquests

Day 30

May 27, 2021

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

Phone: +44 (0)20 3008 5900

Email: [transcripts@opus2.com](mailto:transcripts@opus2.com)

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

1 Thursday, 27 May 2021  
 2 (10.36 am)  
 3 (In the presence of the jury)  
 4 Summing—Up (continued)

5 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Good morning, everyone. Very nice to see  
 6 you all again this morning.

7 I'm going to pick up on where I got to yesterday, so  
 8 Sonia Flynn, the Chief Probation Officer for England and  
 9 Wales. She explained how the Probation Service operates  
 10 and the interaction between probation officers and the  
 11 prison estate, and also the changes which have been made  
 12 to that relationship, in particular the changes that  
 13 have encouraged more timely sharing of information about  
 14 behaviour as the management of offenders is united  
 15 instead of being fragmented.

16 The management of Khan was split, as we know,  
 17 between Mr Skelton or Mr Bromley and Ms Boulton, but is  
 18 now a united function. There have also been changes to  
 19 allow probation staff to view prison records.

20 At the time the senior probation officer,  
 21 Mr Bromley, managed probation staff in the community,  
 22 but not offender supervisors in prison. There was an  
 23 expectation that Mr Bromley would liaise with Ms Gell to  
 24 ensure support was provided to the team. He would also  
 25 manage the offender managers through regular team

1

1 meetings and supervision meetings.

2 She explained that all Probation Service officers,  
 3 probation officers, and senior probation officers are  
 4 subject to common mandated continuing professional  
 5 training covering safeguarding and domestic abuse,  
 6 alongside their own training. Probation officers do  
 7 additional training to the Probation Service officers,  
 8 including training in the OASys assessments and  
 9 producing other forms of reports, and she expected that  
 10 Mr Skelton would have received all the mandatory  
 11 training.

12 All Probation Service staff are required, in  
 13 addition, to undertake a Prevent strategy workshop every  
 14 three years. Further online training on extremism is  
 15 recommended for those dealing with terrorist offenders.  
 16 In addition, counter—terrorism probation officers  
 17 provide briefings to their non—specialist staff. Some  
 18 staff would have optional ERG and HII training. That  
 19 was targeted in particular at those with oversight of  
 20 TACT offenders.

21 Then we dealt with the risk assessments. Ms Flynn  
 22 acknowledged that the OASys risk categories were key  
 23 assessments in the Probation Service. The process is  
 24 not static. They contained fixed indicators that,  
 25 combined with personal judgment, would indicate the

2

1 level of risk. They would also be overseen by a senior  
 2 probation officer. The objective of the assessment was  
 3 to assess the likelihood of re—offending and the risk of  
 4 serious harm, but also in practical terms to assist in  
 5 the management of the offender.

6 The categorisation should identify suitable staff  
 7 and ensure more time is given to supervise high risk  
 8 offenders. They also dictate the levels of approval and  
 9 oversight needed from managers. It is a standard  
 10 requirement to start license OASys systems when someone  
 11 returns to the community. They must be reviewed  
 12 regularly, and when there is a change of circumstance.  
 13 There is guidance for OASys assessments of TACT  
 14 offenders which covers the risk of serious harm  
 15 assessment and the need to guard against manipulation.

16 When asked, Ms Flynn said that the decisions to  
 17 defer the OASys until the ERG was completed was a missed  
 18 opportunity because Khan's move from the approved  
 19 premises was a significant one.

20 Ms Flynn confirmed that the ERG, a set of guidelines  
 21 to inform risk management, informs OASys and can only be  
 22 done by a psychologist or a trained probation officer.  
 23 Khan's ERG was required within 12 months of sentencing,  
 24 and in other circumstances, including when he completed  
 25 the HII, and if he was ever considered for downgrade

3

1 from category A. He was subject to earlier ERGs but did  
 2 not engage.

3 Since this attack, ERGs must be completed within  
 4 six months of actual or potential release. Ms Flynn was  
 5 aware that the ERG prepared by the forensic  
 6 psychologist, Ms Ieva Cechavičiute, was a more  
 7 comprehensive and detailed assessment than Mr Skelton's  
 8 draft. She agreed that Ms Cechavičiute could better  
 9 understand the process of assessment because of her  
 10 training and experience.

11 She also said that the process could be enhanced if  
 12 it's not undertaken by the person supervising the  
 13 individual as it decreased the risk of manipulation.  
 14 She also noted that Mr Skelton did not have the time to  
 15 discuss with the counter—terrorism policing mentors, nor  
 16 did he have access to a forensic psychologist.

17 She agreed that it was a disadvantage the ERG was  
 18 prepared by Mr Skelton, who had completed the ERG but  
 19 was not a trained psychologist. She added, without  
 20 apportioning blame to Mr Skelton, he didn't have the  
 21 support that other TACT teams had or the psychological  
 22 support that has been introduced since in 2021. She  
 23 also agreed that it wasn't great that there was a lack  
 24 of entries in Delius recording the ERG interviews.

25 Following the attack, there have been various

4

1 reviews that concluded the need to have more resources.  
 2 There are now five national security hubs staffed with  
 3 probation officers who go through higher security  
 4 vetting. They work in teams, which helps to develop  
 5 knowledge and understanding, and each team has  
 6 a dedicated forensic psychologist. If someone like Khan  
 7 was released into a region with few TACT offenders, they  
 8 would be allocated an offender manager from the  
 9 specialist hub who was responsible for the OASys,  
 10 supported by a forensic psychologist. The hub limits  
 11 the amount of cases a probation officer has -- between  
 12 10-15 -- and ensures that there is senior probation  
 13 oversight. A counter-terrorism probation officer with  
 14 experience completing ERGs would complete it, supported  
 15 by the a forensic psychologist.

16 Within MAPPA, as we know, Khan was a category 3  
 17 offender and managed at level 3, requiring senior  
 18 representation from the responsible authority and duty  
 19 to cooperate agencies. The responsible agency includes  
 20 the Probation Service, the lead agency, the police and  
 21 Prison Service. The duty to cooperate agencies involved  
 22 housing, Social Services, and others. MAPPA guidance  
 23 for TACT offenders included a requirement to meet  
 24 six months before release in a level 2 or level 3 case,  
 25 and for information-sharing before the meetings.

5

1 A MAPPA F form was prepared by the offender supervisor  
 2 before each meeting.

3 MAPPA was chaired by Mr Byford and met every  
 4 six weeks to discuss Khan. The chair could either be  
 5 a senior police officer or a senior probation manager.  
 6 Ms Flynn agreed that it was a good idea for  
 7 counter-terrorism police to attend the meeting to bring  
 8 their expertise in relation to risk management.

9 The MAPPA agenda lists the cases and attendees, with  
 10 the case of Khan given a 45-minute slot. Ms Flynn  
 11 thought the level 3 meeting on Khan might last a bit  
 12 longer, but she also noted that the case had been  
 13 running for some time. The guidance provided for  
 14 a pre-meet with counter-terrorism police in order to  
 15 share sensitive intelligence that could not be provided  
 16 within the meeting, and she expected to see that  
 17 happening.

18 She was surprised to discover that there may not  
 19 have been a formal pre-meeting, but conversations taking  
 20 place outside of the MAPPA structure. She explained  
 21 there was a real sensitivity due to national security  
 22 intelligence. They all received the MAPPA F form with  
 23 intelligence from the security department in the prison,  
 24 and from CT police where appropriate.

25 Minutes should then be produced in a MAPPA B form.

6

1 In addition to those prescribed to attend, there were  
 2 standing attendees and the chair could invite others.

3 Pathfinder was a structured process for managing  
 4 extremist offenders across HMPPS. In the prison context  
 5 it involves regular case management meetings between the  
 6 offender management units and the probation  
 7 counter-terrorism teams. After release from prison,  
 8 MAPPA takes the place of Pathfinder.

9 ViSOR is a Home Office database system holding  
 10 information on offenders that can be accessed by prison  
 11 and probation, but probation predominantly used Delius.  
 12 One advantage of ViSOR is that it was accessible by  
 13 a range of services, and one difficulty, she  
 14 acknowledged, of Delius is that information was not  
 15 available to Staffordshire Police.

16 MAPPA level 2 and 3 offenders were to be managed by  
 17 a probation officer and not the lower level probation  
 18 services officer. An offender manager has a range of  
 19 responsibilities, including assessments, working with  
 20 MAPPA, and assisting with housing and employment. As  
 21 well as testing individuals and ensuring compliance with  
 22 licence conditions, they would meet with the offender  
 23 regularly and put their reports on to the Delius system.

24 It was a requirement to complete home visits, but  
 25 here Ms Flynn noted that the amount of times Mr Skelton

7

1 visited Khan when he left the approved premises was  
 2 unusual. She expected a minimum of weekly visits and  
 3 was surprised that he visited Khan on his own.

4 She also expressed that requiring somebody to come  
 5 to the probation office was a better test than visiting  
 6 them at home, as home visits could give a slightly  
 7 warped version of how compliant and engaged somebody  
 8 was.

9 Licence conditions are subject to National Offender  
 10 Management Service guidance. There are both standard  
 11 and additional conditions for TACT offenders and those  
 12 would have been discussed with MAPPA before being  
 13 agreed. The probation officer would be responsible for  
 14 instigating the recall should Khan breach any of the  
 15 conditions, and the police would then arrest him.

16 The National Probation Service, she explained, is  
 17 responsible for about 100 sets of approved premises  
 18 across the country, and the premises govern all aspects  
 19 of someone's life and send a representative -- here  
 20 Ms West -- to the MAPPA meetings. Keyworkers help with  
 21 rehabilitation and monitor behaviour and report back to  
 22 the offender manager. After this incident, a MAPPA  
 23 serious case review had taken place, which concluded the  
 24 arrangements had been conscientiously applied, although  
 25 the ViSOR system had not been fully used.

8

1 The reviewer also noted that Mr Skelton and Mr Johal  
 2 took on responsibilities that they were not fully  
 3 prepared for, although management supervision had been  
 4 good. The reviewer also recommended continuous risk  
 5 assessment, including the use of psychologists and said  
 6 decision—making in the case had been carefully  
 7 considered and well based.

8 Under learning points, they commented that there was  
 9 no reliable risk assessment tool for TACT offenders and  
 10 that work was a priority to supplement or replace the  
 11 ERG. Ms Flynn agreed with the reviewer's concern about  
 12 a generalist carrying out the ERG, and also thought more  
 13 opportunities to share information about Khan were  
 14 needed.

15 She also agreed that for someone with the background  
 16 of Khan, it was necessary to have a specialist offender  
 17 manager with psychological support and more time than  
 18 either Mr Skelton or Mr Bromley had. Ms Flynn would  
 19 have expected to see the licence condition permissions,  
 20 including permission to attend the event, recorded on  
 21 Delius or elsewhere. It was a significant step and she  
 22 expected Mr Skelton to record his rationale for what he  
 23 did.

24 She also expressed the view that the internal review  
 25 determined that the decision to travel to London should

1 have been subject to a one—off risk assessment by  
 2 Mr Skelton, PS Forsyth, and potentially  
 3 counter—terrorism police. She also agreed that guidance  
 4 on what permissions required approval was a good idea  
 5 and said it was important professionals understood what  
 6 decisions were significant, and discussed with each  
 7 other.

8 When asked about the lack of a documented decision  
 9 of MAPPa approving the trip, Ms Flynn said it was the  
 10 role of the MAPPa chair and senior officials to set the  
 11 parameters for what they needed to approve. She agreed  
 12 with their internal review that a risk assessment was  
 13 needed but, as concluded by the review, this was  
 14 unlikely to have changed the outcome as they thought  
 15 Learning Together was a hope factor.

16 She also agreed that had the meeting happened in the  
 17 context of MAPPa, it would have included input from the  
 18 counter—terrorism police officers. She was unable to  
 19 say whether a MAPPa discussion with a range of attitudes  
 20 to risk would have changed the outcome, but thought it  
 21 would have produced a better decision.

22 She noted that the reports did not express a view  
 23 about mitigation measures, but may have led to questions  
 24 about security at the event, and to Khan being  
 25 accompanied. In her experience, it is right and

1 standard practice for professionals with different risk  
 2 appetites to discuss their views of a decision in the  
 3 course of a MAPPa meeting. That is the purpose, she  
 4 said, of those meetings.

5 Looking back as to what decision would have been  
 6 made about the London meeting if there had been a fully  
 7 informed MAPPa discussion with all the risks taken into  
 8 account, and people with different attitudes to risk  
 9 discussing it, she cannot say with absolute certainty,  
 10 but she felt it would have been a better discussion.  
 11 Awareness around the size of the audience may have  
 12 impacted on the final decision. From a security point  
 13 of view, there may have been a question back to the  
 14 organisers about bag searches coming into the building,  
 15 given that the event was inviting people who were  
 16 serving their sentence, as well as those on temporary  
 17 release. There might have been some basic questions of  
 18 that sort asked.

19 Khan being accompanied or met en route might have  
 20 come out of that discussion as well. It may have been  
 21 felt that, given the size of the audience, it was too  
 22 risky to let him go unaccompanied. It might have  
 23 prompted some rude behaviour, as he had been observed by  
 24 the mentors as being abrasive. So on that level they  
 25 may have felt it didn't feel right. The overall

1 conclusions of the review was that Khan's case was well  
 2 managed and noted the compliance with procedures both by  
 3 Mr Bromley and by Mr Skelton.

4 The issues identified included the OASys assessments  
 5 that could have been of a higher quality and more  
 6 meaningfully informed by the ERG. The final ERG [was]  
 7 undertaken by Mr Skelton, [who] had insufficient time to  
 8 complete within a reasonable time.

9 In addition, the DDP mentors did little to really  
 10 help Khan to integrate into the community, and it would  
 11 have been helpful to do more in securing employment. It  
 12 also highlighted that the MAPPa focus should have been  
 13 on monitoring the warning signs within the earlier ERG.

14 It was accepted in the review that Mr Skelton and  
 15 Mr Johal lacked experience and support in dealing with  
 16 TACT offenders. Ms Flynn didn't believe that Mr Skelton  
 17 had sufficient time to dedicate to Khan, which is why  
 18 funding has now gone towards giving probation officers  
 19 more time with offenders and with agencies. She agreed  
 20 that Mr Skelton needed counter—terrorism officer support  
 21 to develop scepticism and to be psychologically informed  
 22 as they are at risk of otherwise being groomed.  
 23 A balance was needed between rehabilitation and offender  
 24 capability.

25 Ms Flynn thought the London visit should have been

1 a MAPPA decision and should not have been left with  
 2 Mr Skelton, but noted that overall he did his best in  
 3 very difficult circumstances.  
 4 Mr Armstrong put it to Ms Flynn that the importance  
 5 of recording decisions is not only to evidence the  
 6 decision, but also it creates a discipline to the  
 7 analysis that is to be undertaken. As to there being no  
 8 entries on Delius for when the ERG interviews took place  
 9 that, she accepted, was not great. She recognised there  
 10 should be a clear audit trail on all decisions. She  
 11 recognised that the fact that a completed ERG and  
 12 an OASys analysis were not done within the 11 months of  
 13 Khan's release from custody really were a missed  
 14 opportunity. Since this incident, they've  
 15 introduced polygraph tests for TACT offenders. They  
 16 were in place at the time for sexual offenders but they  
 17 have now come in and that would have helped someone in  
 18 Mr Skelton's position in 2019 in terms of understanding  
 19 some of Khan's thinking.  
 20 Liz Young is a work coach at the Stafford Jobcentre.  
 21 In January 2019 she began helping Khan to look for work.  
 22 She knew he had a terrorist conviction. He originally  
 23 wanted to do youth work but agreed with Ms Young that  
 24 obtaining a CSCS card with a view to applying for  
 25 a construction job was more realistic. He received

1 funding and got the card in June. He had an offer of  
 2 a job as a builder's labourer, which fell through due to  
 3 the distance the job was from where he lived, and he had  
 4 no way of getting there.  
 5 Ms Young explained that Khan complied with her  
 6 suggestions but was limited by his restrictions.  
 7 In August and September she noted that he was down due  
 8 to accommodation issues. She tried to assist. He  
 9 expressed concern about finding work because he had  
 10 limited access to the internet and his phone was full of  
 11 messages and so he wasn't getting all the job  
 12 applications. She continued to assist him and made  
 13 a referral to Mr Skelton from Building Better  
 14 Opportunities.  
 15 Her last meeting with Khan was on 26 November and  
 16 she thought he seemed quite upbeat, looking forward to  
 17 starting a course in January. She noted he had  
 18 a bandage on his left hand that went up his arm, and  
 19 Khan said he had got that from doing too many press-ups.  
 20 Overall she described him as compliant and showing  
 21 little emotion, other than when he was agitated about  
 22 his accommodation. He always turned up for meetings on  
 23 time and was polite.  
 24 Richard Vince is the Executive Director of the  
 25 Long-term and High Security Estates in HMPPS, and has

1 recently been the Director for Security, Order and  
 2 Counter-Terrorism within HMPPS. He is responsible for  
 3 the operational delivery of 13 public sector prisons and  
 4 works closely with three contracted prisons, six  
 5 category A prisons, category B prisons, and also a young  
 6 offender institution.  
 7 He oversees a headquarters group supporting the  
 8 management and policy of long-term high security and  
 9 category A prisons. He made clear he had no direct  
 10 involvement with Mr Khan.  
 11 The Prison Service focuses on Prevent by  
 12 safeguarding prisoners against terrorism, disengagement  
 13 and rehabilitation, for those already involved in or  
 14 convicted for terrorism. There are a number of prison  
 15 Prevent leads that link individual prisons and regional  
 16 counter-terrorism leads by providing the Pathfinder case  
 17 management provision and advice.  
 18 From early 2017, Aspect training was rolled out to  
 19 all staff. It raises awareness of the theological,  
 20 ideological and psychological aspects of extremism and  
 21 terrorism and supports staff in identifying, challenging  
 22 and reporting those types of behaviour. It also  
 23 provides knowledge on and confidence to tackle  
 24 anti-British behaviours. In high security prisons there  
 25 is a counter-terrorism department as well as a security

1 department, subject to specialist training in extremism.  
 2 In 2017, HMPPS had introduced the Joint Extremism  
 3 Unit, JEXU, which is a joint matter between the  
 4 Home Office and HMPPS. JEXU, he described as  
 5 a coordinating point for counter-terrorism related  
 6 activity in prisons and probation. It develops policies  
 7 and procedures for extremist offenders, produces tools  
 8 and products such as the ERG, HII, and deployed  
 9 counter-terrorist specialists both across prisons and  
 10 probation, such as Mr Machin and his team.  
 11 Pathfinder, he said, started about the same time as  
 12 JEXU and is used to identify and manage both extremist  
 13 offenders and those vulnerable to extremism. There are  
 14 regular case management meetings with counter-terrorism  
 15 specialists from prison, probation, police and others,  
 16 including the psychology department where they assess  
 17 individuals and put plans in place to manage and seek to  
 18 reduce risk. That feeds into OASys, NOMIS and with  
 19 Khan, to MAPPA. It is a forum for intelligence and  
 20 learning to be shared between the security department  
 21 and other departments.  
 22 Turning to risk assessments, OASys is available for  
 23 all offenders, ERG for extremists and the MAPPA process  
 24 for dangerous offenders. The category A review process  
 25 would formulate risk assessments as well as post-course

1 assessments involving high intensity psychological  
 2 programmes or interventions.  
 3 In 2019, prison ERG assessments were normally done  
 4 by psychologists, and in the community, sometimes by  
 5 probation officers. The MAPPA procedures require  
 6 cooperation between the responsible authority and the  
 7 duty to cooperate agencies, and meetings to begin 6–8  
 8 months before release from prison. He also confirmed  
 9 that the licence conditions are to be set by MAPPA.  
 10 There are both standard and additional licence  
 11 conditions as well as extremist-specific conditions.  
 12 On his release, Khan was escorted from the prison by  
 13 police and given details of his licence conditions as  
 14 well as the part 4 notification requirements and was  
 15 taken to the approved premises, which is all standard.  
 16 NOMIS records exist for all prisoners. It is  
 17 a central database and a wide range of staff, including  
 18 personal officers and keyworkers can make case notes  
 19 identifying different types of behaviour.  
 20 Until 2013, prison intelligence was recorded on  
 21 paper reports, which followed offenders when they moved  
 22 from prison to prison. From 2013, it was digitised and  
 23 became the Mercury system, which contained all the  
 24 prison intelligence recorded across the whole system,  
 25 including the paper reports. All staff members could

1 make entries and analysts would report to someone like  
 2 Mr Machin on a daily basis.  
 3 For TACT offenders, a CT analyst would give  
 4 an intelligence code based on an evaluation of source,  
 5 truth and sensitivity. Staff assess what could be  
 6 shared with outside agencies, and the records were used  
 7 to prepare a local tactical assessment to inform the  
 8 tactical response to intelligence within the prison as  
 9 well as a national tactical response.  
 10 Turning then to the management of TACT offenders.  
 11 Where an offender arrives in prison they obtain the  
 12 details of the previous convictions from the Police  
 13 National Computer and the offender supervisor then  
 14 carries out a slow, detailed assessment that feeds into  
 15 the OASys system and also the Mercury system. The  
 16 police may also provide further specific intelligence to  
 17 supplement the Mercury records, and they would have  
 18 access to do so to both the NOMIS and the OASys.  
 19 The CT department reviews files that contain  
 20 information relating to security and intelligence.  
 21 While the offender is in prison, CT staff maintain  
 22 contact with the offender supervisor and the wing staff,  
 23 discussing the offender at Pathfinder meetings.  
 24 The counter-terrorism prison intelligence officers  
 25 are police officers with a counter-terrorism background.

1 They act as a liaison between the prisons, the police,  
 2 counter-terrorism policing, and other law enforcement  
 3 agencies, gathering and sharing intelligence that could  
 4 be used in investigations. This, he explained, goes to  
 5 the Pursue part of the Contest strategy.  
 6 He explained the system of Incentives and Earned  
 7 Privileges, IEP, and the four levels: basic, entry,  
 8 standard and then enhanced, and the levels of IEP  
 9 determined things such as access to television, own  
 10 clothes and cash, and that the reviews of those levels  
 11 are documented.  
 12 There are Prison Service Instructions, PSIs, that  
 13 cover things such as prison visits, communications, and  
 14 their interception, and the management of extremist  
 15 communication. For TACT offenders, visitors are cleared  
 16 by the police to make sure there are no concerns.  
 17 Prisoners all have a set of permitted phone numbers that  
 18 they can access using their PIN phones, and he explained  
 19 that for category A prisoners, there are particular  
 20 procedures for the approval of phone numbers and  
 21 visitors which require governor approval. For all TACT  
 22 offenders and category A high risk offenders all of the  
 23 correspondence is read.  
 24 Adult male prisoners are divided into the four  
 25 categories, A to D, depending on the level of danger.

1 Mr Vince decides who is made category A, and for TACT  
 2 offenders he explained it is mandatory for them to be  
 3 referred to the Category A Team but not necessarily to  
 4 be categorised as such. The decision on category A is  
 5 based on risk to the public and then a decision is made  
 6 based on escape risk: standard, high and exceptional.  
 7 High includes the presence of one or more factors,  
 8 suggesting the prisoner may pose a raised escape risk  
 9 due to access to finances, their position within  
 10 an organised crime group, links to a terrorist network,  
 11 or the length of their sentence.  
 12 He told us that on 19 December there were some 945  
 13 category A prisoners, and 70 of those were deemed high  
 14 risk. On 14 April 2021, there were just over 1,000  
 15 category A prisoners, of which 65 were deemed high risk.  
 16 Overall, there were about 78,000 prisoners in the estate  
 17 in April 2021.  
 18 Mr Vince said it was very unusual for a cat A high  
 19 risk prisoner to be released as the normal position was  
 20 that they would gradually move down from cat A to cat D.  
 21 In 2018, there were 27 category A releases, 15 were  
 22 conditional or parole releases, 5 where defendants were  
 23 not found guilty, some were extraditions and one had  
 24 been granted bail. Khan was the only high risk category  
 25 A prisoner released.

1 On release, if someone is still at category A then  
 2 they've shown no measurable significant reduction in the  
 3 risk from the point when they were made into category A.  
 4 Category A status reflects the type of prison someone  
 5 will be in. They will not share a cell and there will  
 6 be rules around their visits and their correspondence.  
 7 The high risk status will affect how closely someone is  
 8 monitored, including whether they need to carry a book  
 9 that monitored their movements within the prison.

10 He explained that an adjudication is the result of  
 11 a formal procedure in which an adjudicator determines  
 12 beyond reasonable doubt there has been a breach of the  
 13 prison rules. That may lead to a loss of privileges,  
 14 deductions from earnings, and in extreme cases, the  
 15 adjudicator can add days to a sentence. Infractions  
 16 amounting to criminal offences may well be reported to  
 17 the police.

18 The managing challenging behaviours strategy, MCBS,  
 19 is a framework for managing dangerous, disruptive, or  
 20 difficult prisoners. HMP Woodhill and HMP Manchester  
 21 both had small units where MCBS prisoners could be held.  
 22 Khan was both locally and centrally managed by MCBS.  
 23 The local team feed decisions to the central team who  
 24 take over when there is a greater level of concern.

25 Mr Vince said he was aware of the Learning Together

1 programme, and understood that prisoners could apply if  
 2 they had appropriate risk rating following a risk  
 3 assessment. He was aware of its aims and that it was  
 4 introduced through HMP Grendon initially, then HMP  
 5 Whitemoor, and finally to HMP Warren Hill.  
 6 Learning Together had been commended in a report by Dame  
 7 Sally Coates on prison education in 2016, and the  
 8 subject of an Innovation Grant from the Prison Service  
 9 in December 2018 of just over £200,000. There was no  
 10 formal assessment by the Prison Service at national  
 11 level of the Learning Together programme outside the  
 12 framework of that grant process.

13 Mr Vince explained that he would visit prisons under  
 14 his responsibility three times a year, and he observed  
 15 a Learning Together workshop at Whitemoor on such  
 16 a visit, so as to see the physical layout and to meet  
 17 the prisoner participants. He had not seen any  
 18 evaluations regarding Learning Together. He accepted  
 19 there were concerns about the programme being rolled out  
 20 without evaluations, but thought the introduction of  
 21 Learning Together was appropriate for the population as  
 22 evidence showed that activities such as education could  
 23 be beneficial, and he understood the absence of  
 24 research.

25 Since 2017, JEXU has carried out a number of

1 actions, including developing specialist staff on  
 2 counter-terrorism at prisons and extending  
 3 counter-terrorism training. Since the attack, he  
 4 explained, the government has introduced legislation to  
 5 end automatic release for all convicted of TACT  
 6 offences, and so now someone in Khan's position, unless  
 7 there are exceptional circumstances, would need to  
 8 satisfy a Parole Board in order for them to be released,  
 9 but Mr Vince said he did not think Khan would have  
 10 succeeded in satisfying a Parole Board as to his  
 11 release.

12 The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021  
 13 ensures TACT offenders serve their whole term and so  
 14 Khan would have had a longer determinate sentence. The  
 15 Police, Crime and Sentencing Bill provides a new power  
 16 for the Secretary of State for Justice to prevent the  
 17 early release of other offenders posing a danger to the  
 18 public. There has also been, he said, a certain  
 19 increased investment in counter-terrorism capacity  
 20 within the Prison Service. In 2021, they received  
 21 £12 million to fund a step change in how they address  
 22 counter-terrorism, and for 2021, 2022, it is 30 million,  
 23 and also he said £100 million had been earmarked for  
 24 security improvements, which supports the work they do  
 25 on counter-terrorism.

1 Turning next to the Prevent Team, starting with  
 2 PS Forsyth. He has been a Prevent officer since 2010.  
 3 Between 2015 and 2019, he was based at the police  
 4 headquarters within the Special Branch area. Until late  
 5 2018, his team were managed by officers from  
 6 Staffordshire Police Special Branch. DI Nicholas Powell  
 7 was head of the Special Branch, and his successor,  
 8 DI Hessel. He explained that the offices were just  
 9 across the corridor and the two teams would liaise  
 10 daily. In late 2018, his team line management changed  
 11 to the Neighbourhood Policing Directorate, but they did  
 12 not move offices and still liaised with Special Branch  
 13 on a daily basis, including meetings each morning. He  
 14 knew of DS Stephenson.

15 West Midlands CTU had some responsibilities in  
 16 Staffordshire and he came to know Team 7 and  
 17 DS Marc Jerromes. The Prevent regional headquarters is  
 18 based at the Counter-Terrorism Unit and so there was  
 19 regular contact. He attended training and some meetings  
 20 were there, but his primary source for counter-terrorism  
 21 intelligence was from Staffordshire Special Branch.

22 The first TACT offender managed in Staffordshire was  
 23 Khan's co-defendant, Mohibur Rahman, in 2015. His team  
 24 were made responsible for monitoring Rahman's compliance  
 25 with his part 4 notification requirements. They made

1 periodic visits and reported concerns to Special Branch.  
2 He explained being daunted at first, comparing the  
3 structure in place in the West Midlands area to his team  
4 of just four. He was tasked with formalising the  
5 process and with producing a policy, which he did  
6 in July 2015, essentially adapting the policy from  
7 West Midlands. It was submitted to the Head of Special  
8 Branch for approval, but he got no response.

9 Whilst managing Rahman, he raised a concern that  
10 there was no risk assessor training to support the  
11 management of part 4 offenders, unlike the position with  
12 violent or sex offenders. No training was introduced  
13 but he did not later pursue it. He explained that he  
14 knew of Khan before 2018 and had played a small part in  
15 gathering intelligence and evidence for his trial, so  
16 was aware of Khan's offending and his conviction.

17 On 4 July 2017, he was informed that his team would  
18 be managing Khan on his ultimate release  
19 in December 2018. He didn't raise any concerns then  
20 about training at that stage, but expressed concerns to  
21 DI Powell about his team's capacity to perform his role  
22 robustly alongside their existing Prevent functions.

23 He attended his first MAPPA meeting relating to Khan  
24 in June 2018. He didn't think he had received anything  
25 beforehand because the minutes were put on ViSOR to

25

1 which he had limited access. He cannot recall receiving  
2 a MAPPA F form or an ERG before that. He was not  
3 previously aware that Khan had been disruptive in prison  
4 and that he remained a figure of considerable concern or  
5 of the prison intelligence that Khan was a radicalising  
6 influence.

7 He recalled a conversation about apparent good  
8 behaviour and Khan's potentially deceptive compliance.  
9 Risk factors from the ERG were set out and Mr Skelton  
10 gave a report. He knew Khan was assessed as being very  
11 high risk, but said he was unfamiliar with the OASys.  
12 He was then tasked with obtaining an update on Khan's  
13 co-defendants, which he thinks Special Branch produced  
14 for him.

15 He knew Khan was under investigation by MI5 but not  
16 that MI5 re-opened a priority investigation into Khan  
17 in August 2018. He understood MI5 to have contact with  
18 Special Branch and West Midlands CTU, but couldn't  
19 recall any direct contact between himself and MI5. He  
20 cannot recall progressing Khan's case between then and  
21 the MAPPA meeting on 15 August, at which he recalled  
22 discussing the security update from the prison, and  
23 DI Powell's update on Khan's co-defendants.

24 He attended a third MAPPA meeting on  
25 11 October 2018. By that point, he had the impression

26

1 that Khan was a problematic individual in prison. He  
2 recalled Mr Skelton's report on the positive impact on  
3 Khan's involvement with Learning Together. He and  
4 Mr Skelton visited Khan at Whitemoor on  
5 28 November 2018, and he served upon him the part 4  
6 notice. Khan told them that he had changed a lot over  
7 the last 18 months and had broken ties with his former  
8 associates. He said that he expected Khan to be  
9 confrontational, but he seemed open, keen to talk, and  
10 accepting of the notice.

11 On 30 November he prepared a risk assessment matrix  
12 based on the document he inherited from the West  
13 Midlands Police in 2015. Under the engagement factors,  
14 he scored Khan very highly. Based on Khan's background,  
15 he scored him highly on intent and on capability  
16 indicators, and he noted this:

17 "The above assessment is based on historic  
18 information that led to the conviction of Khan along  
19 with his attitudes whilst in custody. It is accepted  
20 that he seems to have made a change in his outlook and  
21 attitude, but this is as yet untested outside of  
22 a custodial setting. This assessment will be revisited  
23 after three months has elapsed and will be based on more  
24 up-to-date information."

25 He agreed that this assessment suggested a person of

27

1 real concern who needed watching carefully. He usually  
2 had first sight of the minutes from a previous MAPPA  
3 meeting when he attended the next meeting. He explained  
4 that he had received some MAPPA F forms but didn't  
5 recall them containing any information. He thought they  
6 were for agencies to provide updates in advance. He did  
7 not recall seeing prison security information on the F  
8 forms, but that was discussed at the meetings.

9 By 5 December 2018 MAPPA meeting, he had seen the  
10 ERG prepared by Ms Cechaviciute. He didn't read it in  
11 detail as it largely didn't relate to his role in  
12 securing compliance with the part 4 requirements. He  
13 was aware through MAPPA and his offending that Khan was  
14 someone who could be unreliable and should be watched  
15 carefully for his honesty. The minutes of the meeting  
16 noted that Khan had been generally of good behaviour in  
17 prison over recent times, but he recalled the comment  
18 about Khan potentially returning to his old ways upon  
19 release. This was particularly significant for his  
20 part 4 monitoring. The intelligence was noted to be low  
21 grade, he thought because it was unclear where it came  
22 from, or because it was untested and not from a reliable  
23 individual. No one suggested that it was likely to be  
24 wrong or dishonest. He thought someone was tasked with  
25 testing its veracity, but he heard no more about it.

28

1 On 7 December 2018, he emailed DS Stephenson and  
 2 DI Hessel of the Special Branch, explaining the  
 3 restrictions on Khan's ability to travel. His  
 4 understanding was that he would update Special Branch  
 5 after every meeting with Khan, noting behavioural  
 6 changes, conversations, and any concerns. Prevent were  
 7 to give a full picture so that others could assess what  
 8 was important. He put the reports on ViSOR and used the  
 9 daily meetings to raise concerns. He did not liaise  
 10 much with Team 7 of the West Midlands, but he knew that  
 11 DCI Ryan Chambers was the SIO. Updates were sent to  
 12 Special Branch for them to circulate if necessary.

13 On 24 December 2018, he and PC Ian Oakley collected  
 14 Khan from HMP Woodhill and escorted him to the approved  
 15 premises. He said that Khan was engaged and talkative,  
 16 accepted responsibility for the decisions that put him  
 17 in prison, and seemed genuinely grateful for the  
 18 assistance from the police. After release, his team met  
 19 Khan weekly, then every two weeks. On 7 January, he  
 20 went with PC Oakley. Khan was happy and engaging and  
 21 raised issues about his mobile telephone having some  
 22 internet access and about the deletion of messages.  
 23 Khan didn't want anyone thinking he was breaching his  
 24 requirements. The Prevent Team met Khan again on 14 and  
 25 21 January.

29

1 At a MAPPa meeting on 23 January, he updated the  
 2 panel. His reports went on ViSOR and a lot of the  
 3 contents were emailed to Special Branch who didn't have  
 4 access to ViSOR. He understood that Special Branch were  
 5 the conduit to the Counter-Terrorism Unit and it was for  
 6 them to disseminate the information as they saw fit.

7 At visits on 30 January and 13 February, Khan seemed  
 8 genuinely pleased to see them. He spoke of undergoing  
 9 a transformation in prison. On 13 February, he'd  
 10 emailed DI Hessel about the possibility of Khan  
 11 attending an event in Cambridge, run by Cambridge  
 12 University, which Mr Skelton had told him about. The  
 13 visit was vetoed, but Khan produced a video which  
 14 PS Forsyth saw and which he passed on to Special Branch.  
 15 He thought it was an uncomfortable watch, but it rang no  
 16 alarm bells and he didn't know that Khan's comments  
 17 about being in segregation were untrue.

18 On 7 March, he and PC Craig Hemmings discussed  
 19 Khan's attendance at a gym with its owner. Khan had  
 20 self-disclosed his conviction to the owner and he  
 21 thought his honesty was positive.

22 At a MAPPa meeting on the same day, Mr Skelton  
 23 reported Khan's continued good behaviour. Mr Skelton  
 24 said the visit to Cambridge was too soon, but that  
 25 probation might look to enable Khan to attend events in

30

1 future with measures in place. PS Forsyth said he  
 2 recalled discussing this with Mr Skelton who would  
 3 sometimes call him and ask him for his thoughts. He  
 4 thought he agreed with Mr Skelton because it was  
 5 overnight, it was logistically complicated, and having  
 6 Khan make his own way to Cambridge may well set him up  
 7 to breach his licence, deliberately or inadvertently,  
 8 which would not be fair.

9 He thought it was for Mr Skelton or probation or  
 10 MAPPa to say a yes or a no. The possible danger of  
 11 Khan, a recently released terrorist offender, with  
 12 a high risk rating attending the event was not, he said,  
 13 at the forefront of his mind. That was for MAPPa and  
 14 for probation to decide. He didn't think that the risk  
 15 assessment sat with him, and he expected that input to  
 16 come from probation, Staffordshire Special Branch, and  
 17 the West Midlands officers.

18 At a visit on 13 March, Khan was in a good mood and  
 19 happy about the lunchtime signing on condition being  
 20 removed. Khan repeated his assertion that he had no  
 21 intention of returning to his old ways and spoke about  
 22 becoming a de-radicalisation mentor. He didn't  
 23 challenge Khan on that, but at the time he thought that  
 24 was rather too soon.

25 The assertion that he had changed was one Khan made

31

1 on a regular basis. He was sceptical but didn't think  
 2 his role was to assess the veracity of what Khan said,  
 3 he simply was to report it back. If there was  
 4 a discrepancy, then he thought someone else would pick  
 5 up on it.

6 He saw the mentor reports and noted the flash of  
 7 anger that had been mentioned, but Khan never showed  
 8 that anger towards him. He was not particularly  
 9 concerned that Khan behaved differently to the mentors  
 10 than he did to him.

11 On 11 April 2019, DS Stephenson emailed to ask about  
 12 a potential trip to Whitemoor. In responding,  
 13 PS Forsyth noted that Khan maintained a positive  
 14 outlook, was consistent in his attitude, and was very  
 15 much a different person.

16 At a MAPPa meeting on 17 April, Mr Skelton noted the  
 17 incident of aggressive behaviour towards the mentor and  
 18 said Khan now did wish to attend the Whitemoor event.  
 19 They discussed the logistics and he agreed to provide  
 20 an escort. He couldn't recall anyone discussing risk or  
 21 raising concerns about Khan potentially seeing old  
 22 contacts or extremists again.

23 Later in April, Khan's curfew was put back due to  
 24 his good progress, that was Mr Skelton's decision, but  
 25 he was not informed about it beforehand.

32

1 At a visit on 26 April, Khan was happy with the  
 2 curfew extension and with his new theological mentor.  
 3 They discussed a marriage in Pakistan that Khan's family  
 4 appeared to be arranging. At a visit on 10 May, Khan  
 5 was looking forward, he said, to the Whitemoor trip. It  
 6 was clearly important to him. On 15 May Khan said the  
 7 marriage had not progressed and raised a concern about  
 8 being deported and seemed relieved when reassured that  
 9 this would not happen. Khan also asked about how long  
 10 he would have to wear the tag and mentioned the  
 11 possibility of raising a legal challenge. PS Forsyth  
 12 said he didn't think that Khan was frustrated; it was  
 13 more like he was organising things in his mind.

14 At a visit on 29 May 2019, they spoke about  
 15 arrangements for the Whitemoor visit. At a MAPP  
 16 meeting the next day, PS Forsyth noted that Khan  
 17 presented like a teenager and wanted everything done for  
 18 him. He meant that Khan talked about doing things but  
 19 lacked the motivation to act. He reported that Khan was  
 20 not driven, needed to mature, and didn't have a social  
 21 network which he felt would make him vulnerable when  
 22 leaving the approved premises. He expressed concern  
 23 that Khan's bubble could burst without employment, or if  
 24 his connection to Learning Together ended. He didn't  
 25 see a specific risk, but was simply flagging it for

1 future concern.

2 On 12 June, he recorded Khan's trip to Whitemoor.  
 3 On the way, Khan was quieter, which he put down to  
 4 apprehension. Afterwards, Khan was excited and appeared  
 5 to have got a lot out of it. On 28 June, PC Oakley  
 6 spoke to Khan by phone and Khan said he had passed the  
 7 CSCS course and that he was hoping to take a dumper  
 8 truck course which he thought would give him good  
 9 prospects and a good wage. On 2 July 2019 he had  
 10 checked Khan's phone as Khan had said the message box  
 11 was full and he wasn't able to delete messages; there  
 12 was nothing he saw of concern. They discussed his lack  
 13 of friends locally, but Khan said he was happy in his  
 14 own company, and supported by his family and  
 15 Learning Together. He was not himself concerned about  
 16 Khan's isolation, but wanted to highlight to Khan that  
 17 he needed to think about sources of support.

18 On 3 July, a JTAC report noting the use of vehicles  
 19 as weapons was sent to him by DS Stephenson to assist in  
 20 the decision on the dumper truck course. He responded,  
 21 noting that Khan's conviction did not involve the use of  
 22 vehicles and said that Khan had a driving licence.  
 23 DS Stephenson took a different stance as to risk to him,  
 24 they had access to more information, but he didn't think  
 25 himself that he was being incautious. It was not his

1 decision to make, but he wanted to keep Khan occupied  
 2 and moving forward. He did not think it was his role or  
 3 responsibility to express views about a terrorist risk  
 4 and was clear that MAPP and probation would make the  
 5 decision.

6 He accepted it would be quite a serious problem if  
 7 nobody in the MAPP meetings thought it their  
 8 responsibility to address matters of a terrorist risk.  
 9 The matter was discussed at a MAPP meeting on 11 July,  
 10 and he expressed his view as above. He gave also  
 11 an update, saying Khan was a solitary person who  
 12 appeared happy in his own company. After a visit with  
 13 Khan on 15 August, he noted a lack of progress in  
 14 obtaining accommodation, but Khan seemed positive but  
 15 also still not active in seeking employment.

16 On 20 August, Mr Skelton forwarded on to him  
 17 an email from Dr Ludlow about some courses and the event  
 18 on 29 November. This is when he first learned that Khan  
 19 would be invited. He and Mr Skelton discussed this. He  
 20 had no particular objections, but thought it was  
 21 ultimately for probation and for MAPP to decide.  
 22 Khan's mentoring was also stopping at about this point.  
 23 He saw that as a concern for probation, and  
 24 an information gap, but didn't think it impacted on the  
 25 part 4 issues, and so not of a particular concern to

1 him, but he did know it meant that Khan no longer had  
 2 supervised access to the internet.

3 At the MAPP meeting on 22 August, the November  
 4 event was raised, but he could not recall discussing  
 5 risk. He knew that Khan needed permission from  
 6 Mr Skelton, but did not recall a discussion about  
 7 whether permission should be given. As far as he  
 8 recalled, nobody objected to the event. He said this:  
 9 "My assumption is that the lack of objection would  
 10 have been taken as permission."

11 He accepted it was possible to draw the conclusion  
 12 that the MAPP participants seemed to have a collective  
 13 blind spot to the risk posed by that event.

14 On 30 August 2019 at his final visit with Khan, Khan  
 15 asked why the dumper truck training had been refused,  
 16 and he said the decision had been made by MAPP, who  
 17 needed to see progression in this type of employment  
 18 before they would allow the training. Khan, he said,  
 19 accepted the decision. He did not then personally see  
 20 Khan over the coming months, but that was not a concern  
 21 to him, as members of his team carried out the  
 22 subsequent visits.

23 At a MAPP meeting on 3 October, there was no  
 24 reference to the November event in the minutes, and he  
 25 could not recall any discussion of it. He thought he

1 would have discussed the event with Mr Skelton but could  
 2 not recall doing so. He would have notified Special  
 3 Branch, but didn't recall discussing risk with them. He  
 4 gave a report about wanting to see Khan more  
 5 productively occupied. This did not, he said, ring any  
 6 alarm bells: he simply wanted to see some progress.  
 7 By the end of October 2019 he knew that Khan was  
 8 unlikely to have a new practical mentor, but he thought  
 9 he still had a theological mentor, though he didn't get  
 10 reports from him.  
 11 On 31 October, PCs Oakley and Hemmings visited Khan  
 12 at his flat and he read the ViSOR entry for that visit  
 13 afterwards. Khan had seemed happy to see them but had  
 14 the curtains drawn and was spending a lot of time on his  
 15 Xbox. Without a mentor he couldn't use the internet and  
 16 was struggling to look for work. He knew that social  
 17 isolation and not finding work were risk factors for  
 18 Khan re-engaging with extremism, but his isolation had  
 19 been consistent, he said. He saw their role as feeding  
 20 this information in. It was for others to consider the  
 21 risks.  
 22 On 1 November, Mr Skelton emailed to say someone  
 23 would likely be able to meet Khan at Euston for the  
 24 event and asked about PS Forsyth's team accompanying him  
 25 on the train. He understood this in the context of Khan

1 being apprehensive about going to London rather than in  
 2 relation to risk. On 4 November, he said it couldn't be  
 3 justified because of resources. If DS Stephenson,  
 4 DS Jerromes or the MAPPA chair had needed Khan to be  
 5 accompanied to make sure nothing terrible happened then  
 6 he would have asked Special Branch. He said that part 4  
 7 management didn't give him any legal powers, but  
 8 accepted if Khan was in their company and was behaving  
 9 suspiciously, he had other policing powers that would  
 10 mean he could intervene.  
 11 On 6 November DS Stephenson emailed him to discuss  
 12 increasing the frequency of the visits in the light of  
 13 Khan isolating and no longer seeking employment. He  
 14 passed on Mr Skelton's recent positive visit report, and  
 15 said he didn't think Khan had isolated himself or given  
 16 up on seeking work. He did not think the part 4 visit  
 17 frequency needed to be increased at that time.  
 18 He saw the forthcoming visit to London as positive  
 19 and attached no particular risk to it. The same day, he  
 20 updated the risk matrix. He assessed no risks of  
 21 engagements against all the factors except vulnerability  
 22 to the ideologies of others and no indicators of intent  
 23 to engage in harmful activity. Capability, he said,  
 24 remained moderate. This was completed, this assessment,  
 25 11 months after Khan's release. He had intended to do

1 it after three months but had overlooked it. He  
 2 recorded little to no adverse reporting and good  
 3 engagement with Prevent. He identified Khan's lack of  
 4 employment as a factor which kept him vulnerable or  
 5 susceptible to extreme viewpoints. He accepted that  
 6 this was a dramatic change from his assessment of Khan  
 7 11 months previously, but had said it was based on  
 8 regular contact and consistent reports from partners.  
 9 He accepted to a degree that he relied too much on  
 10 Khan's presentation, but said this was not an overall  
 11 risk assessment, only a tool to set the level or  
 12 frequency of visits.  
 13 At the MAPPA meeting on 14 November 2019, he noted  
 14 that Khan was happy in his own company and his isolation  
 15 was not a change from what was expected. The  
 16 travel logistics for the London event were discussed.  
 17 That day, his team visited Khan to photograph his Xbox  
 18 games. Khan was unhappy about this and asked them to  
 19 leave afterwards. He said this was the first negative  
 20 response on any visit. He read their report and it  
 21 would have gone on to ViSOR and been emailed to Special  
 22 Branch. He also had telephoned Khan about it.  
 23 At this stage, he didn't think that Khan represented  
 24 any real risk of causing harm to the public, saying:  
 25 "You can never say never, and you can never

1 completely rule out anyone who is convicted of any  
 2 offence in that respect. Did I think that his behaviour  
 3 at that time made him an increased risk to what it was  
 4 a week or two before? No, I didn't, I didn't at that  
 5 time, no."  
 6 On 29 November he received an email saying Khan had  
 7 arrived safely. When he heard about an incident  
 8 unfolding later, he did not connect the two. He had not  
 9 previously Googled Fishmongers' Hall because it didn't  
 10 impact on the part 4 management and had overlooked its  
 11 location on London Bridge. If he had been solely  
 12 responsible for Khan's overall risk, then he would have  
 13 looked up the venue and also to see who was attending.  
 14 When Mr Skelton told him what had happened, he was  
 15 shocked and disbelieving.  
 16 In response to Mr Pitchers, the witness said that  
 17 although his primary responsibility was for part 4  
 18 compliance, he accepted that he was involved in the  
 19 offender management in a general sense. It was a team  
 20 effort with Mr Skelton.  
 21 When asked by Mr Armstrong, PS Forsyth accepted that  
 22 Khan was an extraordinarily dangerous man and that the  
 23 Prevent Team did not have backgrounds in offender  
 24 management. He knew the ERG gave isolation as a warning  
 25 sign, but was not aware that the prison intelligence

1 suggested that Khan was not a solitary individual .  
 2 Responding to questions asked by Ms Leek, he said  
 3 that he thought he had a good working relationship with  
 4 other MAPPA authorities and that all agencies recognised  
 5 that Learning Together was an important protective  
 6 factor for Khan. MAPPA decisions were not irrevocable  
 7 and could be revisited . Over nearly 12 months, Khan's  
 8 compliance with his licence conditions had been tested  
 9 in the community.  
 10 Turning to the other members of the team,  
 11 PC Hemmings had joined the Staffordshire Police in 2002  
 12 and spent some 15 years in response policing, two in  
 13 neighbourhood policing, and had joined the Prevent Team  
 14 in January 2019. He had completed a week-long Prevent  
 15 foundation course, the most in-depth training that he  
 16 had taken, and a three-day CTU foundation course. He  
 17 had experience of interviewing people and making daily  
 18 risk assessments. He received no specific training for  
 19 managing TACT offenders subject to part 4 requirements.  
 20 It was explained to him it was part of the team's  
 21 role, which included regular meetings and discussing  
 22 their activities . They would fill in a log on the  
 23 intelligence network, the SPIN system that we heard  
 24 about, on ViSOR and email Special Branch of their  
 25 reports of what had happened. In addition, they would

1 discuss the offenders with Special Branch officers,  
 2 including both DI Hessel and DS Stephenson.  
 3 PC Hemmings was told they would be dealing with Khan  
 4 and he had been released after eight years. He recalled  
 5 being told Khan was progressing well and that there had  
 6 been no issues. He had done some of his own research  
 7 and discovered that he had been convicted of organising  
 8 terrorist training in Pakistan.  
 9 He was taken through a series of visits from January  
 10 to November, the last visit. His visits prior to  
 11 31 October 2019 appeared cordial and noted Khan being in  
 12 good spirits, talkative, and visiting his family and  
 13 going to the gym.  
 14 On 31 October, Khan was not as talkative. He noted  
 15 a large number of Xbox games and DVDs that he seemed to  
 16 use a lot. Khan had said that he had stopped going to  
 17 the mosque but gave no reason. He was going to the gym  
 18 less often and that looking for jobs was difficult  
 19 without a mentor, which he said he was going to raise  
 20 with his probation officers .  
 21 PC Hemmings discussed this with PS Forsyth and  
 22 Special Branch would have seen his report. To the team,  
 23 it seemed it would be a natural reaction to the change  
 24 of circumstances and there was only a slight concern  
 25 about his general well-being. On the last visit, he and

1 PC Oakley were tasked to take photographs of the games  
 2 and DVDs. Khan was initially happy to have them in the  
 3 flat . He spoke about the event and the issues around  
 4 internet access. Khan was unhappy about them taking the  
 5 photographs, and wanted PS Forsyth to call him.  
 6 He couldn't recall who it was who raised the issue  
 7 of them leaving first, but they left soon after taking  
 8 the photographs and the visit altogether was about  
 9 10 minutes. He understood why Khan was upset and it was  
 10 not the first time he had seen him upset. He would have  
 11 discussed this with PS Forsyth and the photographs that  
 12 they took sent on to Special Branch.  
 13 When asked by Mr Pitchers, PC Hemmings agreed that  
 14 when providing his witness statement he was clear that  
 15 Khan asked them to leave the flat. He had a memory that  
 16 the request for the photographs came from Special Branch  
 17 and recalled a conversation with PS Forsyth. He cannot  
 18 recall any particular conversation about the photographs  
 19 that day. He recalled saying he had no previous  
 20 experience of managing offenders and took him at face  
 21 value to avoid antagonising him.  
 22 He also explained that he didn't think Prevent  
 23 should be managing part 4s, and the West Midlands Team 7  
 24 were better trained for it. When asked further, he said  
 25 that understanding the role of Team 7, he thought

1 Prevent were more engaging than Team 7 would have been.  
 2 He acknowledged part 4 was important but felt they  
 3 should have had more support or training.  
 4 PC Oakley had training in Prevent strategy and CT  
 5 training, but nothing specific to part 4 offenders. He  
 6 had an idea of Khan's offences, but not all the details,  
 7 and was told by PS Forsyth that he held extreme views  
 8 and was uncompliant in prison. He met Khan on occasions  
 9 and again put his reports on SPIN, by email to  
 10 PS Forsyth, who would put them on ViSOR. In March 2019,  
 11 he put them on ViSOR himself.  
 12 Again, he was taken through a series of the visits,  
 13 aimed at checking Khan's compliance with part 4 and his  
 14 licence, building a rapport and getting to know him.  
 15 One of those visits was whilst escorting him to  
 16 Whitemoor on 12 June for the Learning Together event.  
 17 The purpose of the escort was for Khan's welfare, and to  
 18 deliver him to the prison so that he could go and then  
 19 bring him back. PC Oakley also attended the last visit  
 20 on 14 November, noting that he was initially happy, but  
 21 became disappointed when they took photographs of his  
 22 Xbox games. He raised concerns and asked if it was to  
 23 do with his licence or notifications which it was not,  
 24 and said he wanted to speak to PS Forsyth and his  
 25 lawyers. Khan, he said, asked them to leave after this,

1 which didn't surprise him. He noticed nothing else  
 2 striking about the flat other than it was dark and the  
 3 games were in a large box.  
 4 As to it being in darkness at 11.48, he said it  
 5 didn't strike him as unusual, but he did accept that  
 6 Khan might be closing himself in.  
 7 Victoria Barker, the fourth member of the Prevent  
 8 team, also completed some awareness training and a  
 9 course about training for the CT unit but again, no  
 10 specific training for managing TACT offenders in the  
 11 community. She thought her experience as an officer was  
 12 more applicable to the part 4 role than specific  
 13 training and was fine about it.  
 14 She was involved in a discussion about Prevent's  
 15 general role being at odds with managing TACT offenders,  
 16 but didn't find the management particularly difficult,  
 17 as it involved meetings, building a rapport, and then  
 18 reporting back.  
 19 She explained that she was concerned because there  
 20 was no guidance on managing TACT offenders, or the  
 21 objective, but understood that Khan had been assigned to  
 22 them.  
 23 She was part of those who worked on Mr Rahman. In  
 24 late 2018, she was told that Khan was a convicted TACT  
 25 offender being released into Stafford, and that they

1 would help with his part 4 management. PC Barker  
 2 expressed that she would have liked to have known more  
 3 about his offence. After meetings, she would write  
 4 an email report, send it to Special Branch and put it  
 5 onto SPIN. She also was taken through a series of the  
 6 visits. She saw Khan three days after his release, and  
 7 was shocked as he didn't quite fit the bill of  
 8 an extremist to her. He spoke about being betrayed by  
 9 his co-defendants.  
 10 On 23 January at another visit, he expressed  
 11 a desire to stay in Stafford, and keeping himself to  
 12 himself in the approved premises. PC Barker said that  
 13 she felt that he was a bit lost. She didn't see him  
 14 after 24 September, but spoke to him in November 2019  
 15 when he called asking to speak to PS Forsyth about going  
 16 to London and the possibility of somebody going with  
 17 him.  
 18 She later spoke to PS Forsyth and was told he was  
 19 panicking about getting the train by himself and being  
 20 in London for the event. She was aware of the event,  
 21 but didn't know when it would take place. As she  
 22 understood it, there was no requirement for him to be  
 23 escorted.  
 24 When asked by Mr Pitchers, PC Barker would not  
 25 disagree with DI Hessel's description of the difference

1 between Prevent and Special Branch or the neighbourhood  
 2 or community tags. She had spent most of her  
 3 18-and-a-half-year career working with PS Forsyth and  
 4 could have asked him questions about offenders. If she  
 5 had a lawful right to do so, she could have accessed the  
 6 Police National Computer, SPIN, or the NCIA with limits  
 7 to gain offender information.  
 8 PC Barker could recall attending one MAPPA meeting,  
 9 though not for Khan. She accepted that if she had  
 10 attended meetings, she may have gathered information on  
 11 Khan's background. She had been seconded to Special  
 12 Branch but didn't deal with part 4 and didn't know what  
 13 information was being sent to them.  
 14 I'm next going to turn, members of the jury, to  
 15 Witness A, an officer of MI5, but not personally  
 16 involved in the investigations into Khan prior to the  
 17 attack. She, you will recall, is someone who has worked  
 18 for MI5 for some 16 years in a variety of roles and is  
 19 currently the deputy director. From 2013 to 2015 she  
 20 was a senior manager in the counter-terrorism division.  
 21 She explained that the function of the Security  
 22 Service is the protection of national security,  
 23 including from terrorism. They employ tools including  
 24 surveillance, communications-interception,  
 25 equipment-interference and the use of agents, including

1 covert human intelligence sources. These powers will  
 2 only be used when absolutely necessary and in proportion  
 3 to the threat posed. A subject of interest, the SOI, is  
 4 someone or something investigated because they are  
 5 suspected of posing a threat to national security. Each  
 6 SOI has a record and a lead investigator responsible for  
 7 maintaining that record and reviewing and grading  
 8 further intelligence. SOIs are categorised into tiers,  
 9 tier 1 being the main target of an investigation, down  
 10 to tier 3, which might simply be their contacts. More  
 11 resources are likely to be dedicated to tier 1s and to  
 12 tier 3s. SOIs are closed when they no longer meet the  
 13 threshold for investigation because they are assessed to  
 14 be no longer engaged in activities of concern. Over the  
 15 course of 2019 there were around 3,000 SOIs under active  
 16 investigation and over 40,000 whose investigations had  
 17 been closed.  
 18 Incoming intelligence, she said, is triaged. A lead  
 19 is a piece of information which comes in which requires  
 20 further work in order to assess whether it is likely to  
 21 pose a threat. A trace is where information is checked  
 22 against existing records. Newly received intelligence  
 23 is usually traced first, then passed to the relevant  
 24 investigative team or a new investigation is opened.  
 25 Where new counter-terrorism intelligence and threat

1 reporting is received which is not linked to an existing  
 2 investigation it's managed through the intelligence  
 3 handling model, which is a joint model shared with  
 4 counter-terrorism policing. New information is assessed  
 5 by considering the risk to national security,  
 6 credibility, actionability and proportionality, and  
 7 a decision is made as to whether further work is  
 8 required.

9 At any time, MI5 has a number of active  
 10 investigations into individuals and groups linked to it,  
 11 or suspected of terrorist activity, categorised by  
 12 priority levels. Priority 1 is where there is  
 13 an actionable intelligence of attack-planning.  
 14 Priority 2 covers extremist activity linked to  
 15 attack-planning, such as travel overseas to undertake  
 16 fighting, or large-scale fundraising. Priority 3 is for  
 17 individuals or networks who require further work to  
 18 determine whether they pose a threat. Priority 4 is the  
 19 lowest category for individuals who have previously  
 20 posed a threat to national security and there is a risk  
 21 of re-engagement, for example, released terrorist  
 22 prisoners. These levels are reviewed regularly by  
 23 senior management and may change at any time. On  
 24 a weekly basis, the highest priority investigations are  
 25 identified in a meeting led by the head of

1 investigations.

2 Externally, MI5 provide a weekly briefing to the  
 3 Assistant Commissioner for Special Operations in the  
 4 Metropolitan Police, and each month hold meetings  
 5 between the Director of Counter-Terrorism at MI5, the  
 6 Secret Intelligence Service, and GCHQ to consider  
 7 strategic matters. In a priority investigation,  
 8 an Executive Liaison Group, an ELG, may be convened to  
 9 set out the strategy for an investigation that is likely  
 10 to result in disruptive action or prosecution. No ELG  
 11 was formed in relation to Khan.

12 In a priority investigation, there will often be  
 13 a joint operation team, JOT meetings, chaired by the  
 14 team leader of the MI5 operational team responsible for  
 15 the investigation and are typically attended by the SIO  
 16 and others involved in the investigation. There is  
 17 regular communication, typically on a daily basis, and  
 18 information-sharing between MI5 and counter-terrorist  
 19 police at every level. MI5 lead the joint investigation  
 20 and set the strategy, but work very closely with the  
 21 police. There are few constraints on information and  
 22 intelligence -sharing with the CT police.

23 Where an SOI in an open investigation is in prison,  
 24 MI5 generally received a regular stream of intelligence,  
 25 but she cannot confirm what form it takes. On release,

1 MI5 do not have direct contact with the Probation  
 2 Service, or in the case of those managed under part 4,  
 3 the officers managing this. All such contact is through  
 4 the counter-terrorism police. It's not a total barrier,  
 5 but this avoids bringing those who deal directly with  
 6 an offender too close to a covert investigation, and  
 7 prevents inadvertent disclosure.

8 When questioned by Mr Beer, she agreed that  
 9 sensitive information could, if necessary, be shared  
 10 with probation or the Prevent Team if it were sanitised,  
 11 so this firewall is not an impermeable barrier. MI5 do  
 12 not play any formal role in MAPPAs or share information  
 13 directly. If there is information to be shared, they  
 14 share it through the counter-terrorism police. In  
 15 Khan's case, MI5 officers attended some MAPPAs meetings,  
 16 but she could not confirm which ones. She is aware that  
 17 the serious case review of MAPPAs in Khan's case  
 18 expressed concerns about there being two parallel  
 19 processes in managing Khan: the JOT process and the  
 20 MAPPAs process. In her view, the processes are quite  
 21 different. The JOT process is to manage a covert  
 22 investigation into whether someone is likely to engage  
 23 in terrorist-related activities, whereas MAPPAs is about  
 24 managing an overt offender in the community.

25 There needs to be a point where these two come

1 together, and in 2018 to 2019, that role was played by  
 2 the counter-terrorism police who bridged the overt and  
 3 covert worlds. When MI5 officers attended MAPPAs  
 4 meetings, they were there to listen, not contribute.  
 5 However, if MI5 possessed intelligence of concern in  
 6 relation to a MAPPAs decision, they would feed it to the  
 7 counter-terrorism police to pass to MAPPAs.

8 At the time of the attack, the national threat level  
 9 was substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong  
 10 possibility. Prior to early November 2019, it had  
 11 largely been at the severe level, meaning an attack is  
 12 highly likely. The UK, she explained, faces a diverse  
 13 range of terrorist threats, including Islamist  
 14 terrorism. The current most likely form of Islamist  
 15 terrorism is a low-sophistication attack carried out at  
 16 short notice, most likely by lone actors.

17 At the time of the attack, MI5 were running around  
 18 600 investigations linked to Islamist terrorism and  
 19 around 3,000 active SOIs in that area, and as  
 20 I mentioned before, some 40,000 closed SOIs. She  
 21 believes that the scale of investigative work has  
 22 significantly increased over the course of her career.  
 23 The director general, Mr McCallum, has noted an increase  
 24 in terrorists adopting basic attack methods requiring  
 25 little preparation, leaving fewer clues and giving less

1 time to find them. She said this was very much at the  
 2 heart of their work. Copycat attacks, for example, by  
 3 location are possible, but given the small number of  
 4 successful attacks, establishing a pattern is difficult.  
 5 Attacking iconic sites may have greater resonance, but  
 6 they also tend to be the most protected. She said there  
 7 needed to be a range of personal motivations which  
 8 inform the targets chosen.

9 Khan first came to MI5's attention in 2008. He was  
 10 assessed as being a member of ALM, which was banned in  
 11 2006. Their leadership declared allegiance to IS in  
 12 2014 and they have been linked to serious terrorist  
 13 plots and have hundreds of members. Membership of ALM  
 14 is considered indicative of an extremist mindset.

15 Khan was investigated in Operation Guava, which  
 16 focused on the network of mainly dual  
 17 British –Bangladeshi nationals with groups in Stoke and  
 18 Cardiff and London and revealed plots in 2010 to attack  
 19 the London Stock Exchange and other targets. Khan was  
 20 a member of the Stoke group, which was assessed as  
 21 intending to send members overseas to receive extremist  
 22 training and then potentially return to carry out  
 23 an attack.

24 A covert listening device identified Khan discussing  
 25 plans to attack a pub using an IED and discussing a pipe

1 bomb recipe. Khan was convicted of committing acts  
 2 preparatory to terrorism. MI5 assessed that Khan did  
 3 not have much access to finance at the time, but was  
 4 seeking ways to raise money to leave the country to set  
 5 up a terrorist training camp.

6 Whilst Khan was on remand in prison  
 7 from December 2010 to February 2012, MI5 opened  
 8 an investigation to support the prosecution, and in  
 9 early 2011, became aware of Khan engaging in violence in  
 10 prison.

11 MI5 knew that a search of his cell in 2011 revealed  
 12 documents by the extremist preached Anwar Al–Awlaki.  
 13 From the start of his time in prison MI5 assessed Khan  
 14 to be an influential figure within the extremist Islamic  
 15 inmate community who was preaching and potentially  
 16 radicalising others, and who maintained contact with his  
 17 co–defendants and extremists outside of prison.

18 In 2012, Khan was assigned his own  
 19 priority 4 investigation. MI5 assessed that he  
 20 maintained his profile in the prison inmate community,  
 21 continued to associate with extremists, and maintained  
 22 his desire to move to Pakistan. They were aware of  
 23 incidents including Khan possessing the address of  
 24 a senior member of the prison staff and performing a  
 25 demonstrating in which he read a poem which included the

1 words "Cut off the kuffar's head". This confirmed to  
 2 them that he maintained an extremist mindset and still  
 3 had a propensity towards violence. In November 2014,  
 4 MI5 became aware that Khan had broken up a radio so the  
 5 exposed wires could be used as a charger. It didn't  
 6 directly raise concerns that he retained an interest in  
 7 constructing a device, as they accepted the explanation  
 8 of its use as a charger at the time.

9 In March 2013, MI5 assessed that it was likely that  
 10 Khan would re–engage in terrorist activity including  
 11 fundraising and potentially attack–planning. MI5 became  
 12 aware that a search of his cell revealed chemicals which  
 13 could be used in an IED. There is no record of an MI5  
 14 assessment of that intelligence.

15 MI5 continued to assess Khan as holding an extremist  
 16 mindset and as a senior figure in the extremist Islamist  
 17 community in prison who may radicalise others.

18 In October 2014, MI5 became aware of Khan's potential  
 19 involvement in a plot by another inmate to kill a prison  
 20 psychologist, though his involvement was later ruled  
 21 out. In December 2014, their assessment was that he was  
 22 likely to re–engage in extremist activity, even while in  
 23 prison.

24 In February 2015, it was decided that the  
 25 investigation would be closed because, although

1 indications suggested that Khan maintained an extremist  
 2 mindset and a propensity to violence, there was no  
 3 intelligence to suggest that he was engaging in  
 4 activities of a national security concern. In her view,  
 5 the decision to close the investigation was appropriate  
 6 because they saw no activities of national security  
 7 concern. The investigation remained closed until  
 8 8 August 2018.

9 Between 2015 and 2018, they continued to receive  
 10 intelligence that Khan was still exercising influence  
 11 among Muslim extremists in prison, maintaining contact  
 12 with terrorist offenders, and that he wished to move to  
 13 Pakistan. In 2016, some reporting suggested that Khan  
 14 had become more extreme, but she said the picture  
 15 varied. The overriding view was that Khan remained of  
 16 an extremist mindset and an open investigation would be  
 17 necessary on release to manage his potential risk.

18 That investigation was re–opened in August, and  
 19 initially given a Priority 4 rating. Release was the  
 20 sole trigger for reopening it. In her view, the primary  
 21 concern was that he would be released from prison from  
 22 a very controlled environment to a far less controlled  
 23 one, and they needed to gain a better understanding to  
 24 manage the potential threat and Priority 4 was the  
 25 correct rating to achieve that.

1 Information received in November 2018 suggested that  
 2 Khan may return to his old ways on release, believed to  
 3 be terrorism-related, and may intend to conduct  
 4 an attack on release. These were two separate strands  
 5 of intelligence, both were uncorroborated and of unknown  
 6 validity, meaning it was unknown whether they could be  
 7 trusted. She did not accept that these two strands of  
 8 information in fact corroborated each other, saying:

9 "It was quite clear to us that they were quite  
 10 different pieces of information."

11 Both strands were shared with colleagues in CT  
 12 policing. The "old ways" information was received  
 13 twice, and so was assessed to be corroborated before the  
 14 duplication was recognised and may have been initially  
 15 described to colleagues in CT policing as corroborated,  
 16 hence DCI Ryan Chambers' comment to that effect.

17 All steps were taken to validate and corroborate  
 18 both pieces of information, but neither ultimately was.  
 19 She noted the context of the intelligence and that TACT  
 20 offenders were more likely to boast about aspirations  
 21 than how rehabilitated they are. However, they took the  
 22 information seriously and it was concerning.

23 On 22 November 2018, MI5 notified the West Midlands  
 24 Counter-Terrorism Unit and Staffordshire Special Branch  
 25 that the investigation had been re-opened and with

1 a Priority 4 designation, and provided the two strands  
 2 of intelligence above. She didn't accept that  
 3 DCI Chambers' note describing the intelligence as "low  
 4 credibility" was imprecise. She thought it entailed  
 5 something fairly similar, that is, you do not know if  
 6 you can trust it or not.  
 7 MI5 were not aware that MAPPAs described this  
 8 information as "low graded" until after the attack, but  
 9 she thought this assessment was along the same lines as  
 10 the MI5 assessment of it as "unknown validity". She  
 11 noted that the CT police at the MAPPAs meeting would have  
 12 been able to mitigate any propensity to mislead inherent  
 13 in that description, if the discussion suggested that  
 14 was a concern.

15 MI5 did not know that the intelligence that Khan  
 16 aspired to carry out an attack was not fed into the  
 17 MAPPAs process. She considered it for the  
 18 counter-terrorism police to determine what to share.  
 19 She thought that the discussion in the MAPPAs meeting  
 20 suggested a "fairly good understanding" of the potential  
 21 risk posed.

22 There were three teams involved in the  
 23 investigation: MI5 was the lead body, West Midlands CTU,  
 24 who had the senior investigating officer, DCI Chambers,  
 25 and Staffordshire Special Branch, who supported the

1 investigation. West Midlands CTU were the senior police  
 2 team. There was contact between all parties on a very  
 3 regular basis. At the JOT meeting on 28 November, MI5  
 4 identified the principal risk as being that Khan may  
 5 become involved in attack-planning on release, that he  
 6 might seek to re-engage in other extremist activity and,  
 7 finally, that he may attempt to abscond, although that  
 8 risk was considered relatively low.

9 On 6 December 2018, the designation was raised to  
 10 Priority 3 in response to the two strands of  
 11 intelligence. This designation enabled some further  
 12 monitoring. At a quarterly review meeting  
 13 in December 2018, it was noted that Khan's strict  
 14 licence conditions may make it more difficult to obtain  
 15 an appropriate level of coverage of his activities and  
 16 an initial period of enhanced surveillance was agreed.  
 17 At a JOT meeting on 19 December, a trigger plan  
 18 originating with the police was agreed. Immediately  
 19 prior to Khan's release, MI5 produced an internal note  
 20 summarising the key intelligence to assist over the  
 21 Christmas period, where different investigators may be  
 22 in at different times. She described the production of  
 23 this note as "routine" when asked if this indicated any  
 24 particular concern about the SIO.

25 On 24 December, Khan was released. MI5 were aware

1 that Khan's compliance was being monitored by the  
 2 Staffordshire Prevent Team and they knew the frequency  
 3 and the nature of their visits, but they did not have  
 4 direct contact with that Prevent Team. MI5 were aware  
 5 that Khan had informed the Prevent Team that he had  
 6 broken ties with his old associates, but they remained  
 7 sceptical and assessed him as being potentially trying  
 8 to influence his licence conditions. There is no record  
 9 to suggest this view was shared with other authorities  
 10 at the time, and she said this, in her view:

11 "It was fairly obvious in the risks that he may seek  
 12 to re-engage in activities of national security concern,  
 13 that in order to do so he would either have to be trying  
 14 to avoid scrutiny from the authorities or seeking to  
 15 hide his true intentions."

16 From the period of heightened surveillance  
 17 post-release, MI5 noted that Khan made a number of  
 18 purchases, including an Xbox. He appeared to be  
 19 complying with his licence conditions. There was no  
 20 intelligence to indicate that his compliance was  
 21 an attempt to avoid scrutiny, but that concern did recur  
 22 during 2018 and 2019 including on formal documents  
 23 assessing risk. In her view, it is typical of an MI5  
 24 investigation to remain very sceptical throughout.

25 When asked whether MI5 were satisfied that its

1 coverage provided a reasonably complete picture of  
 2 Khan's movements, communications and associates, she  
 3 said that the level of coverage was proportionate to the  
 4 threat posed.  
 5 Over this time, there was no intelligence to suggest  
 6 that Khan was involved in any activities of a national  
 7 security concern. They became aware that he took steps  
 8 towards obtaining a Pakistani passport and considered  
 9 how and when to renounce his British citizenship, but  
 10 saw no indication that he was planning to travel for  
 11 nefarious purposes.  
 12 On 12 March 2019, DS Stephenson sought MI5's views  
 13 on whether a Behavioural Science Unit, a BSU, assessment  
 14 to understand Khan's mindset would be useful. MI5, she  
 15 said, decided against this because they had conducted  
 16 a number of potential lone-actor assessments which would  
 17 have triggered a full BSU assessment if certain criteria  
 18 were met, which they were not. In response to  
 19 Mr Armstrong, she confirmed that MI5 did seek a BSU  
 20 assessment after the attack but not before. She could  
 21 not confirm the outcome, aside to say that the  
 22 post-attack review concluded that the assessment would  
 23 not have altered either the priority of the  
 24 investigation or its outcome.  
 25 DS Stephenson also provided a copy of the video Khan

1 made for the Cambridge Learning Together event, which  
 2 MI5 had viewed. They noted its contents contained  
 3 exaggerations but did not consider it to add or detract  
 4 from their assessment of him at that time.  
 5 MI5 became aware of the proposed trip to Whitemoor  
 6 in May 2019. At the quarterly review meeting in the  
 7 summer of 2019, Khan's continued compliance with his  
 8 licence conditions was recorded. MI5's scepticism about  
 9 his motivations remained, though there was still no  
 10 evidence that he was seeking to avoid scrutiny. She  
 11 cannot find a written record indicating that this  
 12 scepticism was shared with the police, but is fairly  
 13 sure it was discussed and absolutely sure that the CT  
 14 police would have passed the right information on to  
 15 those who needed to know.  
 16 She noted that the MAPPA minutes identified possible  
 17 manipulation as a risk. In response to Mr Pitchers she  
 18 did not accept that MI5's assessment should have been  
 19 communicated to the probation and Prevent Team because  
 20 it was an internal judgment with no intelligence to  
 21 support it. She said it isn't always helpful to share  
 22 general judgments.  
 23 MI5 were made aware of the discussion in July 2019  
 24 about Khan undertaking a dumper truck training course.  
 25 The police sought their input and MI5 did not consider

1 it appropriate due to the many terror incidents using  
 2 large vehicles as weapons. MI5 were aware that it was  
 3 subsequently vetoed. She could not say whether MI5 had  
 4 influenced that decision. She confirmed that MI5 would  
 5 have been concerned if the course had been permitted.  
 6 She confirmed that MI5 were aware of the updates,  
 7 noting Khan had been rather solitary, spending the  
 8 majority of the time in the gym or playing computer  
 9 games; that Khan had not re-engaged with his old friends  
 10 was, at the time, a reassurance in that they could  
 11 potentially be a bad influence on him.  
 12 MI5 were informed that when Khan moved into private  
 13 accommodation in September 2019, the quarterly review  
 14 in October noted that his greater level of freedom  
 15 potentially created additional risk. There was no  
 16 intelligence to suggest that he was engaging in  
 17 attack-planning, but his capabilities had not changed.  
 18 There was nothing to suggest that his intent had changed  
 19 but, 10 months on from his release, there had been  
 20 a prolonged period where he appeared to engage  
 21 positively with his rehabilitation. She is fairly sure  
 22 that the potential risk inherent in his move into  
 23 private accommodation would have been discussed with CT  
 24 police. MI5 do not routinely record telephone  
 25 conversations so she is unable to confirm that

1 DS Stephenson spoke with MI5 on 6 November about Khan's  
 2 isolation, but notes that similar views were raised at  
 3 the JOT in November 2019. She explained that Khan did  
 4 not have a very lively social circle at any point after  
 5 his release, so isolation was not a massive step-change.  
 6 She noted that he continued to see his family and  
 7 attended the gym until October.  
 8 She cannot confirm whether or not MI5 received  
 9 Mr Skelton's November 2019 ERG assessment rating Khan's  
 10 risk of re-offending as low, or PS Forsyth's assessment  
 11 rating him as a very low risk. When asked whether she  
 12 agreed with those assessments, she noted there had been  
 13 10 months of apparent rehabilitation and seemingly  
 14 nothing to raise national security concerns.  
 15 Nevertheless, she said, MI5 remained sceptical  
 16 throughout the whole period.  
 17 As regards the 14 November MAPPA meeting, she  
 18 confirmed that the panel's view that more investigation  
 19 was needed into what Khan was doing at home was  
 20 communicated to MI5 at the JOT on 18 November, and it  
 21 was agreed that the frequency of Prevent meetings would  
 22 be increased.  
 23 MI5 first became aware that Khan had been invited to  
 24 the Learning Together event in London in August. In  
 25 late October it was confirmed that he would attend, but

1 they did not receive confirmation of the location until  
2 22 November. MI5 did not question the location or the  
3 attendees in August or October. They were awaiting his  
4 attendance to be confirmed.

5 When asked why MI5 did not seek indirectly to  
6 contribute to MAPPA on this issue as they had with the  
7 dumper truck course, she said that there was no  
8 intelligence of concern to contribute. They were aware  
9 that Khan had a long-standing relationship with  
10 Learning Together and had no intelligence to indicate  
11 that this relationship was a concern. When asked  
12 whether the investigation team thought it part of their  
13 responsibility in protecting the public to know the  
14 location and the attendees, she responded that they did  
15 receive this information on 22 November, that it was not  
16 unusual to receive information relatively late on, or  
17 last-minute.

18 She said that MI5 were aware that the decision  
19 whether to permit Khan to attend would be taken through  
20 the MAPPA authorities, but that it was not for them to  
21 know what information MAPPA was in possession of. When  
22 asked whether part of the function of MI5 is to feed in  
23 their collective wisdom and experience as to the risk of  
24 a person with Khan's profile attending an event in  
25 central London, she said that there was no intelligence

1 to suggest that he should not be allowed to attend. She  
2 noted that preventing a person from doing something can  
3 have ramifications and thought that those managing him  
4 in the community would have had this in mind. When  
5 asked whether she thought that the visit posed a risk  
6 that ought to have been discussed at MAPPA, she said she  
7 thought MAPPA would discuss it, but she wasn't willing  
8 to quality assure MAPPA discussions, but said they had  
9 all the intelligence that MI5 had and that nothing was  
10 held back.

11 On 18 November 2019 a JOT meeting was convened to  
12 discuss potentially closing the investigation into Khan.  
13 At one point it was proposed that PS Forsyth might  
14 attend but, having sought clarification on this, she  
15 said they would always have wished to maintain the  
16 sterile corridor. The visit to London was viewed as  
17 a potential opportunity to seek enhanced coverage of  
18 Khan and get greater assurance before closing the  
19 investigation.

20 When asked whether it was also seen as a potential  
21 source of risk, she said that they had seen nothing to  
22 suggest that it was a potential source of risk. When  
23 questioned by Mr Pitchers, she confirmed that at this  
24 time, there was no knowledge of what security  
25 arrangements, if any, would be in place at the event, or

1 whether the local police forces had been notified.  
2 Attack-planning was not specifically identified as  
3 a risk, and to her knowledge, there was no discussion at  
4 this meeting of the potential risk of Khan attending the  
5 London event. As such, there was no discussion of  
6 methods of mitigating risk.

7 When asked if there should have been some  
8 consideration of risk, she accepted it would have been  
9 helpful, but said this:

10 "I think that at that time we were very much of the  
11 view that the decision around the trip and the risks  
12 around him making that trip were being discussed within  
13 the MAPPA construct. Through CT policing they had all  
14 the information that we had, to the best of our  
15 knowledge, and that we needed to focus on the covert  
16 investigation at that moment in time."

17 She confirmed that MI5 never reached the stage of  
18 deciding whether or not to close the investigation.  
19 They were hopeful that more coverage could be achieved  
20 but it didn't prove possible prior to Khan's death. She  
21 wasn't able to confirm why, save to say that it was not  
22 an issue of resourcing. The rationale for closure would  
23 be that they had not seen any activities of national  
24 security concern over 11 months and couldn't lawfully  
25 continue to investigate someone without just cause. In

1 her view it was appropriate to consider closure, and she  
2 didn't accept that this indicated that Khan's risk was  
3 not taken sufficiently seriously.

4 Had MI5 known that in the days before the attack,  
5 Khan had purchased items including a face mask, gaffer  
6 tape and possibly four kitchen knives, these purchases  
7 would have caused concern and an immediate liaison with  
8 the police to ascertain Khan's intentions and,  
9 potentially, move towards an action such as an arrest.

10 On 22 November 2019, MI5 were notified by email of  
11 the travel details for the trip and the location of the  
12 event. They did not take any further views on the risk  
13 in light of this information. There were no concerns  
14 about this trip, and indeed, his relationship with  
15 Learning Together had a positive aspect. She has seen  
16 nothing to suggest that additional protective measures  
17 such as an accompaniment or a bag search were discussed  
18 and thought that the team would regard these issues as  
19 being managed by probation. She declined to comment  
20 specifically on whether the fact that Khan was wearing  
21 a bulky coat which he kept on, or half on, all day would  
22 have caused concern to an experienced MI5 officer if he  
23 had been under surveillance. She thought it would have  
24 been a factor within a whole range of factors.

25 Following the attack, MI5 has reviewed its systems

1 for any information suggesting that Khan might have been  
 2 planning or preparing for an attack but has found  
 3 nothing, nor was there any suggestion that any other  
 4 person had been involved in or had knowledge of the  
 5 attack. ISIL later claimed responsibility for it, but  
 6 she confirmed that there was nothing to support this.

7 She confirmed that an investigation team received  
 8 and read a copy of Khan's play, "Drive North" in early  
 9 2019. It did not give them cause for concern insofar as  
 10 it did not particularly add or detract from the  
 11 intelligence picture at that time, which was that he  
 12 might potentially re-engage in terror-related  
 13 activities .

14 As regards the manner in which the attack was  
 15 carried out, she agreed that it was likely that Khan was  
 16 seeking to target members of the Learning Together team.  
 17 She confirmed that MI5 held no prior intelligence to  
 18 suggest that Khan harboured any hostility towards them.

19 As regards Khan's toxicology and the indication that  
 20 he had taken drugs, notably cocaine, in the weeks and  
 21 months before his death, she confirmed that MI5 had no  
 22 prior knowledge of this but didn't accept that this  
 23 indicated a blind spot in coverage, only that the  
 24 coverage was not 24/7.

25 She said that MI5 had not been able to connect the

1 construction of the hoax IED vest to any particular  
 2 extremist publication. She thought it would have  
 3 required an extremely high level of coverage in order to  
 4 spot the purchases which led to its creation and that  
 5 this level of coverage would have been disproportionate  
 6 to the intelligence they possessed at the time, likely  
 7 unjustified, and probably unlawful.

8 She agreed with the conclusion of the post-attack  
 9 review team that MI5 could not have taken any actions  
 10 which would have materially affected the outcome.

11 Although learning points relating to the grading and  
 12 review of such investigations were identified, she said  
 13 that these were procedural rather than specific to the  
 14 case. The relationship between the investigative team,  
 15 West Midlands Police and Staffordshire Police was  
 16 identified as good and to be replicated.

17 In response to Mr Armstrong, she described the  
 18 recent formation of the joint CT prisons and probation  
 19 hub which will look at how intelligence can be shared in  
 20 this context.

21 She agreed that MI5 cannot prevent every attack but  
 22 does seek to learn from them and the post-attack reviews  
 23 do result in changes in processes and procedures. And  
 24 she said this: that since 2017, they have stopped around  
 25 30 attacks and thereby prevented considerable loss of

1 life .

2 Members of the jury, I'm sorry, that was quite  
 3 a long session, but I think we'll take our break there,  
 4 certainly well deserved on everyone's part. We'll take  
 5 a break there. Thank you.

6 (In the absence of the jury)

7 Mr Hough, looking at what I've got left to cover,  
 8 I am just going to have a message passed to the jury  
 9 that they may just like -- we'll take a proper break  
 10 because it may well be that I will just continue into  
 11 what would otherwise be the lunch break, because at  
 12 least then the jury, once they have everything that  
 13 I have to say to them, can at least begin their  
 14 deliberations even as they do it over a lunch to start  
 15 with.

16 MR HOUGH: Yes, sir.

17 JUDGE LUCRAFT: I'll rise.

18 (12.15 pm)

19 (A short break)

20 (12.38 pm)

21 (In the absence of the jury)

22 JUDGE LUCRAFT: I've got about another hour to do. What

23 I'm going to do is to continue, I've forewarned the  
 24 jury, obviously, I'm going to eat into what would  
 25 otherwise be their lunch break, I am just mentioning

1 that now in case others feel that I've lost all track of  
 2 time, but I just think that it's probably easier to do  
 3 that rather than do anything else.

4 MR HOUGH: Yes.

5 JUDGE LUCRAFT: There will be some legal directions to be  
 6 given to the jury too, and I know the final versions are  
 7 just being printed, so that should go like a seamless  
 8 transition from one to the other.

9 MR HOUGH: I'm sure it will.

10 (In the presence of the jury)

11 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to turn next  
 12 to Mr Byford. I know some of you are following in your  
 13 own notes and you have all got sustenance with you,  
 14 which is probably no bad thing, I've certainly got some  
 15 too. I think I've got about another hour left of what  
 16 I'm going to do, and I think you have all been  
 17 forewarned that I'm going to eat into what would  
 18 otherwise be our lunch break. Can I just say this: if  
 19 anyone actually does need a break at any stage, please  
 20 don't feel afraid to put your hand up, we will simply  
 21 take a pause, but we will see how we do.

22 So Mr Byford is the Head of Public Protection for  
 23 the West Midlands and he took up that role in 2014. He  
 24 chaired all but one of the meetings for Khan, which met  
 25 every six weeks, as we know. Khan was referred to MAPPA

1 about 10 months before his release, following a referral  
 2 on a MAPPA A form by Mr Skelton which recorded his risk  
 3 of serious harm to the public as being very high.  
 4 Before the first meeting on Khan, Mr Byford received the  
 5 MAPPA F form and the referral document itself, so he had  
 6 a basic understanding of Khan's offending history, his  
 7 behaviour in prison, and information from the  
 8 assessments that had been conducted.

9 Mr Byford knew that Mr Skelton was to manage Khan,  
 10 only the second TACT offender in the area, but knew  
 11 little about his TACT experience or that of others on  
 12 the panel. He did not know that an investigation into  
 13 Khan had been opened by MI5 and counter-terrorism  
 14 officers, but expected Staffordshire Special Branch to  
 15 have some part in his management.

16 The MAPPA guidance sets out the purpose of the panel  
 17 meetings including risk management plans. The key thing  
 18 for the MAPPA approach is to share information. Despite  
 19 MAPPA guidance, there were no formal pre-meetings.

20 Of the 12 MAPPA meetings for Khan, there were four  
 21 before his release and eight afterwards, and as I have  
 22 mentioned, he attended and chaired 11 of those. The  
 23 standing panel included West Midlands CTU, whose role  
 24 was to contribute to the meetings where they had  
 25 information or they had a view, although

1 Staffordshire Police were responsible for Khan at the  
 2 time. Mr Byford said he was not aware of any covert  
 3 investigation.

4 The MAPPA meetings would follow a similar format  
 5 each time and although not recorded in the minutes,  
 6 Mr Byford would ask about any risk information that  
 7 needed to be raised at each meeting. When asked by  
 8 Mr Pitchers, Mr Byford accepted, contrary to the MAPPA  
 9 guidance, that he did not summarise the risks presented  
 10 by Khan at the start of each meeting. Decisions at the  
 11 meeting were reached through discussion and consensus.

12 Whilst an offender remains in custody, the offender  
 13 supervisor completes a MAPPA F for each meeting.  
 14 In December 2018, there was a reference to Khan  
 15 returning to his old ways, and he had seen that. As to  
 16 the intelligence of an aspiration to carry out  
 17 an attack -- the second strand as it was often referred  
 18 to in the evidence -- he was not aware of that until  
 19 after the attack.

20 But when asked by Mr Pitchers, he agreed it was  
 21 something of great significance, and of a concerning  
 22 nature, which people needed to be aware of and to factor  
 23 into their dealings with Khan and the risk management  
 24 planning around him. Mr Byford confirmed low grade  
 25 intelligence would be noted and not ignored.

1 In relation to sensitive information, by the time of  
 2 dealing with Khan, Mr Byford had a CT clearance level.  
 3 Mr Byford said he didn't see his clearance level as  
 4 an impediment to his work. He knew that MI5 were  
 5 present at some of the meetings but that was not passed  
 6 to all of those present. MI5's presence was to listen  
 7 and to hear information being given, rather than  
 8 contributing to discussions. CT police were the bridge  
 9 between MAPPA and MI5 with Mr Byford expecting any  
 10 information of concern that MI5 had to come to MAPPA  
 11 through the police.

12 The MAPPA guidance on minutes required accurate  
 13 minutes and for them to be written in such a way that  
 14 someone not present was able to understand the nature of  
 15 the discussion and the issues involved. Rather than  
 16 being circulated by secure email, the minutes were put  
 17 on to ViSOR. The minutes would also be distributed at  
 18 the next meeting. On occasion, the minutes erroneously  
 19 recorded Khan's risk as high rather than very high, but  
 20 Mr Byford said again he didn't think that affected his  
 21 understanding or that of those present.

22 In relation to the dumper truck training course, the  
 23 minutes contained a detailed account of the discussion  
 24 and the decision with the risks set out and described  
 25 which is how discussions and decisions ought to have

1 been recorded in the minutes. Mr Byford was aware of  
 2 Khan's connection with Learning Together through the  
 3 meetings and also from the Form F material he saw.

4 The MAPPA April 2019 minutes refer to the event at  
 5 Whitemoor to which Khan had been invited. The minutes  
 6 record that Khan was being allowed to go to that but  
 7 with police officers having offered an escort. Although  
 8 there is not a discussion recorded of Khan being  
 9 permitted to attend this event and a decision recorded,  
 10 Mr Byford thought there would have been more discussion  
 11 than is recorded in the minutes.

12 Mr Byford knew that Khan moved out of the approved  
 13 premises in late September and that the mentoring  
 14 arrangement ended abruptly too. He recalled the  
 15 discussion about the effect that Khan was not able to  
 16 access the internet under supervision in his search for  
 17 work. Mr Byford said that his understanding was that he  
 18 had other engagements such as the DWP work coach who  
 19 would assist with that. He was also aware of the  
 20 discussion about reduction in visits to the gym, Khan  
 21 not going to the mosque, and spending a lot of time at  
 22 home with computer games and DVDs.

23 In the autumn of 2019 he recognised that some of the  
 24 risk factors on the ERG were present by his move, his  
 25 social isolation, and the inability to find work.

1 Mr Byford also recalled from the various minutes  
 2 discussions about Khan having unrealistic expectations,  
 3 presenting at times as a teenager, wanting everything  
 4 handed to him on a plate, and the risk of frustration  
 5 being vented in due course.  
 6 Mr Byford considered that one significant difference  
 7 between Khan and other TACT offenders managed by the  
 8 TACT panel was that he was continuing to engage with the  
 9 Learning Together programme that had begun in prison.  
 10 This involvement was seen by the panel as very much  
 11 a protective factor and something to be supported.  
 12 He accepted that Khan remained someone convicted of  
 13 very serious terrorist offences and remained graded in  
 14 all the MAPPAs as presenting a very high risk of  
 15 serious harm to the general public but that they did not  
 16 see his behaviour, despite intensive observation of Khan  
 17 in the approved premises, as raising significant  
 18 concerns. As Mr Byford accepted, the degree of  
 19 intensive observation changed when he moved from the  
 20 approved premises to his own address in the autumn.  
 21 Mr Byford had not heard of the invitation to the  
 22 event at Fishmongers' Hall before the meeting on  
 23 22 August. The minutes recorded that Cambridge  
 24 University were hosting another one-day event  
 25 in November and that Khan would be invited, however, he

1 would likely have moved on from the approved premises  
 2 and would need to source his own means of travel.  
 3 Mr Byford said he believed there was some additional  
 4 discussion but could not recall the detail. He recalled  
 5 them having a discussion around whether there were any  
 6 objections that people wanted to raise in relation to  
 7 that, and that that was his clear memory, but he could  
 8 not recall there was a significant amount of additional  
 9 discussion.  
 10 As to how long this discussion was, he wasn't  
 11 entirely sure. If it had been a long discussion, he  
 12 would have expected it to have been minuted, and even  
 13 the bit he referred to should have been minuted. He  
 14 accepted that if there had been any discussion about  
 15 risks, even if only to say the risks were acceptable, or  
 16 that there are risks but they are balanced by the  
 17 positives, then that should have been minuted as well.  
 18 Mr Byford did not think there was a detailed  
 19 discussion from a risk perspective in the meeting, and  
 20 he thought this was because it was seen as part of  
 21 a continuation of the situation with Khan at the time.  
 22 When asked if there was any discussion or any question  
 23 raised about where the event was taking place or who  
 24 would be attending or the security arrangements, he said  
 25 that he thought they knew it was in London but he

1 couldn't be sure as to whether the location within  
 2 London was known.  
 3 Mr Byford confirmed that had there been concerns  
 4 held by anyone around the panel about Khan's attendance,  
 5 then, in his view, it would have been raised, and he had  
 6 confidence in the panel to do so.  
 7 He acknowledged there is no clear recorded decision  
 8 on this event. In summary, the visit was raised  
 9 in August, nobody objected to it, but no positive clear  
 10 decision was made to approve it. Mr Byford believed  
 11 that there would have been an agreement to that visit,  
 12 but he cannot recall the particular discussion.  
 13 Cathryn Ellsmore is the Deputy Director for the  
 14 Prevent Delivery Unit for Security and Counter-Terrorism  
 15 within the Home Office. The Home Office unit oversaw  
 16 and coordinated the Government's counter-terrorism  
 17 strategy, Contest, which includes Prevent. It is also  
 18 responsible for providing advice on the protective  
 19 security of places. Ms Ellsmore set out the importance  
 20 of private venues, explaining what support they needed.  
 21 The Desistance and Disengagement Programme, DDP, is  
 22 led by the Home Office and run in conjunction with  
 23 HMPPS. The desistance strand aims to rehabilitate those  
 24 involved in terrorism and the disengage strand, to move  
 25 them away from it. The practical and theological

1 mentors are part of that process. The Home Office are  
 2 supplied mentors through a supplier company. Mentors do  
 3 not make risk assessments but will provide reports on  
 4 their interactions with an offender. Initially the  
 5 supplier company trained their own providers but that  
 6 was changed and a personal safety course was put in  
 7 place, and then a mentor's condition training course.  
 8 The condition training was not in place for Khan's  
 9 mentors. Theological mentors were recruited through  
 10 recommendations by police, local authorities or other  
 11 Prevent partners. They are provided with the same  
 12 training as the practical mentors.  
 13 Khan was referred to the DDP programme and was  
 14 provided with mentors. Ms Ellsmore was aware of  
 15 concerns that Khan was not getting much out of the  
 16 mentoring but thought it was effective for the first two  
 17 or three months. They hope that the rapport develops  
 18 and the mentors get more insight into the offender, but  
 19 she noted this did not happen with Khan. Mentors will  
 20 help with internet access but other agencies can assist  
 21 with that too. If such access is necessary, then there  
 22 could be discussion with the offender manager or with  
 23 MAPPAs. She said Khan's mentor reports were quite good  
 24 at providing the content of meetings, but thought  
 25 insight and analysis could have been better, which was

1 partly a reflection of the relationship and engagement  
 2 with Khan being shallow. She accepted the mentoring  
 3 ended abruptly and was not replaced when the contract  
 4 between TUI and the Home Office terminated. She also  
 5 acknowledged that if Ms Gell regarded a new mentor as  
 6 a priority , then it could have been put in place in  
 7 mid–October.

8 Turning next to DS Stephenson, he was a detective  
 9 constable on the Operations Intelligence Management  
 10 Unit, OIMU. OIMU is one of a number of unites of  
 11 Special Branch that supports Special Branch  
 12 investigations by providing intelligence support.  
 13 Officers in the unit receive intelligence , they assess  
 14 it , and decisions are made as to outcomes. Special  
 15 Branch is the unit in the force responsible for national  
 16 security and intelligence including counter–terrorism  
 17 investigations . His intelligence work supported  
 18 priority investigations and mainly CT investigations,  
 19 and so he had significant experience of a number of  
 20 counter–terrorism investigations.

21 The role of the Special Branch was to support the  
 22 SIO for any priority investigation , provide the local  
 23 intelligence , and act as a conduit for any intelligence  
 24 into Staffordshire that could be shared, and also  
 25 involved in the assessment of that intelligence .

1 He knew of Khan's offending history and he knew that  
 2 a priority investigation was set up in November 2018  
 3 jointly between MI5 and West Midlands Police,  
 4 Operation Molal, pretty much as soon as it began.

5 In 2019, the Prevent Team had moved out of Special  
 6 Branch but they remained physically close to the Special  
 7 Branch along the corridor and they had regular contact  
 8 with PS Forsyth and his colleagues, including the  
 9 regular morning briefings. There was a sterile corridor  
 10 too: sensitive intelligence stayed in their team and  
 11 they didn't go through to those dealing with the overt  
 12 management.

13 With Khan's release and the covert investigation, he  
 14 understood that the Prevent Team would be involved in  
 15 the overt management of Khan and would be seeing him on  
 16 a regular basis and that for some purposes, it was his  
 17 responsibility to act as an intermediary between the  
 18 Prevent Team and the West Midlands Counter–Terrorism  
 19 Unit. He also actively assisted in various ways with  
 20 the joint investigation , providing intelligence and  
 21 information that would go to the CTU team and MI5. He  
 22 attended the JOT meetings.

23 By 22 November, he and his team were aware of two  
 24 separate strands of intelligence : one that Khan had said  
 25 he intended to return to his old ways and, two, that

1 Khan said he was planning to commit an attack. In the  
 2 early stages he thought there were two strands  
 3 supporting the piece of intelligence that Khan intended  
 4 to return to his old ways. In relation to it later  
 5 transpiring that there was only one strand supporting  
 6 the "old ways" intelligence , he said he was only aware  
 7 of that recently. His understanding was that the "old  
 8 ways" intelligence was given a grading of mostly  
 9 reliable , and the other strand was given a grading of  
 10 untested source. So far as he was aware, neither of  
 11 those assessments of reliability changed over the course  
 12 of the investigation .

13 On 28 November, a JOT meeting took place with MI5  
 14 and West Midlands CTU. He was present and MI5 gave  
 15 an update and the key risks identified of Khan becoming  
 16 involved in attack–planning after his release, or  
 17 secondly, trying to engage in other extremist behaviour  
 18 such as radicalising others, and that a risk of  
 19 absconding was mentioned, but that risk was recognised  
 20 as low.

21 In the following days, arrangements were put in  
 22 place concerning trigger plans, reporting on the part 4  
 23 notification form process with Khan, and the reporting  
 24 procedures. Prevent Team reports would be put onto the  
 25 ViSOR system, onto SPIN, and also emailed to Special

1 Branch.

2 In December 2018, he and DC Hartill went to see  
 3 Mr Skelton and Mr Bromley. He discussed with them the  
 4 processes if any breaches of the curfew, and discussed  
 5 state benefits and also the creative writing course. He  
 6 recorded that Mr Skelton was keen for Khan to continue  
 7 studies with Cambridge University once released. He  
 8 advised that Prevent continued to work with probation  
 9 and told the probation team of Special Branch's  
 10 interest , as Khan, a convicted TACT offender, needed to  
 11 be sighted on anything, information or intelligence of  
 12 concern that may indicate he was re–engaging with  
 13 extremism.

14 A subject profile was prepared by Dawn Banner and  
 15 updated at various times. He would have read the  
 16 document at the time. It sets out the convictions, the  
 17 licence conditions, and part 4 notifications , employment  
 18 details , recent education, and then intelligence from  
 19 police records going back to 2008, and Ms Banner had set  
 20 out this :

21 "Mindset not changed whilst in prison, he remains  
 22 an extremist and will pose a threat of re–engagement on  
 23 release".

24 There is then detail on prison intelligence ,  
 25 including radicalising others and incidents of violence

1 and influence on others in HMP Whitemoor. It has  
 2 a section of note which reads as follows:  
 3 "The intelligence suggests that some TACT prisoners  
 4 use taqiyya which is a permissible form of telling lies  
 5 to advance the cause of Islam. This means they will  
 6 progress through their sentences by lying when doing  
 7 intervention courses to enable them to leave prison to  
 8 commit further terrorism offences. It is reported that  
 9 Khan did this at HMP Woodhill. He worked with  
 10 a psychologist and stated to another prisoner that he  
 11 was just 'ticking boxes' showing that he is  
 12 progressing".

13 The profile also states as follows:  
 14 "In preparedness for his imminent release Khan has  
 15 spoken to the chaplaincy regarding his future plans and  
 16 responded positively saying all the right things.  
 17 However, intelligence suggests this is a ticking box  
 18 exercise to assist with his release."

19 He said he noted those entries in the profile at the  
 20 time.

21 She had also recorded that Khan is part of a group  
 22 who had boasted about what they intended to do upon  
 23 their release and that Khan intended to return to his  
 24 old ways. She had recorded the "old ways" intelligence  
 25 as well as that Khan intends to carry out an attack

1 after his release. The profile made clear that Khan was  
 2 someone with a history of extremist behaviour throughout  
 3 his time in prison and some recent worrying  
 4 intelligence. As to whether Mr Skelton had access to  
 5 the information about recent statements and plans, he  
 6 was not then aware but subsequently became aware of some  
 7 of this in the MAPPa minutes and the intelligence about  
 8 returning to old ways.

9 Other than through MAPPa, neither he nor his  
 10 colleagues had communications directly with Mr Skelton  
 11 passing on the sorts of concerns it set out. Sharing  
 12 with probation would be the subject of  
 13 information-sharing protocols and not an informal  
 14 conversation. So far as he was aware, no decisions were  
 15 made about setting up such information-sharing protocols  
 16 with probation here.

17 The counter-terrorism risk assessment of DC Hartill  
 18 recorded as follows:

19 "On the approach to his release, Khan has told  
 20 persons in authority he is reformed and wishes to  
 21 rebuild his life. He has stated he no longer believes  
 22 in the rhetoric and is keen to share his experiences as  
 23 a writer. He has good connections with Cambridge  
 24 University and wishes to pursue an academic career in  
 25 combating terrorism. Recent reporting, however, is to

1 the contrary: Khan tries to radicalise others at Friday  
 2 prayers, he is planning on returning to his old ways on  
 3 his release from prison and is part of a group of Muslim  
 4 prisoners who boast about what they intend to do upon  
 5 their release. Further reporting has been received that  
 6 Khan may be intending to carry out an attack after his  
 7 release, albeit this has low credibility."

8 As to why the attack aspiration intelligence was  
 9 referred to as low credibility he said it might be due  
 10 to the handling conditions on the intelligence report.  
 11 He understood it to be untested, and its credibility  
 12 could not be judged.

13 In February 2019, he was keeping himself updated on  
 14 Khan's progress and his behaviour from the mentor  
 15 reports that he saw. On 7 March 2019, along with  
 16 DI Powell and PS Forsyth, he went to the MAPPa meeting  
 17 on Khan. That was his first ever MAPPa meeting. He was  
 18 asked whether he knew that the aspiring to carry out an  
 19 attack prison intelligence had not been fed into the  
 20 MAPPa process. He said he didn't know then and he is  
 21 not aware of that intelligence ever having been shared  
 22 with MAPPa. If he had been asked at any point  
 23 between March and November 2019: do the MAPPa  
 24 participants know these two pieces of intelligence, he  
 25 would have said they were aware of the return to old

1 ways but that he was not aware of them being sighted on  
 2 the attack strand.

3 When asked whether he thought they ought to be  
 4 informed of that piece of intelligence, he said it's not  
 5 something that he considered. He did not receive the  
 6 MAPPa minutes and only became aware of the contents of  
 7 the minutes as a result of these Inquests.

8 He took steps to obtain the video obtained in lieu  
 9 of Khan attending the Cambridge March 2019 event. Khan  
 10 seemed very positive about his involvement with the  
 11 Learning Together programme and there was nothing which  
 12 caused him any concern. He recalled the section of the  
 13 video about segregation, but didn't recall thinking it  
 14 was a lie. At the time he didn't know chapter and verse  
 15 of every aspect of Khan's life in prison.

16 He noted on 29 March that he had printed off  
 17 a downgraded profile with some but not all of the prison  
 18 intelligence. It did include the "old ways"  
 19 intelligence, but not, he thought, have the attack  
 20 aspiration intelligence. He sent it to PS Forsyth as he  
 21 had requested the profile. PS Forsyth did not raise any  
 22 questions about it and there had been no discussion  
 23 about it.

24 On 4 April he noted that he had raised with  
 25 DI Powell the frequency of visits to Khan. His view was

1 that the visits needed to be more frequent as they were  
2 valuable and he was not aware of anything that would  
3 prevent them from happening on a more frequent basis.

4 On 11 April 2019, there was a Special Branch  
5 operation meeting document. Operation Molal is referred  
6 to as a P3 investigation with the words "Uncorroborated  
7 reporting of NS concern judged to have some  
8 credibility ". He thought that wording was a definition  
9 or part of the definition of a P3, but he accepted it  
10 may be in relation to the attack—planning intelligence.

11 On 3 July after a short holiday, he contacted  
12 PS Forsyth as he had been catching up on the mentor  
13 reports and he referred to reports speaking of Khan  
14 seeking to secure dumper truck training. When he read  
15 those reports, it didn't seem appropriate to him as Khan  
16 was a convicted terrorist and he was immediately  
17 concerned. PS Forsyth said that probation was  
18 supportive but there was no doubt it would be discussed  
19 at MAPPA on 11 July. He sent the email chain on to  
20 West Midlands saying that he had raised it with Prevent  
21 and that he had shared it with intelligence partners, as  
22 he was concerned about it.

23 He did not attend the MAPPA meeting in July but  
24 DI Hessel did. He would have received feedback from  
25 the meeting but couldn't recall what was said. He had

1 a verbal update from the August MAPPA meeting and noted  
2 a one—day event with Cambridge University and travelled  
3 to it without an escort. He was not then made aware  
4 where the event was to be held. He didn't recall asking  
5 DC Hartill then for further detail. He believed he may  
6 have made further enquiries later in 2019. He was asked  
7 whether he had a concern about an unescorted visit being  
8 proposed bearing in mind the other concerns that he had  
9 raised. He said the details were not known. When  
10 asked: did you see it as part of your role to get more  
11 details, he said he did later.

12 He did not attend the October MAPPA meeting. He  
13 didn't believe he knew any more details of the proposed  
14 trip. DC Hartill provided an update over email but it  
15 did not occur to him that she had not mentioned the  
16 proposed Cambridge University event in that email. He  
17 can't recall the exact time he knew of the proposed trip  
18 to London but he thought it may have been in  
19 early November.

20 When he read the report of the 31 October Prevent  
21 visit, he thought that Khan did not have the same level  
22 of support he did on his release and that he appeared to  
23 be isolating or isolated.

24 He expressed concern to PS Forsyth about Khan  
25 isolating himself, no longer seeking employment and

1 alluding to increased frequency of the Prevent visits .  
2 In doing so he believed the frequency was far less than  
3 when Khan was first released and with new accommodation  
4 and he would be very interested to know how Khan was  
5 managing and engaging with authority and he wanted more  
6 insight .

7 He also sent an email to the West Midlands CTU  
8 forwarding a report of the visit and saying to them that  
9 he would be speaking to Prevent about increasing the  
10 frequency of the visits as he was appearing to isolate  
11 himself and not proactively seeking employment. It was  
12 several months since the last JOT and he thought these  
13 points should be considered with MI5 and West Midlands  
14 CTU. He called MI5 to inform them of the situation. To  
15 him, Khan did not appear to be on an upward trajectory.

16 Following a recent interaction between Mr Skelton  
17 and Mr Khan, PS Forsyth reported that Khan was happy to  
18 do the journey to the event in London, as long as  
19 someone could meet him at Euston station. DS Stephenson  
20 thought this might have been the first time he was made  
21 aware the event was in London. He heard about  
22 an unescorted visit following the August MAPPA, but then  
23 had no more detail. He did not apprehend any concern  
24 about Khan going on a trip to London potentially  
25 unescorted. When asked why not, he said that Khan had

1 previously been escorted for purposes of taking to and  
2 from a venue, there had been no adverse intelligence  
3 since his release that he was aware of, and there had  
4 been positive engagements from Prevent and from  
5 probation and nothing caused him concern at the time.

6 When pressed by Mr Hough, he accepted he knew Khan  
7 was a very dangerous man convicted of a very serious  
8 offence, who had behaved in a dangerous and violent way  
9 in London and someone capable of lying and manipulating  
10 in his own concerns and where he had been sufficiently  
11 concerned about the prospect of him doing a dumper truck  
12 course and potentially using it as a weapon and whether  
13 it occurred to him as a seasoned counter—terrorism  
14 trained officer that sending such a person unescorted to  
15 the heart of London presented a serious risk. He  
16 replied as follows:

17 "Yes, it would be a risk, in hindsight, and  
18 obviously looking at all the awful events that unfolded,  
19 the dumper truck course objection was objective, based  
20 upon intelligence, that's why that was fed through to  
21 the MAPPA process. We needed to understand more with  
22 regards to this event and that was also my  
23 responsibility to share that information with the West  
24 Midlands Counter—Terrorism Unit and MI5 in order that  
25 those other officers involved with the investigation, it

1 was brought to their attention where that further  
 2 considerations and decisions could be made."  
 3 The last MAPPA meeting was on 14 November, which he  
 4 attended. DC Hartill sets out the notes including the  
 5 objectives of the MAPPA meeting, including "further  
 6 understand London event". The minutes set out some  
 7 details of the trip to London on 29 November. He does  
 8 not himself recall what was said at that meeting about  
 9 the trip. He believes the decision had already been  
 10 made about the trip due to what is set out in the emails  
 11 of 6 November.  
 12 As to whether any public protection matters, such as  
 13 providing an escort, searches, checking security at the  
 14 venue, Khan being met by surprise, whether any of those  
 15 occurred to him, he said he was unaware of anything to  
 16 suggest that it would be a risk and was unsighted on the  
 17 explicit conversations that had taken place at MAPPA and  
 18 their planning for Khan to attend the event.  
 19 Mr Hough then put this to DS Stephenson:  
 20 "Question: ... as we have agreed, this was  
 21 a terrorist with a terrible record in prison and  
 22 consistently a very high risk attached to him, and he  
 23 was about to be sent on his first unaccompanied trip  
 24 away from Stafford, yes?  
 25 "Answer: Yes.

1 "Question: Away from Stafford and the Stoke area,  
 2 and he was going to be sent into central London --  
 3 "Answer: Yes.  
 4 "Question: -- including via a station. Looking  
 5 back on it, do you think that you and your colleagues  
 6 ought to have raised a concern and given some advice  
 7 about this?  
 8 "Answer: Yes."  
 9 At a JOT meeting on 18 November with MI5, he  
 10 attended with DC Plimley, DI Williams and DS Jerromes  
 11 was there too. The police also noted that he had  
 12 significantly withdrawn since moving into his new flat  
 13 and that he was planning to attend an event in London.  
 14 Two risks were identified : re-engage in Islamist  
 15 extremist activity , including being involved in  
 16 radicalisation and incitement of others and that he may  
 17 attempt to travel to Pakistan, although that was said to  
 18 be low risk. He believed it was right that there was no  
 19 discussion at the JOT concerning risks of the visit to  
 20 London event or any means of reducing those risks.  
 21 Given the answers he gave in relation to the MAPPA  
 22 meeting, he accepted, looking back, that he ought to  
 23 have raised some sort of concerns about that visit and  
 24 its risk management.  
 25 On 20 November 2019, the email with train times and

1 location was sent to him. Before he received that, he  
 2 didn't believe he had the exact location of the event.  
 3 Initially he didn't know the location and did some open  
 4 source search on the internet and then knew where it  
 5 was. It gave him no further cause for concern, he said.  
 6 On the day before the attack, the 28th, he emailed  
 7 DC Plimley asking if [there was] anything further around  
 8 the planned trip. He had no doubt the trip was going to  
 9 take place; he was seeing if it was, and the potential  
 10 impact on breaches. Between the JOT on the 18th and the  
 11 day of the attack, there were no further discussions  
 12 between him and his colleagues in Special Branch or  
 13 West Midlands CTU or MI5 about this visit from a risk  
 14 perspective.  
 15 DI Hessel said that in September 2017 he started  
 16 his role as a detective sergeant in the Staffordshire  
 17 Special Branch working in the Operational Intelligence  
 18 Management Unit. He had not done CT work before that  
 19 stage. Between September 2018 and January 2019 he was  
 20 the Temporary Head of Special Branch while DI Powell was  
 21 on a posting elsewhere. He reverted back to his role as  
 22 a detective sergeant in the OIMU in January 2019, and  
 23 was there until early October 2019, when DI Powell moved  
 24 on and he became the Head of Special Branch as a DI.  
 25 Again, he made clear that OIMU provided

1 counter-terrorism intelligence support within Special  
 2 Branch for investigations run by the West Midlands CTU.  
 3 Generally there were one or two priority operations  
 4 but in general his role was supervising the receipt and  
 5 assessment of intelligence and the suitable sharing of  
 6 intelligence. In the priority operations the lead  
 7 investigation officers would come from West Midlands CTU  
 8 and in the OIMU they would be providing intelligence.  
 9 Khan was released while he was the Head of Special  
 10 Branch and was the subject of a P3 priority  
 11 investigation. Whilst the covert operation was taking  
 12 place, the part 4 notification requirements were being  
 13 managed overtly by the Prevent Team. He knew PS Forsyth  
 14 and his team were handling the overt management function  
 15 as opposed to what was being done by the Special Branch  
 16 or West Midlands.  
 17 He knew the team did not have significant  
 18 counter-terrorism investigation or intelligence  
 19 experience. The Prevent Team worked closely with  
 20 Special Branch and attended the morning meetings.  
 21 With Khan, he had no background knowledge other than  
 22 through self-briefing and his colleagues' awareness.  
 23 Initially he was unsure what role the OIMU might play  
 24 and whether there would be a priority operation in  
 25 place -- that was one issue to be resolved -- and also

1 Khan would be subject to part 4 requirements and how  
 2 that work was also to be resolved. A function of  
 3 Special Branch would be to pass on the reports received  
 4 by the Prevent Team on to West Midlands.  
 5 He kept a major incident disclosure book and made  
 6 notes at various times. He made a note of the opening  
 7 of the priority investigation dated in November 2018.  
 8 In preparation he had seen documents on what Khan had  
 9 been sentenced for, a subject profile with summaries of  
 10 the prison intelligence. Over time he saw various  
 11 editions of Khan's subject profile and made various  
 12 notes from the profile in his book including "will  
 13 return to old ways' and "intends to carry out  
 14 an attack'. The quotation marks indicate this is what  
 15 the intelligence said and he regarded these as  
 16 particularly significant. He noted that MI5 had  
 17 commissioned an operation, Operation Molal.  
 18 Substantial details of prison intelligence was in  
 19 the profile, including incidents of violence, and that  
 20 Khan was seen as a radicalising influence. The comments  
 21 as to lying and manipulating were there and they were  
 22 not lost on him. He saw the ERG reports and OASys  
 23 assessments, including the 2018 ERG from Ieva  
 24 Cechavičiute.  
 25 He followed Khan's progress relatively closely and

1 was party to emails and saw the mentor reports, the  
 2 Prevent Team reports and the tag data reports. His  
 3 understanding was that Khan was compliant with all  
 4 conditions and the tag data was unremarkable. From the  
 5 Prevent Team reports he saw reference to Khan being  
 6 reformed and wanting to put the past behind him.  
 7 At the end of January he recalled speaking to  
 8 DS Stephenson about the attack-planning strand of the  
 9 intelligence reports. He recalled it was yet to be  
 10 broken out. By that phrase it referred to the strict  
 11 handling conditions that prevented it being shared more  
 12 widely. He said the intelligence was owned by the  
 13 prison establishment and not by themselves. He is aware  
 14 that it was not shared more widely with MAPPAs and he  
 15 commented that he didn't think it was actually intended  
 16 for the police either. However, he accepted it was very  
 17 valuable both for those investigating Khan and for those  
 18 managing Khan to know that there was intelligence of  
 19 that kind shortly before his release.  
 20 He was asked whether it occurred to him that some  
 21 effort might be made to break out this intelligence, to  
 22 obtain the permission of the owner to get it to the  
 23 MAPPAs participants and to inform Prevent of it. He  
 24 didn't know it was not being shared with MAPPAs by the  
 25 prison or otherwise, and if there was a requirement to

1 share it further, he didn't believe that his team would  
 2 have autonomy to do that, that would have been a policy  
 3 decision for the SIO. He would have expected the SIO,  
 4 DCI Chambers, to be making the decision whether it  
 5 should go further.  
 6 Mr Hough put to him that DS Stephenson was raising  
 7 it directly with him and whether it occurred to him that  
 8 it was something important for his team to make sure it  
 9 did go further, to everyone involved in the management  
 10 of Khan and needed to know, and he said yes. He agreed  
 11 that looking back on it, he and DS Stephenson could have  
 12 raised this with the SIO so that it went further into  
 13 the MAPPAs process.  
 14 With Prevent he thought there was a need to know and  
 15 part of the requirement for Prevent to attend one of the  
 16 operational meetings in December was partly due to that  
 17 reason, so the intelligence could be discussed. As far  
 18 as he can recall, the intelligence was discussed in the  
 19 presence of PS Forsyth at the December JOT. When asked  
 20 whether he could recall the specific intelligence on  
 21 attack-planning being spoken about in front of  
 22 PS Forsyth, he said he can't recall that, that was the  
 23 purpose of inviting him, and if it was not, then he  
 24 would have raised that it needed to be discussed. It  
 25 was put to him that PS Forsyth said he didn't know about

1 the intelligence and DI Hessell said he thinks  
 2 PS Forsyth is wrong about that.  
 3 Going through various dates in his book,  
 4 in February 2019 DC Hartill sent an email where Khan had  
 5 been asked to give a talk that had been ruled out and so  
 6 a video was to be done. He asked for a copy of the  
 7 video. He understood the Cambridge visit to be one step  
 8 too many too soon. He thought the rehabilitation  
 9 process would take longer than the two months that had  
 10 elapsed since his initial release. He cannot recall  
 11 identifying risks at that stage, but it would be a fair  
 12 assumption about a risk of him going.  
 13 On 21 May, he made an entry noting the probation  
 14 officer had approved a visit to a Learning Together  
 15 event at Whitemoor and that the Prevent Team were going  
 16 to transport him there which was for reasons of  
 17 logistics rather than insuring against some risk. He  
 18 noted that questions had been asked about who was  
 19 attending. He wanted to understand who might be there  
 20 and that was based on concerns about associations but  
 21 also whether it gave rise to any covert opportunities.  
 22 He had noted that suitability to attend would be  
 23 a decision for MAPPAs.  
 24 On 3 June he summarised a recent Prevent report that  
 25 referred to Khan having obtained the CSCS card and being

1 hopeful of attending a dumper truck course. When the  
 2 dumper truck course was raised he was surprised and he  
 3 thought attendance was naïve. When it was identified he  
 4 recalled a discussion with DS Stephenson and they were  
 5 both of the same opinion. He understood that  
 6 DS Stephenson was liaising with PS Forsyth and Prevent  
 7 to understand more. PS Forsyth thought it was  
 8 potentially suitable, and so he spoke to one of his CT  
 9 advisors and got the JTAC threat assessment document to  
 10 give to PS Forsyth to give it to MAPPAs as to why it was  
 11 unsuitable. He also sought an invitation to go to  
 12 the July MAPPAs meeting as he thought this was  
 13 sufficiently serious to do so. It is the only one he  
 14 attended.

15 He made notes of the update he received on the MAPPAs  
 16 meeting in August and noted the dumper truck course was  
 17 on hold. He recalled some level of continued  
 18 involvement with Cambridge University. However, a visit  
 19 later in the year and Khan being expected to go under  
 20 his own steam was not mentioned to him. If he had been  
 21 told of such an event, he would want more assurances  
 22 because of what he had said in other contexts and that  
 23 would have included with the partners involved, so the  
 24 priority operation team and MI5. He is now aware that  
 25 MI5 and the priority op team were aware that Khan was

101

1 due to attend on 29 November.

2 DC Hartill emailed him and others on 4 October with  
 3 an update from that MAPPAs meeting. It covers things  
 4 such as mentors and other assistance for Khan on  
 5 internet access, but he was not aware the extent to  
 6 which that happened or not. He added this update to his  
 7 book: there is no reference of a visit to London in that  
 8 email or in his notes on it.

9 On 31 October, there was a Prevent engagement and he  
 10 read a report that day. He noted that Khan was not  
 11 going to the mosque, had no mentor, no internet access  
 12 and was struggling to find employment. That was  
 13 consistent with his conversations with and the concerns  
 14 that DS Stephenson highlighted. He shared the concerns  
 15 around lacking social connections and Khan isolating  
 16 himself. He was concerned about a lack of support and  
 17 the frequency of visits and what probation were doing in  
 18 the absence of a mentor. He felt an information void  
 19 was being created which meant less insight into Khan and  
 20 was concerned as to how they were going to fill that.

21 He had not noted in his book the "illumni" event  
 22 referred to in the emails. Before the email exchanges  
 23 he was not aware there was to be a visit to London. He  
 24 and DS Stephenson wanted more detail as to the proposal,  
 25 the risk, associations, covert opportunities, and they

102

1 would want that detail through probation and the Prevent  
 2 Team in order to share with their partners. One aspect  
 3 would be to understand whether the event poses a risk to  
 4 the public. The risk was that Khan was a dangerous  
 5 ex-terrorist and sending him to a high profile event  
 6 might pose a risk to the public. They would want to  
 7 know about the details as they would all matter.

8 He did not get that additional information  
 9 personally, and didn't press for it. When asked why he  
 10 didn't press for it, he said he did not recall  
 11 expressing those explicit concerns at the time. He knew  
 12 DS Stephenson was seeking further clarity as to what the  
 13 proposal was, and he didn't push or chase it, and he  
 14 would have expected to have been made aware of further  
 15 finer detail as and when it became known.

16 He did not attend the MAPPAs meeting in November. He  
 17 would have discussed the meeting with DS Stephenson and  
 18 DC Hartill but cannot recall the details of the  
 19 conversation, but if London had been mentioned, he would  
 20 have likely queried it. He had noted "Trip to  
 21 Cambridge? Discussed with probation" in his book. He  
 22 recalled in an update there was a suggestion of a trip  
 23 to Cambridge which was at odds with what he had been  
 24 told previously on interactions with Learning Together,  
 25 so it was an anomaly, but he did not seek clarification.

103

1 On 18 November he noted the JOT meeting with MI5 and  
 2 West Midlands. This was a note of an update given to  
 3 him by DS Stephenson. He had noted "No adverse  
 4 intelligence", and he had summarised the lifestyle  
 5 position of Khan, no tagging issues, no mentor, no  
 6 change about employment, and no attendance at the  
 7 mosque.

8 It was put to him that according to Witness A it was  
 9 also noted at the meeting that there remained a risk of  
 10 Khan re-engaging in Islamist extremist activity,  
 11 including radicalising and inciting others. He could  
 12 not say that was not mentioned as he was not present at  
 13 the meeting and his note was just a summary of the  
 14 update given by DS Stephenson. He did not tell him  
 15 whether anything had been said in relation to  
 16 a prospective visit to London. By the time that JOT was  
 17 happening and he was getting the update on it, he was  
 18 not aware that Khan was going to go to London on  
 19 29 November.

20 Looking back, given the concerns that he had  
 21 expressed at various points, if he had been told that  
 22 Khan was to be permitted to go to a significant  
 23 building, a livery company hall right next to  
 24 London Bridge, that he was going to be going unescorted  
 25 and that there were going to be some relatively high

104

1 profile figures there, and what he would have thought of  
2 that proposal, he said if he'd been aware of that level  
3 of detail, at the very least he thought he would have  
4 wanted some assurances around what was in place which  
5 would have no doubt provoked further conversations.

6 As to what he meant by what was in place, he said  
7 that with all the factors that had been mentioned to him  
8 there's obviously some levels of concerns and what  
9 levels of security may be in place or who was  
10 accompanying and who would be in attendance.  
11 Unfortunately, no, he didn't know that detail. When  
12 asked about what security measures he would want to see  
13 in place and whether that might be a bag search or  
14 a metal detector, he was unable to say. Looking back,  
15 obviously yes, and possibly being accompanied to the  
16 event.

17 Dawn Banner's statement was read to you. She was  
18 the crime analyst in Staffordshire Special Branch and  
19 her role involved analysing data and producing reports  
20 from various systems in order to assist with the Special  
21 Branch investigations. She first became aware of Khan  
22 around September 2018 when he was due to be released  
23 from prison. In anticipation of that, she put together  
24 the subject intelligence profile. It would be a living  
25 document which would be updated from various sources,

1 including prison and police intelligence, probation and  
2 mentor reports, and the tagging data. She felt she had  
3 a good understanding of his behaviour and mindset from  
4 those sources.

5 From her reading about his behaviour whilst in  
6 prison, it did not appear to her that Khan had changed  
7 his mindset. It appeared to her that he showed no  
8 remorse or want to change while in prison until a short  
9 period prior to his release. She believed she used the  
10 words "He will pose a risk of re-engagement when  
11 released" to summarise this in the profile documents.

12 DI Powell was a Staffordshire Police Special Branch  
13 officer in the time that we are concerned with. He is  
14 now on secondment as part of the West Midlands CTU.

15 The planning for Khan's release into management in  
16 the community began in mid-2018 when he was head of the  
17 Special Branch. Whilst he was on secondment in  
18 a regional organised crime unit, a P3 priority  
19 investigation was commencing by MI5 working jointly with  
20 the CTU. He knew that PS Forsyth and his team would  
21 take on an overt management of Khan rather than Special  
22 Branch or CTU. This was established practice. He had  
23 no concerns about their ability or qualifications. He  
24 knew they did not have significant CT experience.

25 He attended a number of MAPPAs meetings with a view

1 as the supervisor of the Prevent Team managing part 4  
2 and the licence conditions. He was at the meeting  
3 in June 2018. As to pre-reading or pre-briefing, he was  
4 requested to prove some background information of the  
5 offence Khan had been sentenced for and one of the  
6 officers in the OIMU had prepared a document so he could  
7 give that information. He knew nothing about Khan's  
8 conduct in prison or intelligence from prison before the  
9 meeting. An update was given at the meeting and he  
10 recalled the details being discussed and a concern about  
11 Khan being compliant to avoid scrutiny. He had not seen  
12 the ERG at the time of that meeting but saw it later.  
13 He recalled they attached a very high risk of serious  
14 harm to Khan.

15 Before the second meeting he went to in August,  
16 MAPPAs had asked Special Branch to look into the  
17 whereabouts of the co-defendants and he requested what  
18 intelligence was known to the prison. The co-defendants  
19 were still in custody and there was no update from the  
20 prisons. A security update was given at the MAPPAs  
21 meeting and there was continuing concern about Khan.

22 October 2018 is the third meeting that he attended.  
23 The picture was the same. He was then on secondment and  
24 returning in January 2019 when Khan had been released.  
25

1 He reviewed the subject profile that had been prepared  
2 within Special Branch. The "return to his old ways"  
3 intelligence was in the profile then as well as the  
4 "attack after release" strand. He had the intelligence  
5 brought to his attention when he was on secondment. He  
6 understood that the commencement of the priority  
7 operation was due to these two pieces of intelligence  
8 and the priority operation was upgraded to P3 and so he  
9 understood that this intelligence was being taken  
10 seriously. He did not know at the time if the MAPPAs  
11 panel knew of both parts of the intelligence. As  
12 a result of reading the documents, he was now aware of  
13 the sensitivities around the second piece and that it  
14 could not go to the MAPPAs panel.

15 He had conversations with DI Hessel about the  
16 handling and the grading. He thought it was being  
17 handled appropriately by DI Hessel and the team, having  
18 shared it further or discussed it further with  
19 West Midlands CTU and MI5, and so he did not intervene  
20 in the management of that intelligence at the time.

21 He was attending the MAPPAs panel and knew the  
22 participants were making decisions about Khan, and what  
23 he could and couldn't do in terms of management,  
24 including employment, curfew, sign-on times, et cetera.

25 He was asked whether it occurred to him at the time

1 that people were doing so without knowing this critical  
 2 piece of intelligence that caused the operation to be  
 3 upgraded in its priority . He said he was aware of that,  
 4 and then there was this exchange. Mr Hough asked:  
 5 "Question: Did you or anyone else, to your  
 6 knowledge, give any thought as to how that might be  
 7 circumvented, whether a gist could be provided, or  
 8 whether information could be provided to the MAPPA chair  
 9 by other method?  
 10 "Answer: I hadn't, and I think that was because the  
 11 intelligence was being managed in my absence.  
 12 I certainly didn't revisit this intelligence in my mind  
 13 at the MAPPA meetings to question whether or not, for  
 14 example, form of words or things had been discussed.  
 15 "Question: But in the meetings that followed, and  
 16 we'll look at a few of them shortly, you are sitting  
 17 there in a room with people making a decision?  
 18 "Answer: Yes.  
 19 "Question: Does it ever strike you: gosh, all these  
 20 people are having these discussions and making these  
 21 decisions without knowing something really important  
 22 that I know?  
 23 "Answer: Yes.  
 24 "Question: When you did think that, did you think  
 25 it was unsatisfactory, or difficult ?

109

1 "Answer: I obviously had due regard to handling  
 2 conditions, and that is very often a position that we  
 3 find ourselves in in terms of knowing intelligence but  
 4 having to adhere to the grading and conditions that's  
 5 applied to it .  
 6 "Question: But does it then make it all the more  
 7 important that the person in the meeting or the people  
 8 in the meeting who do know this intelligence speak up in  
 9 relation to any decisions to which it might be relevant?  
 10 "Answer: Yes."  
 11 The 7 March 2019 MAPPA meeting was the first one he  
 12 attended since October 2018. It didn't strike him that  
 13 neither the West Midlands CTU SIO nor the deputy were in  
 14 attendance. He recalled the discussion about  
 15 a Learning Together event being too soon, and also about  
 16 future events with measures in place. No specific  
 17 measures, he said, were mentioned. He and colleagues  
 18 did ask for a heads-up if Khan was attending events so  
 19 they could accurately assess any particular intelligence  
 20 around those events and also to assess covert options to  
 21 feed into the priority investigation . It was not  
 22 specifically to assist in advising on public protection  
 23 or risk .  
 24 He recalled DCI Cobbett speaking about being happy  
 25 for her team to facilitate the attendance by Khan to

110

1 reduce pressure on Staffordshire Prevent Team. From the  
 2 way the wording was phrased, he agreed it seems to  
 3 suggest that DCI Cobbett assumed that if he is allowed  
 4 to go, someone will be there as an escort .  
 5 In the April MAPPA meeting, it notes that the escort  
 6 was offered by CTU for the Whitemoor event, which was  
 7 initially understood to be West Midlands Police  
 8 officers , and then it was ultimately a collective from a  
 9 police perspective. The May MAPPA meeting was then the  
 10 last one he attended before his secondment. He was not  
 11 aware of the discussions at the August MAPPA about Khan  
 12 being invited to the event by Learning Together, and he  
 13 was not aware of any specific arrangements for that  
 14 trip . Later in September, [in the] Special Branch  
 15 operations meeting there was reference to the dumper  
 16 truck course, and the team were going to monitor any  
 17 future discussions in MAPPA in case that issue arose  
 18 again. There was no discussion in the meeting about any  
 19 particular visits by Khan to Learning Together events.  
 20 Then Detective Chief Superintendent Oomer of  
 21 Staffordshire Police. He had been in that rank since  
 22 2017 and oversees a number of departments and is the  
 23 link or liaison for Staffordshire Police to the  
 24 West Midlands CTU.  
 25 Between 2018–2020 the CT structure was that

111

1 West Midlands CTU did the investigations while  
 2 Staffordshire Special Branch provided the intelligence  
 3 support function for the investigation into Khan.  
 4 Staffordshire Special Branch, he said, had four  
 5 capabilities : a dedicated source unit for managing  
 6 sources including informants; an intelligence management  
 7 function that has a unit to receive intelligence , and  
 8 a unit to provide intelligence support for  
 9 counter-terrorism investigations; field intelligence and  
 10 operations, and a variety of other activities , including  
 11 vetting checks. While Special Branch officers were  
 12 under the management of Staffordshire Police, much of  
 13 the daily tasking for their work came from West Midlands  
 14 CTU and investigative officers there.  
 15 In late 2018, a decision was taken that the Prevent  
 16 Team should no longer be managed within Special Branch.  
 17 The rationale was that the Prevent officers were  
 18 predominantly community-based. Their role involved  
 19 liaison and identification of potential radicalisation  
 20 and it is against the Prevent strategy in terms of being  
 21 so closely linked to Special Branch, and this was  
 22 an opportunity to develop better community links through  
 23 neighbourhood policing rather than being seen as  
 24 an investigative arm of the Special Branch function.  
 25 Prevent officers are not vetted to the same level as

112

1 Special Branch officers. The officers continued working  
 2 physically closely and operationally closely with their  
 3 Special Branch colleagues and so the change did not  
 4 really affect relations between the two sets of  
 5 officers .  
 6 He was not himself directly or closely involved with  
 7 the investigation and management of Khan. He was given  
 8 a briefing and told the date of Khan's release and that  
 9 the part 4 issues would be managed by the Prevent Team.  
 10 He was also told of the priority operation and that MI5  
 11 and the CTU would be working together on that and that  
 12 his Special Branch would be assisting with the  
 13 intelligence function.  
 14 When asked by Mr Pitchers, he thought when he  
 15 approved the allocation of Khan to the Prevent Team he  
 16 had made an assumption that he had been released by  
 17 a Parole Board decision. He accepted the assumption he  
 18 made was profoundly wrong.  
 19 He was aware in general terms that the Prevent  
 20 officers managing Khan didn't have access to  
 21 intelligence that sat at secret level, and that here,  
 22 some or all did not have access to intelligence shortly  
 23 before his release, indicating an expressed intention to  
 24 carry out an attack. He accepted that there is  
 25 a disadvantage if the officers dealing with the

113

1 management of an offender are ignorant of some critical  
 2 pieces of intelligence .  
 3 The Prevent officers didn't have CT investigative  
 4 experience. He did not agree it necessarily helped to  
 5 have that experience in dealing with part 4 as this was  
 6 not their role .  
 7 He wasn't expecting the Prevent officers to be  
 8 involved in any covert operation around Khan. His  
 9 expectation was that they were managing the part 4  
 10 requirements that were very specific and they were well  
 11 capable of doing that, especially as they had experience  
 12 in identifying extremist behaviour and potential  
 13 radicalisation based upon their roles.  
 14 In addition at MAPPAs, a number of agencies with  
 15 counter-terrorism experience were present to provide  
 16 that advice, support, and expertise.  
 17 He was asked about the absence from the MAPPAs  
 18 meetings of the SIO or the deputy SIO. That too he said  
 19 didn't concern him. He would have been concerned if  
 20 there was no representation from the Counter-Terrorism  
 21 Unit, but the minutes show there was representation.  
 22 SIOs are managing multiple investigations and so it  
 23 would be difficult for him to say they must attend as he  
 24 doesn't know the exact commitments they had, but he was  
 25 reassured that someone from the CTU was there and that

114

1 any information would be passed onto the SIO.  
 2 In 2019, the approach to management of part 4  
 3 nominals varied widely across the country. In some  
 4 areas they were managed by CT officers and in other  
 5 areas it was as it was in Staffordshire .  
 6 In September 2019, officers of West Midlands CTU made  
 7 a proposal that Team 7 of that unit, who had been  
 8 responsible for offender management in the West Midlands  
 9 force area, should take charge of managing part 4  
 10 nominals across the broader West Midlands, including  
 11 Staffordshire . The rationale was to give some  
 12 consistency across the region with Team 7 taking on  
 13 responsibility for all part 4s and utilising that  
 14 experience.  
 15 DCI Ryan Chambers, at the time we're concerned with,  
 16 he is at West Midlands CTU and the SIO in the covert  
 17 operation between November 2018 and October/November  
 18 2019.  
 19 The SIO is answerable to senior officers around the  
 20 conduct of an investigation . In November 2018, he knew  
 21 Khan was being released into the broader West Midlands  
 22 area, and knew it was to be a priority operation with  
 23 MI5. A message came from MI5 setting out the background  
 24 on Khan and the decision to re-open the investigation.  
 25 The log sets out the background and also this:

115

1 "Recent intelligence indicates that Khan may be  
 2 intending to carry out an attack on his release. We  
 3 note that this reporting is uncorroborated and deemed of  
 4 low credibility ."  
 5 He said that was the first he was told of the  
 6 intelligence . He then received a subject profile for  
 7 Khan, noting that DI Powell was listed on the front of  
 8 the document as the person to provide approval for  
 9 dissemination. This was important as DI Powell was  
 10 involved in the MAPPAs process. In the subject profile  
 11 he saw both strands of the intelligence present and  
 12 understood they had the same security classification as  
 13 the document. He was able to draw that conclusion, he  
 14 said that those were agreed forms of words at the date  
 15 given of 14 November 2018.  
 16 He understood the intelligence could be lawfully  
 17 shared with other parties outside the police, meaning  
 18 those on a need-to-know basis if there was justification  
 19 for them knowing.  
 20 As to DI Powell's evidence that with regard to the  
 21 handling conditions for the second piece of  
 22 intelligence, the attack-planning intelligence, he  
 23 considered that the permission of the intelligence owner  
 24 would be required in order to break it out.  
 25 DCI Chambers was not saying that DI Powell's evidence

116

1 was wrong, but noted that as it was an official  
 2 sensitive profile he came to the conclusion that  
 3 an agreed process must have been in place because the  
 4 profile had a form of words on an intelligence report.  
 5 He was aware that DI Hessel and DI Powell had given  
 6 evidence that the decision whether or not to share with  
 7 the MAPPAs participants the two strands of intelligence  
 8 was for him as the SIO. He disagrees with that fairly  
 9 strongly. He has a professional concern about it as  
 10 they addressed the position in January 2019 and took no  
 11 positive action to correct it. He was comfortable with  
 12 them holding the view that it was his responsibility if  
 13 they had positively informed him and allowed him to take  
 14 action. If they are not taking action and not informing  
 15 him, he accepted that creates a problem as something  
 16 might be missed and important intelligence may not be  
 17 fed into the MAPPAs process. He thought that is what had  
 18 happened here.  
 19 As to the two strands of intelligence, he understood  
 20 that the "old ways" intelligence had been corroborated.  
 21 He later discovered that was due to a simple error and  
 22 it was two duplicate pieces of intelligence. It was  
 23 only just before these proceedings that he found out it  
 24 had not been corroborated. Although he had carried out  
 25 this investigation without being told that the "old

117

1 ways" intelligence was not in fact corroborated, he  
 2 never viewed them differently. Corroborated or  
 3 uncorroborated: the intelligence existed and could not  
 4 be ignored. He was taking the two strands seriously.  
 5 On 29 November he had made notes in his major  
 6 incident policy document. The document was for him to  
 7 record information as he knew it, and he would make  
 8 decisions based on that as to the investigation going  
 9 forward. He had noted this:  
 10 "Uncorroborated intelligence suggests had that he's  
 11 planning to return to his old ways and will plan to  
 12 conduct an attack on release (no further context at  
 13 present)."  
 14 He said he had to consider risks and he had written  
 15 this:  
 16 "There's no current intel that identifies any  
 17 current potential risk to the community and having  
 18 reviewed the intel as it stands following a formal JOT  
 19 it is agreed that reporting is not corroborated but  
 20 should be considered as an aspirational aim of Khan and  
 21 that he may still hold extremist views towards UK."  
 22 He said that he was stressing that he was taking the  
 23 intelligence seriously. He also says that he and MI5  
 24 will keep the risk that Khan poses to the public and the  
 25 police under review, and that while MI5 are the lead

118

1 agency in the covert investigation, any threat to life  
 2 then the police will take primacy and if necessary, take  
 3 executive action. Had any intelligence suggested there  
 4 was a risk to the community, he would have been more  
 5 than comfortable of making an intelligence-based arrest  
 6 just to try and mitigate that threat.  
 7 He knew there had been some MAPPAs meetings and there  
 8 would be more to come. From his perspective,  
 9 Staffordshire Special Branch and Staffordshire Prevent  
 10 would attend. They had ownership of the licence  
 11 conditions and part 4. It was not standard process for  
 12 the SIOs to attend MAPPAs. He would have expected to  
 13 have been told what was being reported at those  
 14 meetings. They have a DCI from West Midlands who  
 15 attends MAPPAs, that is a requirement of the process and  
 16 he would have expected if there was any information or  
 17 intelligence to be brought to his attention, and  
 18 equally, if he felt that MAPPAs participants needed to  
 19 know something, he could feed it back through the DCI.  
 20 DCI Cobbett was attending and he had a conversation  
 21 with her and asked if his attendance was required to  
 22 give an initial presentation. She said he did not need  
 23 to attend. With the two strands of intelligence, he had  
 24 no reason not to think they didn't know of both.  
 25 Between January to March 2019, the monitoring gave

119

1 rise to no concerning intelligence and the Prevent  
 2 reports were that Khan's presentation was generally  
 3 good. His role was to remain sceptical but the material  
 4 was presenting positively. He was not aware of the  
 5 7 March report of the Learning Together event in  
 6 Cambridge and permission being refused, and of  
 7 Staffordshire Special Branch officers asking to be  
 8 informed of any similar invitations, but it was not  
 9 necessary, he said, and didn't surprise him.  
 10 If there had been a proposal that Khan should go to  
 11 an event somewhere in the country he would be confident  
 12 in that the fact that DCI Cobbett and other  
 13 West Midlands CTU colleagues were present at MAPPAs, and  
 14 they would be able to address that.  
 15 Between April and July 2019 there was no concerning  
 16 intelligence from the priority operation. He knew Khan  
 17 was involved in Learning Together but the attendance at  
 18 the event at Whitemoor in June was not brought to his  
 19 attention by DCI Cobbett or any other mechanism. He  
 20 focused on the covert investigation into Khan; others  
 21 were responsible for managing the risk within the MAPPAs  
 22 process.  
 23 The dumper truck course was brought to his attention  
 24 by Staffordshire Special Branch and he acted on it  
 25 immediately. It was felt jointly it would be raised at

120

1 MAPPA and they shouldn't do anything to support it. It  
2 was never brought to his attention that there was some  
3 support for Khan going on the course. He recognised  
4 that those managing Khan were entitled to have the  
5 viewpoint of wishing to support him on this, but from  
6 a CT SIO perspective he would have been concerned that  
7 they thought it was a positive thing to do. Had he  
8 known their views, he might have had a conversation with  
9 Team 7's DS Jerromes and DI Williams to look at that.

10 In the period from August to early November 2019,  
11 the monitoring of Khan in the priority operation gave  
12 rise to no intelligence of concern. After the 22 August  
13 MAPPA meeting, he was told his objections to the dumper  
14 truck course had been successful. He was not told then  
15 about the Learning Together trip. He first heard of it  
16 at the end of October or early November when the  
17 investigation was about to pass to DI Williams.

18 He accepted there are risks of a person with Khan's  
19 background going to a high profile event in a major city  
20 centre, however, he said it was important to see the  
21 context and referred to how Khan could have gone to  
22 London without being in breach of any of his licence  
23 conditions if he made his way by any means other than  
24 by train, stressing that the London part of a  
25 consideration was slightly irrelevant.

121

1 When Mr Hough pushed him on this, he accepted that  
2 if he was getting information from tagging data of  
3 long-distance travel to major cities, he would want to  
4 know about it from a risk perspective. He recognised  
5 that the travelling to London does have two dimensions,  
6 going to a city centre and going to a gathering with  
7 some senior figures from the criminal justice system.  
8 He accepted he would want to know the features of the  
9 prospective visit in advance so that he could express  
10 a view and consider all the pros and cons of it going  
11 ahead. Had he been aware of any intelligence whatsoever  
12 they would have opposed it. Had he been told what  
13 Mr Skelton was told in August 2019 of the prospective  
14 visit and the venue, some details of the attendees, he  
15 would have wanted to explore and understand more as to  
16 make a more informed decision reviewing it with a lens  
17 of scepticism.

18 When asked: based on what we now know of the venue,  
19 its location and attendees, that some sort of security  
20 measures should be considered, he considered that if:

21 "... they were making the decision that they need to  
22 put security measures in place, that means that  
23 organisationally, collectively, they are saying there is  
24 a risk and therefore if there is a risk they should be  
25 mitigating against it and the only way to do that is to

122

1 stop him going".

2 However, he felt it would have been challenging to  
3 object to Khan attending based on the intelligence that  
4 was known and there was no adverse information that  
5 there was any risk.

6 The Prevent visit on 31 October where it was  
7 reported back to him that Khan was spending a lot of  
8 time on his own and not doing anything productive, that  
9 was the second time that the matter was brought to his  
10 direct attention. The fact that Khan appears to preempt  
11 the scepticism of the officers was not lost on him and  
12 he knew it was not lost on DI Williams that there are  
13 some concerning things to this. Isolation suggests that  
14 if they are not regularly engaging with people, not  
15 having regular contact, not putting themselves forward  
16 to actively engage with life, that is concerning. From  
17 his experience with CT investigations around lone actors  
18 who go on to attack without any preemptive intelligence,  
19 that was something very much at the forefront of his  
20 mind.

21 He knew that DS Stephenson and DC Hartill were going  
22 to the MAPPA meeting. He did not plan to attend the  
23 MAPPA meeting. At that point he knew that DS Jerromes  
24 would likely be attending and would be actively engaged  
25 with the intelligence around Operation Molal and would

123

1 be sighted on it, and so he had confidence that that  
2 would be taken forward.

3 In relation to the factors put to him which might  
4 have been considered as reasons to allow Khan to go to  
5 the visit, any absence of concerning intelligence, he  
6 accepted, as Witness A had, that when a person is  
7 subject to the kind of strict licence conditions  
8 affecting Khan, that it can be difficult, as  
9 counter-terrorism investigators, to get clear insight  
10 into what they're doing and what they're thinking  
11 because their movements and behaviour are so restricted;  
12 secondly, that Khan had engaged well with figures in  
13 authority and been quite polite and engaging to the  
14 point he was aware there were a number of reports from  
15 the time that he was in prison referring to him engaging  
16 positively with prison staff in a range of contexts,  
17 even while very disturbing intelligence was coming in  
18 about his behaviour on the wing; and thirdly, that  
19 Learning Together was seen as a positive force or  
20 a positive aspect in his life. His very careful  
21 response was that he saw that based on the information  
22 he had. Mr Hough then asked this:

23 "Question: Is it right that in saying that, you  
24 were pointing to the fact that you didn't know that Khan  
25 wasn't doing regular creative writing work or regularly

124

1 engaging in an educative way, but was in effect going to  
 2 a few social occasions during the course of a year?  
 3 "Answer: Yes, exactly that: it really does appear  
 4 that there's quite a big intelligence gap there in  
 5 understanding fully what Learning Together was about and  
 6 how participative Mr Khan was."  
 7 DS Marc Jerromes, part of the West Midlands CTU and  
 8 has been part of Team 7 since 2017. In that role he  
 9 also acts as a deputy SIO in counter—terrorism  
 10 investigations. One of their functions was the overt  
 11 management of part 4 terrorist offenders within the  
 12 West Midlands area, the job undertaken by PS Forsyth on  
 13 Khan.  
 14 His first awareness of Khan coming into MAPPA would  
 15 have been when the agenda was set for the June meeting.  
 16 The name did not mean anything to him, but he would have  
 17 taken time to find out about Khan. He attended the  
 18 MAPPA meetings in June, August and October 2018, but not  
 19 the one in December.  
 20 He didn't recall the "return to old ways" specific  
 21 intelligence being disclosed to him at that point, but  
 22 in the context of MAPPA he was not aware of it being  
 23 discussed.  
 24 He went to the MAPPA meeting in January 2019 and he  
 25 would have seen the reference in the minutes to the

125

1 intelligence about returning to his old ways. At that  
 2 time he didn't read any version of the Staffordshire  
 3 Special Branch subject profile on Khan. He was not  
 4 aware of the second strain of intelligence about  
 5 intending to carry out an attack on his release and it  
 6 was not something he became aware of before the  
 7 October/November handover.  
 8 In response to Mr Armstrong, he explained that he  
 9 didn't see it as his position to be the intelligence  
 10 conduit. Staffordshire Special Branch were there and  
 11 were the intelligence support to the covert  
 12 investigation, and that was not his function in that  
 13 meeting.  
 14 He attended the MAPPA meeting on 7 March 2019. He  
 15 recalled what was said about the Learning Together event  
 16 at Cambridge, that Mr Skelton had said Khan should not  
 17 attend, but for future events they may look to Khan  
 18 attending with measures in place. He did not form any  
 19 view or have any concerns on Khan attending events at  
 20 that stage. To him it seemed that the lead agency,  
 21 probation, and the Prison Service seemed to have thought  
 22 it through. That was how it was presented to him and he  
 23 had no concerns then.  
 24 The July MAPPA meeting was the first time he found  
 25 out about the visit to Whitemoor. He was aware that

126

1 Prevent officers escorted him as it would be difficult  
 2 otherwise to get there. The dumper truck course was  
 3 raised. It didn't sit comfortably with him. He  
 4 recalled the decision to seek more information as there  
 5 was a difference of opinion. At the August MAPPA  
 6 meeting he recalled an event in November being proposed,  
 7 presented by probation and Prevent as part of the  
 8 ongoing work that they were doing with Khan. He did not  
 9 recall anyone expressing a view or any specific positive  
 10 decision being taken. Had it been a decision, then he  
 11 would like to think it would have been in the minutes.  
 12 Mr Hough asked him whether, when three months later  
 13 the attack happened, it occurred to him that he had been  
 14 in a meeting where the events had been approved. In  
 15 response he said he was present in the MAPPA when it was  
 16 discussed, the panel were given an opportunity to raise  
 17 any concerns with attendance and he didn't recall any  
 18 resistance to the attendance being discussed during the  
 19 MAPPA panel.  
 20 He was taken to the contents of the minutes on the  
 21 dumper truck course and the summaries of the points  
 22 being made and the decision on it. Because the minutes  
 23 record such decisions or points noted, he would expect  
 24 any positive approval of the Learning Together visit to  
 25 be minuted. He was aware that soon after this meeting,

127

1 Khan's mentoring arrangement came to an end.  
 2 In September, he and DI Williams produced  
 3 a memorandum of plans to manage a broader range of the  
 4 part 4 nominals within the community. He was keen to  
 5 explore outside of the West Midlands region especially  
 6 as other regions nationally were coming to see how they  
 7 were doing things and liked what they saw and that it  
 8 seemed to make sense that they look at consistency with  
 9 neighbouring forces.  
 10 At the same time there was a project, Project  
 11 Amplify, which was the regionalisation of  
 12 counter—terrorism resources and so they saw this as  
 13 an opportunity to take control of the Staffordshire  
 14 cases. He had noted the risk and credibility of the  
 15 part 4 nominals cannot be underestimated and that they  
 16 have shown capability and intent to cause communities  
 17 serious harm.  
 18 As a result of the proposals, the plan was to make  
 19 the transfers over the coming months on a risk—based  
 20 system. With the handover, he started to receive  
 21 investigation documents. Nothing stood out before  
 22 18 November 2019. Before the JOT he recalled  
 23 DI Williams having a discussion with him about  
 24 intelligence within the prison. He did not recall the  
 25 specific second strand of intelligence being shared with

128

1 him. At the time he had no reason to think there was  
 2 intelligence the MAPPA panel did not already have or  
 3 that certainly probation or Staffordshire would not have  
 4 shared the information.  
 5 He did not know at that point if there were any  
 6 restrictions on the use of the information and he could  
 7 not recall specific intelligence in terms of asking its  
 8 grading or anything of that nature.  
 9 He was also aware that prior to the JOT that due to  
 10 the lack of reporting and intelligence, they were  
 11 working towards a closure of the operation. He saw that  
 12 as going hand-in-hand with the overt offender management  
 13 handover to see if they could once and for all mitigate  
 14 any risks with regard to Khan. He had noted that Khan  
 15 was no longer attending the gym with great frequency,  
 16 and that he was going to London on 29 November as part  
 17 of an educational visit with the company that helped him  
 18 previously. He recalled a discussion about the London  
 19 event at that meeting, presented as a conversational in  
 20 an update by probation or Prevent, but being honest, he  
 21 said he couldn't remember the detail.  
 22 He was asked whether he had any concern at this  
 23 meeting that Khan, with the background we've looked at,  
 24 and the characteristics he knew, was being permitted to  
 25 go to an event in London arranged by this reasonably

1 prestigious organisation. He said not. He still had  
 2 the view from the information that he was being given  
 3 that this was a positive factor with regards to Khan's  
 4 rehabilitation. He was asked whether it occurred to him  
 5 that here is Khan, a serious terrorist offender being  
 6 managed at MAPPA level 3, has only left the Stoke and  
 7 Stafford area on one occasion, suddenly being permitted  
 8 to go to a major London station and a big event in  
 9 central London without an escort, as a CT policeman he  
 10 was worried about that, and whether that went through  
 11 his head. He said not.  
 12 A JOT was arranged for the handover to formalise the  
 13 process and to make sure intelligence MI5 had and the  
 14 concerns raised by DS Stephenson with regard to the  
 15 visit at the end of October where he expressed concerns  
 16 on Khan becoming self-isolated and going almost nowhere  
 17 were discussed. He had spoken to the intelligence  
 18 officer in OIMU, Mr Mills, and before the JOT spoke to  
 19 the MI5 desk officer as well. Mr Mills told him there  
 20 was no adverse reporting following release and nothing  
 21 in addition to the intelligence of concern that had been  
 22 generated in prison. The MI5 desk officer told him  
 23 nothing of interest. He didn't recall anyone in the  
 24 meeting raising the point that the visit to London might  
 25 involve any risk.

1 He was asked whether he ought to have had a detailed  
 2 discussion at the joint operational team meeting about  
 3 the risk involved in the visit to London. He assessed  
 4 that the safeguarding and risk assessment sat firmly  
 5 with Staffordshire Prevent and Staffordshire Special  
 6 Branch as part of their overt offender management. He  
 7 reiterated that he had no information or intelligence to  
 8 suggest that Khan should be prevented from going. He  
 9 took the view that they had an individual who appears  
 10 not to have had many factors in his life which were  
 11 causing him to leave the premises, but the London visit  
 12 was one. So with the Learning Together event being  
 13 a rehabilitation event, the thinking would have been  
 14 that this was a positive event, and with regards to  
 15 travel to London, he had actually raised the facts  
 16 around his licence conditions and that was being managed  
 17 by probation with regards to risk assessment on the  
 18 licence conditions.  
 19 The final witness, members of the jury, you heard  
 20 from, was Assistant Chief Constable Matthew Ward. He is  
 21 responsible for organised crime, counter-terrorism and  
 22 intelligence in the West Midlands Police. He provided  
 23 detailed information regarding the structure of  
 24 counter-terrorism policing in the West Midlands Police  
 25 area and the development of those structures across the

1 UK. He explained Project Amplify was set up to develop  
 2 a new operating model which could combine the two  
 3 Special Branches within the CTU and that was due to take  
 4 place with effect from April 2020.  
 5 Prior to this, the covert management of offenders in  
 6 the community under part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act  
 7 lay with the force area in which the registered  
 8 terrorist offender was living, which in the case of Khan  
 9 was Staffordshire.  
 10 ACC Ward would have supported the decision that  
 11 management under part 4 was done by Prevent officers  
 12 because they are specialist counter-terrorism officers  
 13 with the required skills. He was unaware that they felt  
 14 they lacked confidence or clarity.  
 15 In November 2019, there was no national or local  
 16 policing policies or procedures specifically for  
 17 counter-terrorism offender management under part 4.  
 18 There was general training for Prevent officers which  
 19 covered ideology and general awareness training, and  
 20 briefings for CT officers which covered  
 21 counter-terrorism. ACC Ward did not support SIOs  
 22 routinely attending MAPPA meetings, but noted that it  
 23 was important there was a flow of intelligence between  
 24 the SIO and MAPPA which would be captured and managed by  
 25 Special Branch. There was no process in place for

1 specific intelligence to be shared between the SIO and  
 2 the chair, and the minutes were not routinely shared.  
 3 Since November 2019, he said that guidance has been  
 4 developed for the management of terrorist offenders that  
 5 includes the process for the sharing of information and  
 6 intelligence .  
 7 Following the 2017 terrorist attacks, an operational  
 8 improvement review was established between the police  
 9 and MI5. This introduced multi-agency centres between  
 10 the Home Office, MI5 and counter-terrorism police, which  
 11 sought to standardise processes for moving individuals  
 12 from covert investigations into long-term life in the  
 13 community, and management under part 4.  
 14 In parallel with this, he said that CT police  
 15 headquarters established a high-level review of the  
 16 approaches to overt management of nominals of terror  
 17 interest. This led, he said, to a strategic plan, which  
 18 in turn led to Project Semper from November 2019. In  
 19 early 2020, that project made a series of  
 20 recommendations for changes that would improve the  
 21 management of CT nominals within the community. One  
 22 being that management is now formally recognised as  
 23 a capability within CT policing and he described that  
 24 150 posts will be created for nominal managers who will  
 25 complete nominal management training and do the work of

1 Prevent, Team 7 and Special Branch combined. There will  
 2 also be guidance and processes for nominal management  
 3 including processes for risk assessment informed by all  
 4 relevant intelligence . There will be a lead responsible  
 5 officer who will be responsible for all nominal  
 6 management across the region. There will also be  
 7 a nominal management capability board setting the  
 8 standard for nominals management across the country and  
 9 a CT nominal management strategic partnership board  
 10 ensuring joint working with other agencies too.  
 11 Members of the jury, I've got one final document to  
 12 give to you, which I think is now ready to be handed  
 13 out. I'll ask for that to be handed to you and then  
 14 I'll go through it with you. (Handed).  
 15 What you should have in fact are three documents:  
 16 one headed "legal directions to the jury", and then  
 17 questionnaire which is in two parts. Can I just ask for  
 18 the moment that you have in front of you, please, the  
 19 legal directions to the jury, because the other  
 20 documents will become apparent when I read through these  
 21 to you.  
 22 So, by way of introduction:  
 23 1. As the Coroner in these Inquests, I am  
 24 responsible for giving legal directions to you as the  
 25 jury and you must accept these directions and apply them

1 to the evidence. It is for you to reach factual  
 2 conclusions following these legal directions .  
 3 2. Your findings must be based solely on the  
 4 evidence you have heard or seen in court. You should  
 5 ignore anything else such as media coverage of the case.  
 6 3. I have summarised the evidence for you.  
 7 However, subject to these legal directions, you should  
 8 decide what features of the evidence are important and  
 9 you should form your own view of the evidence.  
 10 The purpose of an Inquest and Record of Inquest.  
 11 4. The primary purpose of an inquest is to provide  
 12 answers to four factual questions: who the deceased  
 13 person was; when did he or she come by his or her death;  
 14 where did he or she come by his or her death; and how  
 15 did he or she come by his or her death.  
 16 A coroner's jury should not address any other  
 17 matters in their conclusions, except for confirming  
 18 certain information required for the registration of  
 19 death. In addition, a jury's conclusions must not be  
 20 framed in such a way that they appear to determine any  
 21 question of criminal liability of a named person or any  
 22 question of civil liability .  
 23 5. Very often, the evidence in an inquest will be  
 24 much more wide-ranging than is necessary to allow the  
 25 jury to answer the four questions mentioned above. That

1 is mainly because the process of hearing the evidence  
 2 and conducting a full and rigorous inquiry in public is  
 3 important in itself .  
 4 6. In these Inquests, as in many inquests, the  
 5 answers to the first three questions are clear and  
 6 obvious. The fourth question is how each of  
 7 Saskia Jones and Jack Merritt came by his or her death.  
 8 The question means by what means and in what  
 9 circumstances did each come by his or her death.  
 10 Documents for completion.  
 11 7. In this case you will give your conclusions by  
 12 completing a questionnaire. I shall ask my usher to  
 13 provide each of you with a copy, although you will  
 14 together complete just one copy with your collective  
 15 conclusions. I repeat, you will only complete one copy  
 16 of this questionnaire between all of you. It is in two  
 17 parts. The first four pages, stapled separately,  
 18 contain notes to guide you. The remaining pages form  
 19 the actual questionnaire. You will see it has five  
 20 questions.  
 21 8. Once you have reached your conclusions and  
 22 completed the questionnaire, you will be asked to sign  
 23 a formal Record of Inquest for each of Jack Merritt and  
 24 Saskia Jones. I shall ask my usher to provide you with  
 25 a single copy for each Record of Inquest for all of you

1 together, not one copy for each of you. These have been  
2 pre-completed with the formal particulars of death and  
3 the sections on the means and circumstances of death  
4 refer to the questionnaire.

5 Question 1 – short-form conclusion: unlawful  
6 killing :

7 9. A "short-form conclusion" is a word or short  
8 phrase which expresses a conclusion as to the death.

9 10. The law says that, in an inquest, the coroner  
10 may only leave to the jury the short-form conclusion or  
11 conclusions that they could safely return on the  
12 evidence. If there is only one short-form conclusion  
13 the jury could safely return, the coroner should direct  
14 the jury to return that conclusion.

15 11. In this case I have decided, with no objection  
16 from any interested person, that the only short-form  
17 conclusion which you, the jury, could safely return on  
18 the evidence for each of those who died is "unlawful  
19 killing"; in other words, that each of Saskia Jones and  
20 Jack Merritt was unlawfully killed. Therefore, you, the  
21 jury, are directed to return that short-form conclusion  
22 for each of them.

23 12. Question 1 on the questionnaire on page 5 is  
24 the part which deals with this short-form conclusion.  
25 As the questionnaire says on that page, I am directing

1 you to answer "yes" to that question.

2 The questionnaire general points.

3 13. I am now going to go through the Notes to the  
4 Jury section on the questionnaire which you can follow  
5 on pages 2-4 and they are set out here as well.

6 14. The questionnaire you have has been prepared by  
7 me as Coroner after receiving submissions from  
8 interested persons. By answering the questions you will  
9 give your determinations on the key factual issues in  
10 the case. All are intended to address the central  
11 question: by what means and in what circumstances did  
12 Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones come by their deaths?

13 15. After the Inquests, a completed copy of this  
14 questionnaire will form part of the Record of Inquest  
15 for each of Jack and Saskia.

16 16. For a number of the question, 3-5, you are  
17 required to answer "yes" or "no". You are then given  
18 the option to explain further in a box. You are not  
19 obliged to fill in the box. Consideration and issues  
20 are listed which you may want to consider although you  
21 should feel free to give your own answers provided that  
22 you follow the legal directions in these notes and the  
23 summing-up.

24 17. For some of the questions (again, questions  
25 3-5) you are asked to answer whether there was some

1 error, omission or circumstance that (probably) caused  
2 or contributed to the two deaths. If you have answered  
3 no to that, you are then asked whether the same thing  
4 may have caused or contributed to the deaths. In  
5 answering the second part of such a question, you will  
6 need to consider whether there is a realistic  
7 possibility that an error, omission or circumstance as  
8 described caused or contributed to the two deaths.

9 18. You may only say that something contributed to  
10 the two deaths if you consider that it made more than  
11 a minimal contribution.

12 19. You should only give an answer to a question if  
13 all of you agree upon the answer. If you find  
14 yourselves unable to agree on an answer to one question,  
15 move on to the next and return to the question later.  
16 If a time comes when I can accept any answer on which  
17 you are not all agreed, I shall tell you.

18 20. In resolving factual issues, you should give  
19 your answers in accordance with the "balance of  
20 probabilities": what is more likely than not. (However,  
21 please note that if you are deciding whether something  
22 may have caused or contributed to the deaths, you should  
23 consider whether there is a realistic possibility that  
24 it did so.

25 21. If you choose to give further explanation in

1 any of the boxes where you are given the option to do  
2 so, please follow these directions when writing your  
3 responses:

4 (a) Your responses should all be directed to  
5 answering the question by what means and in what  
6 circumstances the deaths occurred. You should not make  
7 any statement or comment which does not assist in  
8 answering that question.

9 (b) It might help you at each stage to consider the  
10 cause/causes of the deaths, any defects in systems and  
11 practices which contributed to the deaths, and any other  
12 factors which are relevant to the circumstances of the  
13 deaths.

14 (c) You should try to be brief and to the point.

15 (d) If you wish to write more than the space in any  
16 of the boxes permitted, you may continue on a separate  
17 sheet. At the top of the sheet you should write the  
18 number of the question and the words "Answer to question  
19 X continued".

20 (e) You should not make any comment on any  
21 circumstance, act, omission or event unless there is at  
22 least a realistic possibility that it caused or  
23 contributed to the deaths.

24 (f) You should not say anything to the effect that  
25 a breach of civil law has been committed or that any

1 named person has committed a crime. Because of this  
 2 legal rule, when writing explanations, you should avoid  
 3 using words and phrases such as "negligence/negligent",  
 4 "breach of duty", "duty of care", "careless",  
 5 "reckless", "liability", "guilt/guilty",  
 6 "crime/criminal", "illegal /unlawful". This rule does  
 7 not prevent you from confirming in question 1 that those  
 8 who died were unlawfully killed. The proposed form of  
 9 words in that question avoids naming the person  
 10 responsible.

11 (g) You may use ordinary and non-technical words  
 12 which express factual judgments. So you may say that  
 13 errors or mistakes were made, and you may use words such  
 14 as "failure", "missed opportunity", "inappropriate",  
 15 "inadequate", "unsuitable", "unsatisfactory",  
 16 "insufficient", "omit", "omission", "unacceptable" or  
 17 "lacking". Equally you may indicate in your answer if  
 18 you consider that particular errors or mistakes were not  
 19 made. You may add adjectives such as "serious" or  
 20 "important" to indicate the strength of your findings.

21 (h) If you are uncertain about what may be written,  
 22 you may ask a question in writing to the Coroner during  
 23 your deliberations.

24 22. I have already mentioned the key questions which  
 25 you will be asked to address. Let me now run through

1 all the questions.

2 23. On page 5 you will find question 1. That asks  
 3 you to confirm that each of Saskia Jones and  
 4 Jack Merritt was unlawfully killed. As I have said,  
 5 I am directing you to answer "yes" to that question,  
 6 because it is the only proper answer on the evidence and  
 7 the law says that I should direct a conclusion in those  
 8 circumstances.

9 24. On page 6, you will find question 2(a). This  
 10 sets out a short factual summary of the basic facts of  
 11 the death of Jack Merritt. It has been agreed with the  
 12 representatives of Jack's family. You were asked to  
 13 either confirm that you agree with the summary by  
 14 writing "confirmed" or "agreed" in the box or to  
 15 indicate any amendments you would like to make.

16 25. On page 7, you will find question 2(b). This  
 17 similarly provides a summary of the basic facts of the  
 18 death of Saskia Jones, which has been agreed with her  
 19 family's representatives. Again, you are asked to  
 20 confirm agreement to that summary or to indicate  
 21 amendments you would like to make.

22 26. Question 3 (page 8) asks first whether there  
 23 was any omission or failure in the management of  
 24 Usman Khan as an offender in the community by agencies  
 25 of the State which probably contributed to the deaths of

1 Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones. If you think there was,  
 2 you answer "yes" in the upper right box, and you provide  
 3 any reasons in the box at the bottom of the page. If  
 4 not, you answer "no" in the upper right box, and then go  
 5 on to the second question on the page. As you will see,  
 6 that asks whether there was any omission or failure in  
 7 the management of Usman Khan as an offender in the  
 8 community by agencies of the State which may have  
 9 contributed to the deaths of Jack Merritt and  
 10 Saskia Jones. A "yes" or "no" answer should be written  
 11 in the box next to the question, and any reasons given  
 12 in the box at the bottom.

13 27. On pages 9 and 10, you will find a series of  
 14 factors and considerations which you may wish to  
 15 consider in answering question 3.

16 28. Question 4 is in similar form to question 3.  
 17 It asks whether there was any omission or failure in the  
 18 sharing of information by agencies responsible for  
 19 monitoring or management of Usman Khan which probably  
 20 contributed to the deaths of Jack Merritt and  
 21 Saskia Jones. If you answer "no" to that question, you  
 22 are asked to say whether there was any omission or  
 23 failure which may have contributed to the deaths.  
 24 Again, you approach the question in the same manner,  
 25 giving reasons for your answer in the box at the bottom

1 of page 11. Again, pages 12 to 13 set out factors and  
 2 considerations you may wish to bear in mind when  
 3 answering question 4.

4 29. Question 5, page 14, is the final question. It  
 5 asks first whether there was any omission or deficiency  
 6 in the organisation of and security measures for the  
 7 event at Fishmongers' Hall which probably contributed to  
 8 the deaths of Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones. If you  
 9 answer "no" to that question, you are asked to say  
 10 whether there was any such omission or deficiency which  
 11 may have contributed to the deaths. Again, you approach  
 12 the question in the same manner, giving the reasons for  
 13 your answer in the box at the bottom of page 14.  
 14 Page 15, meanwhile, contains factors and considerations  
 15 you may wish to take into account in answering.

16 30. You should aim to produce a set of answers on  
 17 which you all agree -- so that you all agree on all  
 18 parts of a single questionnaire. We can give you as  
 19 many copies of the questionnaire as you wish to prepare  
 20 draft answers, but when you have reached a set of  
 21 conclusions on which you are all agreed, we shall want  
 22 one single completed master copy of the questionnaire,  
 23 containing answers to all the questions on which you are  
 24 all agreed.

25 31. There are a few points I should emphasise in

1 respect of the factors which are listed variously under  
 2 questions 3, 4 and 5.  
 3 (a) First, that the factors are only examples. The  
 4 lists are not exhaustive. You may take into account  
 5 other factors which you consider to be proper answers to  
 6 the questions to which you are responding. Likewise,  
 7 you may consider that some or all of the factors do not  
 8 assist you in answering the questions to which you are  
 9 responding, in which case you must disregard them.  
 10 (b) Secondly, the fact that a particular factor has  
 11 been included in a list is not an indication that  
 12 I believe the presence of that factor would on its own  
 13 indicate you answer "yes" to the question of whether  
 14 particular omissions or failures caused or contributed  
 15 to the deaths or the question of whether they may have  
 16 done. That is a matter for you.  
 17 (c) As an example if, in a hypothetical inquest  
 18 concerning the death of a patient in hospital following  
 19 an operation, you were considering the question "Did any  
 20 omission or failure in medical care provision cause or  
 21 contribute to the death?" and one of the factors in the  
 22 questionnaire was "whether or not on the day of the  
 23 death the staffing levels at the hospital were below the  
 24 recommended minimum level", you would have to go through  
 25 this thought process in order to rely on the facts in

145

1 answering "yes" to the question.  
 2 (i) First, you would wish to consider your finding  
 3 of fact: on the balance of probabilities were staffing  
 4 levels on the day of the death below the recommended  
 5 minimum level?  
 6 (ii) If you were to answer "yes" to that question  
 7 and find as a fact that the staffing levels on the day  
 8 of the death were below the recommended minimum level,  
 9 then that would not automatically mean that you should  
 10 answer "yes" to the question of whether any omission or  
 11 failure in medical care provision caused or contributed  
 12 to the death.  
 13 (iii) Secondly, you would wish to consider whether  
 14 the fact of low staffing levels did probably cause or  
 15 contribute to the death either on its own or in  
 16 combination with other facts that you have found to be  
 17 the case. You may, instead, be of the view that even  
 18 though staffing levels were below the minimum  
 19 recommended level, it would not probably have saved the  
 20 life of the deceased if staffing levels had been at the  
 21 appropriate level. That would be a question for the  
 22 jury, on the evidence heard in that case.  
 23 (iv) Thirdly, if you do not consider that omissions  
 24 or failures did probably cause or contribute to the  
 25 death, you would go on to consider the second part of

146

1 the hypothetical question: whether there is a realistic  
 2 possibility that such an omission or failure as  
 3 described caused or contributed to the death. In the  
 4 example I have given, you would have to decide whether  
 5 or not staffing levels at the appropriate level may  
 6 realistically have saved the life (even though you could  
 7 not say that they probably would have done).  
 8 Final directions.  
 9 32. You should leave the courtroom together, retire  
 10 to your jury room and consider your conclusions. Your  
 11 task is to complete the questionnaire as directed above.  
 12 As well as the individual copies you have, you will be  
 13 provided with the master version to record your final  
 14 version.  
 15 33. If you haven't already done so, please elect  
 16 a foreman or forewoman; someone to chair your  
 17 discussions and to speak on your behalf when you return  
 18 to court.  
 19 34. If you would like any further directions or to  
 20 be reminded of any evidence, please pass a note to the  
 21 jury bailiff and you will be brought back into court.  
 22 35. When you have completed your task, you should  
 23 inform the jury bailiff. I will check the questionnaire  
 24 that you have prepared. You will then be brought into  
 25 court to deliver your conclusions.

147

1 36. Finally, you are reminded of the warning given  
 2 at the outset. You decide this case only on the  
 3 evidence you've heard in court. You should not carry  
 4 out your own research. You should not discuss the case  
 5 except with your other jurors and when you are all  
 6 together in the jury room.  
 7 Ladies and gentlemen, a very late lunch is what  
 8 you're going to get when you finally retire, for which  
 9 my sincere apologies. I'm going to ask now, please, for  
 10 the jury bailiff to take the oath.  
 11 (The jury bailiffs were sworn)  
 12 Thank you. I should just explain: I'm not having  
 13 three bailiffs sworn because I'm expecting any difficult  
 14 behaviour; it's just pragmatically that they have to  
 15 take the oath together, so that's why they've done that.  
 16 The other thing I just wanted to say is please don't  
 17 be concerned about the time. We will sit the hours that  
 18 we have during the course of this Inquest. The  
 19 circumstances allow that if you need some more time  
 20 tomorrow you can go home, go about your normal life and  
 21 then come back tomorrow morning. So please don't be  
 22 concerned about that. When that time arises I'll just  
 23 have you back into court and say one or two words to you  
 24 before you then go home.  
 25 But now I'm going to ask you, please, to retire and

148

1 to commence your deliberations.  
 2 (2.17 pm)  
 3 (The jury retired to commence their deliberations)  
 4 MR HOUGH: Sir, during the jury's deliberations I understand  
 5 that you have permitted the BBC to take a short video  
 6 and some photographs of this room, obviously in the  
 7 absence of the jury.  
 8 I'm making that known so that anyone who doesn't  
 9 wish to be in court when that's happening can remove  
 10 themselves, and also so that people can ensure that any  
 11 confidential papers are closed or placed in bags if  
 12 that's appropriate.  
 13 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Certainly. And I should just explain, it's  
 14 not because I'm seeking to myself get any publicity.  
 15 I know Mr Sandford, who has been covering these Inquests  
 16 on behalf of the BBC and, indeed, all other press  
 17 agencies just wish, in a sense, to put some context into  
 18 the reporting, and we have all been taking part in what  
 19 is a unique event here in the Guildhall in the City of  
 20 London. And I think certainly in my conversations with  
 21 those who have represented the press throughout these  
 22 hearings, in fact they're very complimentary about the  
 23 provisions that have been made here for these Inquests  
 24 to be conducted in these difficult Covid times, and for  
 25 those who have not been here, it may just help to

149

1 understand quite what the layout is, what the  
 2 arrangements have been, but anyone who wishes not to be  
 3 in court for that process — and I'm looking  
 4 particularly at family members who may wish not to be,  
 5 that's really why I'm saying it now, that we will do it  
 6 in such a way which is discreet to you and also to the  
 7 jury. I know the press understand all of that but,  
 8 equally, it's important that you know that that is  
 9 happening.  
 10 What I'm going to suggest, if this meets with  
 11 approval, is that I rise momentarily. I appreciate it  
 12 may help that coverage if there are some people in the  
 13 room, rather than it being entirely empty, but simply  
 14 I would personally just like a short comfort break,  
 15 having been speaking for rather a long time, but I'll  
 16 come back in in a few minutes' time.  
 17 MR HOUGH: Yes, sir.  
 18 (2.20 pm)  
 19 (The short adjournment)  
 20 (4.28 pm)  
 21 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Mr Hough, I propose to have the jury into  
 22 court to send them home for the day. I'm told they  
 23 would like to — they're happy to come in at 9.45  
 24 tomorrow, so that is when we will resume, and I'll give  
 25 the usual directions about not contacting each other,

150

1 not doing anything overnight, putting their  
 2 deliberations on hold, and then tomorrow morning not to  
 3 resume their deliberations until they've been brought  
 4 back in before me and the bailiffs have retaken the  
 5 oath.  
 6 MR HOUGH: I should also just mention for the advocates and  
 7 others, that after this jury has been brought in and  
 8 sent out tomorrow morning at 9.45, there will be  
 9 selection of the jury for the Inquest of Usman Khan in  
 10 this room.  
 11 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Yes.  
 12 MR HOUGH: I know that those interested persons who are most  
 13 closely involved with that Inquest are well aware that  
 14 will be taking place tomorrow morning.  
 15 JUDGE LUCRAFT: Thank you.  
 16 (In the presence of the jury)  
 17 Ladies and gentlemen, as I promised at the end of my  
 18 summing—up to you, we would continue to sit the hours we  
 19 had during this Inquest, and so the time has come for me  
 20 to send you home.  
 21 Before I do so, can I just say one or two things to  
 22 you. They are obvious, but it is important I say them  
 23 nonetheless. Please do not do any more deliberating  
 24 now. I will release the bailiffs from their oaths and  
 25 affirmations. Tomorrow morning they will retake the

151

1 oath or affirmation and then you will go back into your  
 2 deliberations so if, for example, you bumped into one  
 3 another away from this building or indeed, first thing  
 4 in the morning, can I just suggest you might just park  
 5 any private thoughts you've got, wait until you are all  
 6 back together and that is the time then to discuss with  
 7 each other what those private thoughts may or may not  
 8 be. You have had a very long day today, I'm sorry for  
 9 that, listening to me, and now commencing your  
 10 deliberations.  
 11 So whatever you've got planned for the rest of the  
 12 day, can I just suggest to you firmly press that pause  
 13 button I have spoken about before, get about whatever it  
 14 is you've got planned for the rest of the day, and then  
 15 we'll all come back refreshed tomorrow morning. I think  
 16 you are all happy to be here for 9.45, that is  
 17 fantastic, thank you very much indeed, we will look  
 18 forward to seeing you then. So please, those burning  
 19 thoughts overnight, don't be tempted to contact each  
 20 other in any way, shape or form. If it's a really  
 21 pressing thought, I've often suggested this to people  
 22 before, simply just write yourself a note. But as  
 23 I say, don't be tempted to do anything about it, any  
 24 research, any contact with anyone at all. You can then  
 25 discuss it when you are all back together with each

152

1 other tomorrow. All right.  
 2 Thank you very much indeed for your attention today.  
 3 See you tomorrow morning. Thank you.  
 4 (In the absence of the jury)  
 5 I'll rise.  
 6 (4.33 pm)  
 7 (The court adjourned until 9.45 am on  
 8 Friday, 28 May 2021)

9  
 10  
 11  
 12  
 13  
 14  
 15  
 16  
 17  
 18  
 19  
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25

153

1		
2	INDEX	
3		PAGE
4	Summing-Up (continued) .....	1

5  
 6  
 7  
 8  
 9  
 10  
 11  
 12  
 13  
 14  
 15  
 16  
 17  
 18  
 19  
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25

154

155

<b>A</b>	41:25 114:14 130:21 135:19	<b>almost (1)</b> 130:16	<b>applying (1)</b> 13:24	<b>assess (10)</b> 3:3 16:16 18:5 29:7 32:2 48:20 55:15 81:13 110:19,20	<b>attention (9)</b> 53:9 93:1 108:5 119:17 120:19,23 121:2 123:10 153:2	<b>basis (9)</b> 18:2 24:13 32:1 49:24 50:17 59:3 82:16 89:3 116:18
<b>ability (2)</b> 29:3 106:23	<b>additional (8)</b> 2:7 8:11 17:10 63:15 68:16 78:3,8 103:8	<b>along (4)</b> 27:18 58:9 82:7 87:15	<b>apportioning (1)</b> 4:20	<b>assessed (13)</b> 26:10 38:20 48:13 49:4 53:10,20 54:2,13,19 55:9 57:13 60:7 131:3	<b>attitude (2)</b> 27:21 32:14	<b>became (15)</b> 17:23 44:21 54:9 55:4,11,18 61:7 62:5 64:23 86:6 88:6 95:24 103:15 105:21 126:6
<b>able (9)</b> 34:11 37:23 58:12 67:21 69:25 75:14 76:15 116:13 120:14	<b>address (8)</b> 23:21 35:8 54:23 77:20 120:14 135:16 138:10 141:25	<b>alongsides (2)</b> 2:6 25:22	<b>appropriate (1)</b> 91:23	<b>assessing (1)</b> 60:23	<b>attitudes (3)</b> 10:19 11:8 27:19	<b>bear (1)</b> 144:2
<b>above (5)</b> 27:17 35:10 58:2 135:25 147:11	<b>addressed (1)</b> 117:10	<b>also (72)</b> 1:11,18,24 3:1,4,8 4:11,14,23 6:12 8:4 9:1,4,12,15,24 10:3,16 12:12 13:6 15:5,22 17:8 18:15,16 23:18,23 33:9 35:10,15,22 39:22 40:13 43:22 44:19 45:8 46:5 53:6 61:25 66:20 75:17 76:3,19 77:1 79:17 81:4,24 82:19 83:25 84:5 85:13,21 91:7 92:22 94:11 96:25 97:2 100:21 101:11 104:9 110:15,20 113:10 115:25 118:23 125:9 129:9 134:2,6 149:10 150:6 151:6	<b>approach (5)</b> 73:18 86:19 115:2 143:24 144:11	<b>audience (2)</b> 11:11,21	<b>bearing (1)</b> 90:8	
<b>abrasive (1)</b> 11:24	<b>adhere (1)</b> 110:4	<b>alter (1)</b> 61:23	<b>approaches (1)</b> 133:16	<b>audit (1)</b> 13:10	<b>beer (1)</b> 51:8	
<b>abruptly (2)</b> 76:14 81:3	<b>adjectives (1)</b> 141:19	<b>although (13)</b> 8:24 9:3 40:17 55:25 59:7 70:11 73:25 74:5 76:7 94:17 117:24 136:13 138:20	<b>appropriate (11)</b> 6:24 22:2,21 56:5 59:15 63:1 68:1 89:15 146:21 147:5 149:12	<b>audit (1)</b> 13:10	<b>before (38)</b> 5:24,25 6:2 8:12 17:8 25:14 26:2 36:18 40:4 52:20 57:13 61:20 66:18 68:4 69:21 73:1,4,21 77:22 95:1,6,18 98:19 102:22 107:8,15 111:10 113:23 117:23 126:6 128:21,22 130:18 148:24 151:4,21 152:13,22	
<b>abscond (1)</b> 59:7	<b>adjoined (1)</b> 153:7	<b>altogether (1)</b> 43:8	<b>approved (14)</b> 3:18 8:1,17 17:15 29:14 33:22 46:12 76:12 77:17,20 78:1 100:14 113:15 127:14	<b>audience (2)</b> 11:11,21	<b>become (3)</b> 56:14 59:5 134:20	
<b>absconder (1)</b> 83:19	<b>adjoined (1)</b> 150:19	<b>always (3)</b> 14:22 62:21 66:15 amendments (2) 142:15,21	<b>approval (8)</b> 3:8 10:4 19:20,21 25:8 116:8 127:24 150:11	<b>authority (5)</b> 5:18 17:6 86:20 91:5 124:13	<b>becoming (3)</b> 31:22 83:15 130:16	
<b>absence (9)</b> 22:23 71:6,21 102:18 109:11 114:17 124:5 149:7 153:4	<b>adjudication (1)</b> 21:10	<b>among (1)</b> 56:11	<b>approve (2)</b> 10:11 79:10	<b>automatic (1)</b> 23:5	<b>being (84)</b> 1:15 8:12 10:24 11:19,24 12:22 13:7 22:19 25:2 26:10 30:17 31:19 33:8 34:25 38:1 42:5,11 45:4,15,25 46:8 49:17 43:13 48:9 51:18 53:10 59:4 60:1,7 67:12 68:19 72:7 73:7 75:7,16 76:6,8 77:5 81:2 88:1 90:7 93:14 94:15 96:12,15 98:5,11,24 99:21 100:25 101:19 102:19 105:15 107:10,11 108:9,16 109:11 110:15,24 111:12 120:23 115:21 117:25 119:13 120:6 121:22 125:21,22 127:6,10,18,22 128:25 129:20,24 130:2,5,7 131:12,16 133:22 150:13	
<b>absolute (1)</b> 11:9	<b>adjudicator (2)</b> 21:11,15	<b>amount (3)</b> 5:11 7:25 78:8	<b>approved (14)</b> 3:18 8:1,17 17:15 29:14 33:22 46:12 76:12 77:17,20 78:1 100:14 113:15 127:14	<b>automatically (1)</b> 146:9	<b>behind (1)</b> 98:6	
<b>absolutely (2)</b> 48:2 62:13	<b>adopting (1)</b> 52:24	<b>amounting (1)</b> 21:16	<b>april (12)</b> 20:14,17 32:11,16,23 33:1 76:4 88:24 89:4 111:5 120:15 132:4	<b>autonomy (1)</b> 99:2	<b>behaviour (21)</b> 1:14 8:21 11:23 15:22 17:19 26:8 28:16 30:23 32:17 40:2 73:7 77:16 83:17 86:2 87:14 106:3,5 114:12 124:11,18 148:14	
<b>abuse (1)</b> 2:5	<b>adult (1)</b> 19:24	<b>amplify (2)</b> 128:11 132:1	<b>arm (2)</b> 14:18 112:24	<b>autumn (2)</b> 76:23 77:20	<b>being (84)</b> 1:15 8:12 10:24 11:19,24 12:22 13:7 22:19 25:2 26:10 30:17 31:19 33:8 34:25 38:1 42:5,11 45:4,15,25 46:8 49:17 43:13 48:9 51:18 53:10 59:4 60:1,7 67:12 68:19 72:7 73:7 75:7,16 76:6,8 77:5 81:2 88:1 90:7 93:14 94:15 96:12,15 98:5,11,24 99:21 100:25 101:19 102:19 105:15 107:10,11 108:9,16 109:11 110:15,24 111:12 120:23 115:21 117:25 119:13 120:6 121:22 125:21,22 127:6,10,18,22 128:25 129:20,24 130:2,5,7 131:12,16 133:22 150:13	
<b>acc (2)</b> 132:10,21	<b>advance (3)</b> 28:6 85:5 122:9	<b>analogue (1)</b> 105:19	<b>armstrong (5)</b> 13:4 40:21 61:19 70:17 126:8	<b>available (2)</b> 7:15 16:22	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>accept (8)</b> 45:5 57:7 58:2 62:18 68:2 69:22 134:25 139:16	<b>advantage (1)</b> 7:12	<b>analyst (2)</b> 18:3 105:18	<b>arises (1)</b> 148:22	<b>avoid (6)</b> 6:20 60:14,21 62:10 107:11 141:2	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>acceptable (1)</b> 78:15	<b>advice (4)</b> 15:17 79:18 94:6 114:16	<b>analysts (1)</b> 18:1	<b>arm (2)</b> 14:18 112:24	<b>avoids (2)</b> 51:5 141:9	<b>behalf (2)</b> 147:17 149:16	
<b>accepted (32)</b> 12:14 13:9 22:18 27:19 29:16 35:6 36:11,19 38:8 39:5,9 40:18,21 47:9 55:7 67:8 74:8 77:12,18 78:14 81:2 89:9 92:6 94:22 98:16 113:17,24 117:15 121:18 122:1,8 124:6	<b>advised (1)</b> 84:8	<b>anger (2)</b> 32:7,8	<b>arn (2)</b> 14:18 112:24	<b>awaiting (1)</b> 65:3	<b>behaviour (2)</b> 29:5 61:13 <b>behaviours (2)</b> 15:24 21:18	
<b>access (21)</b> 4:16 14:10 18:18 19:9,18 20:9 26:1 29:22 30:4 34:24 36:2 43:4 54:3 76:16 80:20,21 86:4 102:5,11 113:20,22	<b>advising (1)</b> 110:22	<b>anomaly (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arnold (23)</b> 11:11 21:6 43:3 48:15 52:17,19 67:11,12 70:24 74:24 78:5 79:4 95:7 102:15 105:4,22 108:13 110:20 114:8 115:19 123:17,25 131:16	<b>awaiting (1)</b> 65:3	<b>behind (1)</b> 98:6	
<b>accessed (2)</b> 7:10 47:5	<b>advisors (1)</b> 101:9	<b>another (7)</b> 46:10 55:19 71:22 72:15 77:24 85:10 152:3	<b>arose (1)</b> 111:17	<b>aware (70)</b> 4:5 21:25 22:3 25:16 26:3 28:13 40:25 46:20 51:16 54:9,22 55:4,12,18 58:7 59:25 60:4 61:7 62:5,23 63:2,6 64:23 65:8,18 74:2,18,22 76:1,19 80:14 82:23 83:6,10 86:6,14 87:21,25 88:1,6 89:2 90:3 91:21 92:3 98:13 101:24,25 102:5,23 103:14 104:18 105:21 108:12 109:3 111:11,13 113:19 117:5 120:4 122:11 124:14 125:22 126:4,6,25 127:25 129:9 151:13	<b>being (84)</b> 1:15 8:12 10:24 11:19,24 12:22 13:7 22:19 25:2 26:10 30:17 31:19 33:8 34:25 38:1 42:5,11 45:4,15,25 46:8 49:17 43:13 48:9 51:18 53:10 59:4 60:1,7 67:12 68:19 72:7 73:7 75:7,16 76:6,8 77:5 81:2 88:1 90:7 93:14 94:15 96:12,15 98:5,11,24 99:21 100:25 101:19 102:19 105:15 107:10,11 108:9,16 109:11 110:15,24 111:12 120:23 115:21 117:25 119:13 120:6 121:22 125:21,22 127:6,10,18,22 128:25 129:20,24 130:2,5,7 131:12,16 133:22 150:13	
<b>accessible (1)</b> 7:12	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>accommodation (6)</b> 14:8,22 35:14 63:13,23 91:3	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>accompanied (4)</b> 10:25 11:19 38:5 105:15	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>accompaniment (1)</b> 68:17	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>accompanying (2)</b> 37:24 105:10	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>accordance (1)</b> 139:19	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>according (1)</b> 104:8	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>account (4)</b> 11:8 75:23 144:15 145:4	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>accurate (1)</b> 75:12	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>accurately (1)</b> 110:19	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>achieve (1)</b> 56:25	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>achieved (1)</b> 67:19	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>acknowledged (5)</b> 2:22 7:14 44:2 79:7 81:5	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>across (11)</b> 7:4 8:18 16:9 17:24 24:9 115:3,10,12 131:25 134:6,8	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>acted (1)</b> 120:24	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>action (6)</b> 50:10 68:9 117:11,14,14 119:3	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>actionability (1)</b> 49:6	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>actionable (1)</b> 49:13	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>actions (2)</b> 23:1 70:9	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>active (4)</b> 35:15 48:15 49:9 52:19	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>actively (3)</b> 82:19 123:16,24	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>activities (12)</b> 22:22 41:22 48:14 51:23 56:4,6 59:15 60:12 61:6 67:23 69:13 112:10	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>activity (9)</b> 16:6 38:23 49:11,14 55:10,22 59:6 94:15 104:10	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>actors (2)</b> 52:16 123:17	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>acts (2)</b> 54:1 125:9	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>actual (2)</b> 4:4 136:19	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>actually (3)</b> 72:19 98:15 131:15	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>adapting (1)</b> 25:6	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>add (4)</b> 21:15 62:3 69:10 141:19	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>added (2)</b> 4:19 102:6	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	
<b>addition (8)</b> 2:13,16 7:1 12:9	<b>advertisements (2)</b> 142:15,21	<b>anomalies (1)</b> 103:25	<b>arouse (1)</b> 111:17	<b>awful (1)</b> 92:18	<b>begin (2)</b> 17:7 71:13	

**blame (1)** 4:20  
**blind (2)** 36:13 69:23  
**board (5)** 23:8,10 113:17  
 134:7,9  
**boast (2)** 57:20 87:4  
**boasted (1)** 85:22  
**body (1)** 58:23  
**bomb (1)** 54:1  
**book (7)** 21:8 97:5,12 100:3  
 102:7,21 103:21  
**both (17)** 8:10 12:2 16:9,12  
 17:10 18:18 21:21,22 42:2  
 57:5,11,18 98:17 101:5  
 108:11 116:11 119:24  
**bottom (4)** 143:3,12,25  
 144:13  
**bouton (1)** 1:17  
**box (13)** 34:10 45:3 85:17  
 138:18,19 142:14  
 143:2,3,4,11,12,25 144:13  
**boxes (3)** 85:11 140:1,16  
**branch (72)** 24:4,6,7,12,21  
 25:1,8 26:13,18 29:2,4,12  
 30:3,4,14 31:16 37:3 38:6  
 39:22 41:24 42:1,22  
 43:12,16 46:4 47:1,12  
 57:24 58:25 73:14  
 81:11,11,15,21 82:6,7 84:1  
 89:4 95:12,17,20,24  
 96:2,10,15,20 97:3  
 105:18,21 106:12,17,22  
 107:16 108:2 111:14  
 112:2,4,11,16,21,24  
 113:1,3,12 119:9 120:7,24  
 126:3,10 131:6 132:25  
 134:1  
**branches (1)** 132:3  
**branchs (1)** 84:9  
**breach (6)** 8:14 21:12 31:7  
 121:22 140:25 141:4  
**breaches (2)** 84:4 95:10  
**breaching (1)** 29:23  
**break (11)** 71:3,5,9,11,19,25  
 72:18,19 98:21 116:24  
 150:14  
**bridge (3)** 40:11 75:8 104:24  
**bridged (1)** 52:2  
**brief (1)** 140:14  
**briefing (2)** 50:2 113:8  
**briefings (3)** 2:17 82:9  
 132:20  
**bring (2)** 6:7 44:19  
**bringing (1)** 51:5  
**british (1)** 61:9  
**britishbangladeshi (1)** 53:17  
**broader (3)** 115:10,21 128:3  
**broken (4)** 27:7 55:4 60:6  
 98:10  
**bromley (6)** 1:17,21,23 9:18  
 12:3 84:3  
**brought (11)** 93:1 108:5  
 119:17 120:18,23 121:2  
 123:9 147:21,24 151:3,7  
**bsu (3)** 61:13,17,19  
**bubble (1)** 33:23  
**builders (1)** 14:2  
**building (6)** 11:14 14:13  
 44:14 45:17 104:23 152:3  
**bulky (1)** 68:21  
**bumped (1)** 152:2  
**burning (1)** 152:18  
**burst (1)** 33:23  
**button (1)** 152:13  
**byford (25)** 6:3 72:12,22  
 73:4,9 74:2,6,8,24  
 75:2,3,9,20 76:1,10,12,17  
 77:1,6,18,21 78:3,18  
 79:3,10

C

**c (2)** 140:14 145:17  
**call (2)** 31:3 43:5  
**called (2)** 46:15 91:14  
**cambridge (17)** 30:11,11,24  
 31:6 62:1 77:23 84:7 86:23

**chapter (1)** 88:14  
**characteristics (1)** 129:24  
**charge (1)** 115:9  
**charger (2)** 55:5,8  
**chase (1)** 103:13  
**check (1)** 147:23  
**checked (2)** 34:10 48:21  
**checking (2)** 44:13 93:13  
**checks (1)** 112:11  
**chemicals (1)** 55:12  
**chief (3)** 1:8 111:20 131:20  
**choose (1)** 139:25  
**chosen (1)** 53:8  
**christmas (1)** 59:21  
**circle (1)** 64:4  
**circulate (1)** 29:12  
**circulated (1)** 75:16  
**circumstance (4)** 3:12  
 139:1,7 140:21  
**circumstances (11)** 3:24  
 13:3 23:7 42:24 136:9  
 137:3 138:11 140:6,12  
 142:8 148:19  
**circumvented (1)** 109:7  
**cities (1)** 122:3  
**citizenship (1)** 61:9  
**city (3)** 121:19 122:6 149:19  
**civil (2)** 135:22 140:25  
**claimed (1)** 69:5  
**clarification (2)** 66:14 103:25  
**clarity (2)** 103:12 132:14  
**classification (1)** 116:12  
**clear (12)** 13:10 15:9 35:4  
 43:14 57:9 78:7 79:7,9  
 86:1 95:25 124:9 136:5  
**clearance (2)** 75:2,3  
**cleared (1)** 19:15  
**clearly (1)** 33:6  
**close (4)** 51:6 56:5 67:18  
 82:6  
**closed (6)** 48:12,17 52:20  
 55:25 56:7 149:11  
**closely (10)** 15:4 21:7 50:20  
 96:19 97:25 112:21  
 113:2,2,6 151:13  
**closing (3)** 45:6 66:12,18  
**closure (3)** 67:22 68:1  
 129:11  
**clothes (1)** 19:10  
**clues (1)** 52:25  
**coach (2)** 13:20 76:18  
**coat (1)** 68:21  
**coates (1)** 22:7  
**cobbett (5)** 110:24 111:3  
 119:20 120:12,19  
**cocaine (1)** 69:20  
**code (1)** 18:4  
**codefendant (1)** 24:23  
**codefendants (6)** 26:13,23  
 46:9 54:17 107:17,18  
**colleagues (10)** 57:11,15  
 82:8 86:10 94:5 95:12  
 96:22 110:17 113:3 120:13  
**collected (1)** 29:13  
**collective (4)** 36:12 65:23  
 111:8 136:14  
**collectively (1)** 122:23  
**combating (1)** 86:25  
**combination (1)** 146:16  
**combine (1)** 132:2  
**combined (2)** 2:25 134:1  
**come (18)** 8:4 11:20 13:17  
 31:16 51:25 75:10 96:7  
 119:8 135:13,14,15 136:9  
 138:12 148:21 150:16,23  
 151:19 152:15  
**comes (2)** 48:19 139:16  
**comfort (1)** 150:14  
**comfortable (2)** 117:11  
 119:5  
**comfortably (1)** 127:3  
**coming (6)** 11:14 36:20  
 124:17 125:14 128:6,19  
**commence (2)** 149:1,3  
**commencement (1)** 108:6  
**commencing (2)** 106:19

152:9  
**commended (1)** 22:6  
**comment (5)** 28:17 57:16  
 68:19 140:7,20  
**commented (2)** 9:8 98:15  
**comments (2)** 30:16 97:20  
**commissioned (1)** 97:17  
**commissioner (1)** 50:3  
**commit (2)** 83:1 85:8  
**commitments (1)** 114:24  
**committed (2)** 140:25 141:1  
**committing (1)** 54:1  
**common (1)** 2:4  
**communicated (2)** 62:19  
 64:20  
**communication (2)** 19:15  
 50:17  
**communications (3)** 19:13  
 61:2 86:10  
**communicationsinterception (1)** 47:24  
**communities (1)** 128:16  
**community (22)** 1:21 3:11  
 12:10 17:4 41:9 45:11 47:2  
 51:24 54:15,20 55:17 66:4  
 106:16 112:22 118:17  
 119:4 128:4 132:6  
 133:13,21 142:24 143:8  
**communitybased (1)** 112:18  
**company (8)** 34:14 35:12  
 38:8 39:14 80:2,5 104:23  
 129:17  
**comparing (1)** 25:2  
**complete (8)** 5:14 7:24 12:8  
 61:1 133:25 136:14,15  
 147:11  
**completed (12)** 3:17,24  
 4:3,18 13:11 38:24 41:14  
 45:8 136:22 138:13 144:22  
 147:22  
**completely (1)** 40:1  
**completes (1)** 74:13  
**completing (2)** 5:14 136:12  
**completion (1)** 136:10  
**compliance (11)** 7:21 12:2  
 24:24 26:8 28:12 40:18  
 41:8 44:13 60:1,20 62:7  
**compliant (4)** 8:7 14:20 98:3  
 107:11  
**complicated (1)** 31:5  
**complied (1)** 14:5  
**complimentary (1)** 149:22  
**complying (1)** 60:19  
**comprehensive (1)** 4:7  
**computer (4)** 18:13 47:6  
 63:8 76:22  
**concern (46)** 9:11 14:9 21:24  
 25:9 26:4 28:1 33:7,22  
 34:1,12 35:23,25 36:20  
 42:24 48:14 52:5 56:4,7,21  
 58:14 59:24 60:12,21 61:7  
 65:8,11 67:24 68:7,22 69:9  
 75:10 84:12 88:12 89:7  
 90:7,24 91:23 92:5 94:6  
 95:5 107:10 114:19 117:9  
 121:12 129:22 130:21  
**concerned (15)** 32:9 34:15  
 45:19 63:5 89:17,22 92:11  
 102:16,20 106:13 114:19  
 115:15 121:6 148:17,22  
**concerning (11)** 57:22 74:21  
 83:22 94:19 107:21  
 120:1,15 123:13,16 124:5  
 145:18  
**concerns (32)** 19:16 22:19  
 25:1,19,20 29:6,9 32:21  
 44:22 51:18 55:6 64:14  
 68:13 77:18 79:3 80:15  
 86:11 90:8 92:10 94:23  
 100:20 102:13,14 103:11  
 104:20 105:8 106:23  
 126:19,23 127:17  
 130:14,15  
**concluded (4)** 5:1 8:23 10:13  
 61:22  
**conclusion (14)** 36:11 70:8

116:13 117:2  
 137:5,7,8,10,12,14,17,21,24  
 142:7  
**conclusions (11)** 12:1  
 135:2,17,19 136:11,15,21  
 137:11 144:21 147:10,25  
**condition (4)** 9:19 31:19  
 80:7,8  
**conditional (1)** 20:22  
**conditions (26)** 7:22  
 8:9,11,15 17:9,11,11,13  
 41:8 59:14 60:8,19 62:8  
 84:17 87:10 98:4,11 107:2  
 110:2,4 116:21 119:11  
 121:23 124:7 131:16,18  
**conduct (4)** 57:3 107:8  
 115:20 118:12  
**conducted (3)** 61:15 73:8  
 149:24  
**conducting (1)** 136:2  
**conduit (3)** 30:5 81:23  
 126:10  
**confidence (4)** 15:23 79:6  
 124:1 132:14  
**confident (1)** 120:11  
**confidential (1)** 149:11  
**confirm (9)** 50:25 51:16  
 61:21 63:25 64:8 67:21  
 142:3,13,20  
**confirmation (1)** 65:1  
**confirmed (18)** 3:20 17:8  
 55:1 61:19 63:4,6 64:18,25  
 65:4 66:23 67:17  
 69:6,17,21 74:24 79:3  
 142:14  
**confirming (2)** 135:17 141:7  
**confrontational (1)** 27:9  
**conjunction (1)** 79:22  
**connect (2)** 40:8 69:25  
**connection (2)** 33:24 76:2  
**connections (2)** 86:23  
 102:15  
**cons (1)** 122:10  
**conscientiously (1)** 8:24  
**consensus (1)** 74:11  
**consider (21)** 37:20 50:6  
 62:3,25 68:1 118:14  
 122:10 138:20 139:6,10,23  
 140:9 141:18 143:15  
 145:5,7 146:2,13,23,25  
 147:10  
**considerable (2)** 26:4 70:25  
**consideration (3)** 67:8  
 121:25 138:19  
**considerations (4)** 93:2  
 143:14 144:2,14  
**considered (14)** 3:25 9:7  
 53:14 58:17 59:8 61:8 77:6  
 88:5 91:13 116:23 118:20  
 122:20,20 124:4  
**considering (2)** 49:5 145:19  
**consistency (2)** 115:12 128:8  
**consistent (4)** 32:14 37:19  
 39:8 102:13  
**consistently (1)** 93:22  
**constable (2)** 81:9 131:20  
**constraints (1)** 50:21  
**construct (1)** 67:13  
**constructing (1)** 55:7  
**construction (2)** 13:25 70:1  
**contact (15)** 18:22 24:19  
 26:17,19 39:8 51:1,3 54:16  
 56:11 59:2 60:4 82:7  
 123:15 152:19,24  
**contacted (1)** 89:11  
**contacting (1)** 150:25  
**contacts (2)** 32:22 48:10  
**contain (2)** 18:19 136:18  
**contained (4)** 2:24 17:23  
 62:2 75:23  
**containing (2)** 28:5 144:23  
**contains (1)** 144:14  
**content (1)** 80:24  
**contents (4)** 30:3 62:2 88:6  
 127:20  
**contest (2)** 19:5 79:17

**context (9)** 7:4 10:17 37:25  
 57:19 70:20 118:12 121:21  
 125:22 149:17  
**contexts (2)** 101:22 124:16  
**continuation (1)** 78:21  
**continue (6)** 67:25 71:10,23  
 84:6 140:16 151:18  
**continued (13)** 1:4 14:12  
 30:23 54:21 55:15 56:9  
 62:7 64:6 84:8 101:17  
 113:1 140:19 154:4  
**continuing (3)** 2:4 77:8  
 107:21  
**continuous (1)** 9:4  
**contract (1)** 81:3  
**contracted (1)** 15:4  
**contrary (2)** 74:8 87:1  
**contribute (7)** 52:4 65:6,8  
 73:24 145:21 146:15,24  
**contributed (16)**  
 139:2,4,8,9,22 140:11,23  
 142:25 143:9,20,23  
 144:7,11 145:14 146:11  
 147:3  
**contributing (1)** 75:8  
**contribution (1)** 139:11  
**control (1)** 128:13  
**controlled (2)** 56:22,22  
**convened (2)** 50:8 66:11  
**conversation (7)** 26:7  
 43:17,18 86:14 103:19  
 119:20 121:8  
**conversational (1)** 129:19  
**conversations (8)** 6:19 29:6  
 63:25 93:17 102:13 105:5  
 108:15 149:20  
**convicted (10)** 15:14 23:5  
 40:1 42:7 45:24 54:1 77:12  
 84:10 89:16 92:7  
**conviction (5)** 13:22 25:16  
 27:18 30:20 34:21  
**convictions (2)** 18:12 84:16  
**cooperate (3)** 5:19,21 17:7  
**cooperation (1)** 17:6  
**coordinated (1)** 79:16  
**coordinating (1)** 16:5  
**copies (2)** 144:19 147:12  
**copy (10)** 61:25 69:8 100:6  
 136:13,14,15,25 137:1  
 138:13 144:22  
**copycat (1)** 53:2  
**cordial (1)** 42:11  
**coroner (5)** 134:23 137:9,13  
 138:7 141:22  
**coroners (1)** 135:16  
**correct (2)** 56:25 117:11  
**correspondence (2)** 19:23  
 21:6  
**corridor (4)** 24:9 66:16  
 82:7,9  
**corroborate (1)** 57:17  
**corroborated (8)** 57:8,13,15  
 117:20,24 118:1,2,19  
**couldnt (10)** 26:18 32:20  
 37:15 38:2 43:6 67:24 79:1  
 89:25 108:23 129:21  
**counterterrorism (60)** 2:16  
 4:15 5:13 6:7,14 7:7  
 10:3,18 12:20 15:2,16,25  
 16:5,14 18:24,25 19:2  
 24:18,20 30:5 47:20 48:25  
 49:4 50:5 51:4,14 52:2,7  
 57:24 58:18 73:13  
 79:14,16 81:16,20 82:18  
 86:17 92:13,24 96:1,18  
 112:9 114:15,20 124:9  
 125:9 128:12 131:21,24  
 132:6,12,17,21 133:10  
**counterterrorist (2)** 16:9  
 50:18  
**country (5)** 8:18 54:4 115:3  
 120:11 134:8  
**course (32)** 11:3 14:17  
 34:7,8,20 41:15,16 45:9  
 48:15 52:22 62:24 63:5

D

**d (3)** 19:25 20:20 140:15  
**daily (7)** 18:2 24:10,13 29:9  
 41:17 50:17 112:13  
**dame (1)** 22:6  
**danger (3)** 19:25 23:17 31:10  
**dangerous (6)** 16:24 21:19  
 40:22 92:7,8 103:4  
**dark (1)** 45:2  
**darkness (1)** 45:4  
**data (5)** 98:2,4 105:19 106:2  
 122:2  
**database (2)** 7:9 17:17  
**date (2)** 113:8 116:14  
**dated (1)** 97:7  
**dates (1)** 100:3  
**dated (1)** 25:2  
**dawn (2)** 84:14 105:17  
**day (16)** 30:22 33:16 38:19  
 39:17 43:19 68:21 95:6,11  
 102:10 145:22 146:4,7  
 150:22 152:8,12,14  
**days (4)** 21:15 46:6 68:4  
 83:21

dc (11) 84:2 86:17 90:5,14  
 93:4 94:10 95:7 100:4  
 102:2 103:18 123:21  
 dci (14) 29:11 57:16 58:3,24  
 99:4 110:24 111:3 115:15  
 116:25 119:14,19,20  
 120:12,19  
 ddp (3) 12:9 79:21 80:13  
 deal (2) 47:12 51:5  
 dealing (7) 2:15 12:15 42:3  
 75:2 82:11 113:25 114:5  
 dealings (1) 74:23  
 deals (1) 137:24  
 dealt (1) 2:21  
 death (22) 67:20 69:21  
 135:13,14,15,19 136:7,9  
 137:2,3,8 142:11,18  
 145:18,21,23  
 146:4,8,12,15,25 147:3  
 deaths (18) 138:12  
 139:2,4,8,10,22  
 140:6,10,11,13,23 142:25  
 143:9,20,23 144:8,11  
 145:15  
 deceased (2) 135:12 146:20  
 december (17) 20:12 22:9  
 25:19 28:9 29:1,13 54:7  
 55:21 59:9,13,17,25 74:14  
 84:2 99:16,19 125:19  
 deceptive (1) 26:8  
 decide (5) 31:14 35:21 135:8  
 147:4 148:2  
 decided (3) 55:24 61:15  
 137:15  
 decides (1) 20:1  
 deciding (2) 67:18 139:21  
 decision (42) 9:25 10:8,21  
 11:2,5,12 13:1,6 20:4,5  
 32:24 34:20 35:1,5  
 36:16,19 49:7 52:6 56:5  
 63:4 65:18 67:11 75:24  
 76:9 79:7,10 93:9 99:3,4  
 100:23 109:17 112:15  
 113:17 115:24 117:6  
 122:16,21 127:4,10,10,22  
 132:10  
 decisionmaking (1) 9:6  
 decisions (17) 3:16 10:6  
 13:5,10 21:23 29:16 41:6  
 74:10 75:25 81:14 86:14  
 93:2 108:22 109:21 110:9  
 118:8 127:23  
 declared (1) 53:11  
 declined (1) 68:19  
 decreased (1) 4:13  
 dedicate (1) 12:17  
 dedicated (3) 5:6 48:11  
 112:5  
 deductions (1) 21:14  
 deemed (3) 20:13,15 116:3  
 defects (1) 140:10  
 defendants (1) 20:22  
 defer (1) 3:17  
 deficiency (2) 144:5,10  
 definition (2) 89:8,9  
 degree (2) 39:9 77:18  
 delete (1) 34:11  
 deletion (1) 29:22  
 deliberately (1) 31:7  
 deliberating (1) 151:23  
 deliberations (9) 71:14  
 141:23 149:1,3,4 151:2,3  
 152:2,10  
 delius (6) 4:24 7:11,14,23  
 9:21 13:8  
 deliver (2) 44:18 147:25  
 delivery (2) 15:3 79:14  
 demonstrating (1) 54:25  
 department (6) 6:23 15:25  
 16:1,16,20 18:19  
 departments (2) 16:21  
 111:22  
 depending (1) 19:25  
 deployed (1) 16:8  
 deported (1) 33:8  
 deputy (5) 47:19 79:13

110:13 114:18 125:9  
 deradicalisation (1) 31:22  
 described (10) 14:20 16:4  
 57:15 58:7 59:22 70:17  
 75:24 133:23 139:8 147:3  
 describing (1) 58:3  
 description (2) 46:25 58:13  
 deserved (1) 71:4  
 designation (3) 58:1 59:9,11  
 desire (2) 46:11 54:22  
 desistance (2) 79:21,23  
 desk (2) 130:19,22  
 despite (2) 73:18 77:16  
 detail (11) 28:11 78:4 84:24  
 90:5 91:23 102:24  
 103:1,15 105:3,11 129:21  
 detailed (6) 4:7 18:14 75:23  
 78:18 131:1,23  
 details (14) 17:13 18:12 44:6  
 68:11 84:18 90:9,11,13  
 93:7 97:18 103:7,18  
 107:10 122:14  
 detective (4) 81:8 95:16,22  
 111:20  
 detector (1) 105:14  
 determine (1) 23:14  
 determinations (1) 138:9  
 determine (3) 49:18 58:18  
 135:20  
 determined (2) 9:25 19:9  
 determines (1) 21:11  
 detract (2) 62:3 69:10  
 develop (4) 5:4 12:21 112:22  
 132:1  
 developed (1) 133:4  
 developing (1) 23:1  
 development (1) 131:25  
 develops (2) 16:6 80:17  
 device (2) 53:24 55:7  
 di (31) 24:6,8 25:21 26:23  
 29:2 30:10 42:2 46:25  
 87:16 88:25 89:24 94:10  
 95:15,20,23,24 100:1  
 106:12 108:15,17  
 116:7,9,20,25 117:5,5  
 121:9,17 123:12 128:2,23  
 dictate (1) 3:8  
 didnt (74) 4:20 11:25 12:16  
 25:19,24 28:4,10,11 29:23  
 30:3,16 31:14,22 32:1  
 33:12,20,24 34:24 35:24  
 37:3,9 38:7,15 39:23  
 40:4,4,9 43:22 45:1,5,16  
 46:7,13,21 47:12,12 55:5  
 58:2 67:20 68:2 69:22  
 75:3,20 82:11 87:20  
 88:13,14 89:15 90:4,13  
 95:2,3 98:15,24 99:1,25  
 103:9,10,13 105:11 109:12  
 110:12 113:20 114:3,19  
 119:24 120:9 124:24  
 125:20 126:2,9 127:3,17  
 130:23  
 died (2) 137:18 141:8  
 difference (3) 46:25 77:6  
 127:5  
 different (9) 11:1,8 17:19  
 32:15 34:23 51:21 57:10  
 59:21,22  
 differently (2) 32:9 118:2  
 difficult (12) 13:3 21:20  
 42:18 45:16 53:4 59:14  
 109:25 114:23 124:8 127:1  
 148:13 149:24  
 9:21 13:8  
 digitised (1) 17:22  
 dimensions (1) 122:5  
 direct (7) 15:9 26:19 51:1  
 60:4 123:10 137:13 142:7  
 directed (3) 137:21 140:4  
 147:11  
 directing (2) 137:25 142:5  
 directions (12) 72:5  
 134:16,19,24,25 135:2,7  
 138:22 140:2 147:8,19  
 150:25

directly (6) 51:5,13 55:6  
 86:10 99:7 113:6  
 director (6) 14:24 15:1 47:19  
 50:5 52:23 79:13  
 directorate (1) 24:11  
 disadvantage (2) 4:17  
 113:25  
 disagree (1) 46:25  
 disagrees (1) 117:8  
 disappointed (1) 44:21  
 disbelieving (1) 40:15  
 discipline (1) 13:6  
 disclosed (1) 125:21  
 disclosure (2) 51:7 97:5  
 discover (1) 6:18  
 discovered (2) 42:7 117:21  
 discreet (1) 150:6  
 discrepancy (1) 32:4  
 discuss (10) 4:15 6:4 11:2  
 38:11 42:1 66:7,12 148:4  
 152:6,25  
 discussed (33) 8:12 10:6  
 28:8 30:18 32:19 33:3  
 34:12 35:9,19 37:1 39:16  
 42:21 43:11 62:13 63:23  
 66:6 67:12 68:17 84:3,4  
 89:18 99:17,18,24  
 103:17,21 107:10 108:18  
 109:14 125:23 127:16,18  
 130:17  
 discussing (10) 11:9 18:23  
 26:22 31:2 32:20 36:4 37:3  
 41:21 53:24,25  
 discussion (37) 10:19  
 11:7,10,20 36:6,25 45:14  
 58:13,19 62:23 67:3,5  
 74:11 75:15,23  
 76:8,10,15,20  
 78:4,5,9,10,11,14,19,22  
 79:12 80:22 88:22 94:19  
 101:4 110:14 111:18  
 128:23 129:18 131:2  
 discussions (9) 66:8 75:8,25  
 77:2 95:11 109:20  
 111:11,17 147:17  
 disengage (1) 79:24  
 disengagement (2) 15:12  
 79:21  
 dishonest (1) 28:24  
 disproportionate (1) 70:5  
 disregard (1) 145:9  
 disruptive (3) 21:19 26:3  
 50:10  
 disseminate (1) 30:6  
 dissemination (1) 116:9  
 distance (1) 14:3  
 distributed (1) 75:17  
 disturbing (1) 124:17  
 diverse (1) 52:12  
 divided (1) 19:24  
 division (1) 47:20  
 document (12) 27:12 73:5  
 84:16 89:5 101:9 105:25  
 107:6 116:8,13 118:6,6  
 134:11  
 documented (2) 10:8 19:11  
 documents (9) 54:12 60:22  
 97:8 106:11 108:12 128:21  
 134:15,20 136:10  
 does (9) 70:22 72:19 93:7  
 109:19 110:6 122:5 125:3  
 140:7 141:6  
 doesnt (2) 114:24 149:8  
 doing (17) 14:19 33:18 37:2  
 64:19 66:2 85:6 91:2 92:11  
 102:17 109:1 114:11 123:8  
 124:10,25 127:8 128:7  
 151:1  
 domestic (1) 2:5  
 done (13) 3:22 13:12 17:3  
 33:17 42:6 95:18 96:15  
 100:6 132:11 145:16  
 147:7,15 148:15  
 dont (5) 72:20 148:16,21  
 152:19,23  
 doubt (4) 21:12 89:18 95:8

105:5  
 down (4) 14:7 20:20 34:3  
 48:9  
 downgrade (1) 3:25  
 downgraded (1) 88:17  
 dr (1) 35:17  
 draft (2) 4:8 144:20  
 dramatic (1) 39:6  
 draw (2) 36:11 116:13  
 drawn (1) 37:14  
 drive (1) 69:8  
 driven (1) 33:20  
 driving (1) 34:22  
 drugs (1) 69:20  
 ds (33) 24:14,17 29:1 32:11  
 34:19,23 38:3,4,11 42:2  
 61:12,25 64:1 81:8 91:19  
 93:19 94:10 98:8 99:6,11  
 101:4,6 102:14,24  
 103:12,17 104:3,14 121:9  
 123:21,23 125:7 130:14  
 dual (1) 53:16  
 due (17) 6:21 14:2,7 20:9  
 32:23 63:1 77:5 87:9 93:10  
 99:16 102:1 105:22 108:7  
 110:1 117:21 129:9 132:3  
 dumper (17) 34:7,20 36:15  
 62:24 65:7 75:22 89:14  
 92:11,19 101:1,2,16  
 111:15 120:23 121:13  
 127:2,21  
 duplicate (1) 117:22  
 duplication (1) 57:14  
 during (7) 60:22 125:2  
 127:18 141:22 148:18  
 149:4 151:19  
 duty (5) 5:18,21 17:7 141:4,4  
 dvds (3) 42:15 43:2 76:22  
 dwp (1) 76:15

E

enable (2) 30:25 85:7  
 enabled (1) 59:11  
 encouraged (1) 1:13  
 end (7) 23:5 37:7 98:7  
 121:16 128:1 130:15  
 151:17  
 ended (3) 33:24 76:14 81:3  
 enforcement (1) 19:2  
 engage (7) 4:2 38:23 51:22  
 63:20 77:8 83:17 123:16  
 engagement (5) 8:7 29:15 48:14  
 123:24 124:12  
 engagement (4) 27:13 39:3  
 81:1 102:9  
 engagements (3) 38:21  
 76:18 92:4  
 engaging (10) 29:20 44:1  
 54:9 56:3 63:16 91:5  
 123:14 124:13,15 125:1  
 england (1) 1:8  
 enhanced (4) 4:11 19:8  
 59:16 66:17  
 enquiries (1) 90:6  
 ensure (3) 1:24 3:7 149:10  
 ensures (2) 5:12 23:13  
 ensuring (2) 7:21 134:10  
 entailed (1) 58:4  
 entirely (2) 78:11 150:13  
 entitled (1) 121:4  
 entries (4) 4:24 13:8 18:1  
 85:19  
 entry (3) 19:7 37:12 100:13  
 environment (1) 56:22  
 equally (3) 119:18 141:17  
 150:8  
 equipmentinterference (1)  
 47:25  
 erg (27) 2:18 3:17,20,23  
 4:5,17,18,24 9:11,12  
 12:6,13 13:8,11 16:8,23  
 17:3 26:2,9 28:10 40:24  
 64:9 76:24 97:22,23  
 107:12  
 ergs (3) 4:1,3 5:14  
 erroneously (1) 75:18  
 error (3) 117:21 139:1,7  
 errors (2) 141:13,18  
 escape (2) 20:6,8  
 escort (8) 32:20 44:17 76:7  
 90:3 93:13 111:4,5 130:9  
 escorted (5) 17:12 29:14  
 46:23 92:1 127:1  
 escorting (1) 44:15  
 especially (2) 114:11 128:5  
 essentially (1) 25:6  
 established (3) 106:22  
 133:8,15  
 establishing (1) 53:4  
 establishment (1) 98:13  
 estate (2) 1:11 20:16  
 estates (1) 14:25  
 et (1) 108:24  
 euston (2) 37:23 91:19  
 evaluation (1) 18:4  
 evaluations (2) 22:18,20  
 even (7) 55:22 71:14  
 78:12,15 124:17 146:17  
 147:6  
 event (66) 9:20 10:24 11:15  
 30:11 31:12 32:18 35:17  
 36:4,8,13,24 37:1,24 39:16  
 43:3 44:16 46:20,20 62:1  
 64:24 65:24 66:25 67:5  
 68:12 76:4,9 77:22,24  
 78:23 79:8 88:9 90:2,4,16  
 91:18,21 92:22 93:6,18  
 94:13,20 95:2 100:15  
 101:21 102:21 103:3,5  
 105:16 110:15 111:6,12  
 120:5,11,18 121:19 126:15  
 127:6 129:19,25 130:8  
 131:12,13,14 140:21 144:7  
 149:19  
 events (9) 30:25 92:18  
 110:16,18,20 111:19  
 126:17,19 127:14

ever (4) 3:25 87:17,21  
 109:19  
 every (8) 2:13 6:3 29:5,19  
 50:19 70:21 72:25 88:15  
 everyone (2) 1:5 99:9  
 everyone (1) 71:4  
 everything (3) 33:17 71:12  
 77:3  
 evidence (21) 13:5 22:22  
 25:15 62:10 74:18  
 116:20,25 117:6  
 135:1,4,6,8,9,23 136:1  
 137:12,18 142:6 146:22  
 147:20 148:3  
 exact (3) 90:17 95:2 114:24  
 exactly (1) 125:3  
 exaggerations (1) 62:3  
 example (6) 49:21 53:2  
 109:14 145:17 147:4 152:2  
 examples (1) 145:3  
 except (3) 38:21 135:17  
 148:5  
 exceptional (2) 20:6 23:7  
 exchange (2) 53:19 109:4  
 exchanges (1) 102:22  
 excited (1) 34:4  
 executive (3) 14:24 50:8  
 119:3  
 exercise (1) 85:18  
 exercising (1) 56:10  
 exhaustive (1) 145:4  
 exist (1) 17:16  
 existed (1) 118:3  
 existing (3) 25:22 48:22 49:1  
 expect (1) 127:23  
 expectation (2) 1:23 114:9  
 expectations (1) 77:2  
 expected (15) 2:9 6:16 8:2  
 9:19,22 27:8 31:15 39:15  
 73:14 78:12 99:3 101:19  
 103:14 119:12,16  
 expecting (3) 75:9 114:7  
 148:13  
 experience (14) 4:10 5:14  
 10:25 12:15 41:17 43:20  
 45:11 65:23 73:11 81:19  
 96:19 106:24  
 114:4,5,11,15 115:14  
 123:17  
 experienced (1) 68:22  
 experiences (1) 86:22  
 expertise (2) 6:8 114:16  
 explain (3) 138:18 148:12  
 149:13  
 explained (24) 1:9 2:2 6:20  
 8:16 14:5 19:4,6,18 20:2  
 21:10 22:13 23:4 24:8  
 25:2,13 28:3 41:20 43:22  
 45:19 47:21 52:12 64:3  
 126:8 132:1  
 explaining (2) 29:2 79:20  
 explanation (2) 55:7 139:25  
 explanations (1) 141:2  
 explicit (2) 93:17 103:11  
 explore (2) 122:15 128:5  
 exposed (1) 55:5  
 express (4) 10:22 35:3 122:9  
 141:12  
 expressed (13) 8:4 9:24 14:9  
 25:20 33:22 35:10 46:2,10  
 51:18 90:24 104:21 113:23  
 130:15  
 expresses (1) 137:8  
 expressing (1) 103:1  
 extending (2) 23:2  
 extension (1) 33:2  
 extent (1) 102:5  
 externally (1) 50:2  
 extremist (1) 103:5  
 extraditions (1) 20:23  
 extraordinarily (1) 40:22  
 extreme (4) 21:14 39:5 44:7  
 56:14  
 extrememly (1) 70:3  
 extremist (7) 2:14 15:20  
 16:1,2,13 37:18 84:13

extremist (25) 7:4 16:7,12  
 19:14 46:8 49:14 53:14,21  
 54:12,14 55:2,15,16,22  
 56:1,16 59:6 70:2 83:17  
 84:22 86:2 94:15 104:10  
 114:12 118:21  
 extremists (5) 16:23 32:22  
 54:17,21 56:11  
 extremistspecific (1) 17:11

F

f (9) 6:1,22 26:2 28:4,7 73:5  
 74:13 76:3 140:24  
 face (2) 43:20 68:5  
 faces (1) 52:12  
 facilitate (1) 110:25  
 factor (9) 10:15 39:4 41:6  
 68:24 74:22 77:11 130:3  
 145:10,12  
 factors (19) 20:7 26:9 27:13  
 37:17 38:21 68:24 76:24  
 105:7 124:3 131:10 140:12  
 143:14 144:1,14  
 145:1,3,5,7,21  
 factual (6) 135:1,12 138:9  
 139:18 141:12 142:10  
 failure (8) 141:14 142:23  
 143:6,17,23 145:20 146:11  
 147:2  
 failures (2) 145:14 146:24  
 fair (2) 31:8 100:11  
 fairly (6) 58:5,20 60:11  
 62:12 63:21 117:8  
 family (6) 33:3 34:14 42:12  
 64:6 142:12 150:4  
 families (1) 142:19  
 fantastic (1) 152:17  
 far (6) 36:7 56:22 83:10  
 86:14 91:2 99:17  
 features (2) 122:8 135:8  
 february (6) 30:7,9 54:7  
 55:24 67:13 100:4  
 fed (4) 58:16 87:19 92:20  
 117:17  
 feed (5) 21:23 52:6 65:22  
 110:21 119:19  
 feedback (1) 89:24  
 feeding (1) 37:19  
 feeds (2) 16:18 18:14  
 feel (4) 11:25 72:1,20 138:21  
 fell (1) 14:2  
 felt (12) 11:10,21,25 33:21  
 44:2 46:13 102:18 106:2  
 119:18 120:25 123:2  
 132:13  
 few (6) 5:7 50:21 109:16  
 125:2 144:25 150:16  
 fewer (1) 52:25  
 field (1) 112:9  
 fighting (1) 49:16  
 figure (3) 26:4 54:14 55:16  
 figures (3) 105:1 122:7  
 124:12  
 files (1) 18:19  
 fill (3) 41:22 102:20 138:19  
 final (9) 11:12 12:6 36:14  
 72:6 131:19 134:11 144:4  
 147:8,13  
 finally (4) 22:5 59:7 148:1,8  
 finance (1) 54:3  
 finances (1) 20:9  
 find (13) 45:16 53:1 62:11  
 76:25 102:12 110:3 125:17  
 139:13 142:2,9,16 143:13  
 146:7  
 finding (3) 14:9 37:17 146:2  
 findings (2) 135:3 141:20  
 fine (1) 45:13  
 finer (1) 103:15  
 firewall (1) 51:11  
 firmly (2) 131:4 152:12  
 first (30) 24:22 25:2,3 28:2  
 35:18 39:19 43:7,10 48:23  
 53:9 64:23 73:4 80:16  
 87:17 91:3,20 93:23  
 105:21 110:11 116:5

121:15 125:14 126:24  
 136:5,17 142:22 144:5  
 145:3 146:2 152:3  
**fishmongers (3)** 40:9 77:22  
 144:7  
**fit (2)** 30:6 46:7  
**five (2)** 5:2 136:19  
**fixed (1)** 2:24  
**flagging (1)** 33:25  
**flash (1)** 32:6  
**flat (5)** 37:12 43:3,15 45:2  
 94:12  
**flow (1)** 132:23  
**flynn (14)** 1:8 2:21 3:16,20  
 4:4 6:6,10 7:25 9:11,18  
 10:9 12:16,25 13:4  
**focus (2)** 12:12 67:15  
**focused (2)** 53:16 120:20  
**focuses (1)** 15:11  
**follow (4)** 74:4 138:4,22  
 140:2  
**followed (3)** 17:21 97:25  
 109:15  
**following (13)** 4:25 22:2  
 68:25 72:12 73:1 83:21  
 91:16,22 118:18 130:20  
 133:7 135:2 145:18  
**follows (4)** 85:2,13 86:18  
 92:16  
**force (4)** 81:15 115:9 124:19  
 132:7  
**forces (2)** 67:1 128:9  
**forefront (2)** 31:13 123:19  
**foreman (1)** 147:16  
**forensic (5)** 4:5,16 5:6,10,15  
**forewarned (2)** 71:23 72:17  
**forewoman (1)** 147:16  
**form (20)** 6:1,22,25 26:2  
 50:25 52:14 73:2,5 76:3  
 83:23 85:4 109:14 117:4  
 126:18 135:9 136:18  
 138:14 141:8 143:16  
 152:20  
**formal (9)** 6:19 21:11 22:10  
 51:12 60:22 73:19 118:18  
 136:23 137:2  
**formalise (1)** 130:12  
**formalising (1)** 25:4  
**formally (1)** 133:22  
**format (1)** 74:4  
**formation (1)** 70:18  
**formed (1)** 50:11  
**former (1)** 27:7  
**forms (5)** 2:9 28:4,8 77:14  
 116:14  
**formulate (1)** 16:25  
**forsyth (37)** 10:2 24:2 30:14  
 31:1 32:13 33:11,16 40:21  
 42:21 43:5,11,17  
 44:7,10,24 46:15,18 47:3  
 66:13 82:8 87:16 88:20,21  
 89:12,17 90:24 91:17  
 96:13 99:19,22,25 100:2  
 101:6,7,10 106:20 125:12  
**forsyths (2)** 37:24 64:10  
**forthcoming (1)** 38:18  
**forum (1)** 16:19  
**forward (7)** 14:16 33:5 35:2  
 118:9 123:15 124:2 152:18  
**forwarded (1)** 35:16  
**forwarding (1)** 91:8  
**found (5)** 20:23 69:2 117:23  
 126:24 146:16  
**foundation (2)** 41:15,16  
**four (9)** 19:7,24 25:4 68:6  
 73:20 112:4 135:12,25  
 136:17  
**fourth (2)** 45:7 136:6  
**fragmented (1)** 1:15  
**framed (1)** 135:20  
**framework (2)** 21:19 22:12  
**free (1)** 138:21  
**freedom (1)** 63:14  
**frequency (11)** 38:12,17  
 39:12 60:2 64:21 88:25  
 91:1,2,10 102:17 129:15

**frequent (2)** 89:1,3  
**friday (2)** 87:1 153:8  
**friends (2)** 34:13 63:9  
**front (3)** 99:21 116:7 134:18  
**frustrated (1)** 33:12  
**frustration (1)** 77:4  
**full (5)** 14:10 29:7 34:11  
 61:17 136:2  
**fully (4)** 8:25 9:2 11:6 125:5  
**function (10)** 1:18 47:21  
 65:22 96:14 97:2  
 112:3,7,24 113:13 126:12  
**functions (2)** 25:22 125:10  
**fund (1)** 23:21  
**funding (2)** 12:18 14:1  
**fundraising (2)** 49:16 55:11  
**further (31)** 2:14 18:16  
 43:24 48:8,20 49:7,17  
 59:11 68:12 85:8 87:5  
 90:5,6 93:1,5 95:5,7,11  
 99:1,5,9,12 103:12,14  
 105:5 108:18,18 118:12  
 138:18 139:25 147:19  
**future (6)** 31:1 34:1 85:15  
 110:16 111:17 126:17

**G**

**g (1)** 141:11  
**gaffer (1)** 68:5  
**gain (2)** 47:7 56:23  
**games (7)** 39:18 42:15 43:1  
 44:22 45:3 63:9 76:22  
**gap (2)** 35:24 125:4  
**gathered (1)** 47:10  
**gathering (3)** 19:3 25:15  
 122:6  
**gave (11)** 26:10 35:10 37:4  
 40:24 42:17 83:14 94:21  
 95:5 100:21 119:25 121:11  
**gchq (1)** 50:6  
**gell (2)** 1:23 81:5  
**general (11)** 40:19 42:25  
 45:15 52:23 62:22 77:15  
 96:4 113:19 132:18,19  
 138:2  
**generalist (1)** 9:12  
**generally (4)** 28:16 50:24  
 96:3 120:2  
**generated (1)** 130:22  
**gentlemen (3)** 72:11 148:7  
 151:17  
**genuinely (2)** 29:17 30:8  
**get (11)** 37:9 66:18 80:18  
 90:10 98:22 103:8 124:9  
 127:2 148:8 149:14 152:13  
**getting (7)** 14:4,11 44:14  
 46:19 80:15 104:17 122:2  
**gist (1)** 109:7  
**give (22)** 8:6 18:3 29:7 34:8  
 38:7 69:9 100:5 101:10,10  
 107:7 109:6 115:11 119:22  
 134:12 136:11 138:9,21  
 139:12,18,25 144:18  
 150:24  
**given (30)** 3:7 6:10 11:15,21  
 17:13 36:7 38:15 53:3  
 56:19 72:6 75:7 83:8,9  
 94:6,21 104:2,14,20  
 107:9,20 113:7 116:15  
 117:5 127:16 130:2 138:17  
 140:1 143:11 147:4 148:1  
**giving (5)** 12:18 52:25  
 134:24 143:25 144:12  
**goes (1)** 19:4  
**going (48)** 1:7 38:1  
 42:13,16,17,19 46:15,16  
 47:14 71:8,23,24  
 72:11,16,17 76:21 84:19  
 91:24 94:2 95:8  
 100:3,12,15 102:11,20  
 104:18,24,24,25 111:16  
 118:8 121:3,19 122:6,6,10  
 123:1,21 125:1 129:12,16  
 130:16 131:8 138:3  
 148:8,9,25 150:10  
**gone (3)** 12:18 39:21 121:21

**good (20)** 1:5 6:6 9:4 10:4  
 26:7 28:16 30:23 31:18  
 32:24 34:8,9 39:2 41:3  
 42:12 58:20 70:16 80:23  
 86:23 106:3 120:3  
**googled (1)** 40:9  
**gosh (1)** 109:19  
**government (1)** 8:18  
**govern (1)** 23:4  
**governments (1)** 79:16  
**governor (1)** 19:21  
**grade (2)** 28:21 74:24  
**graded (2)** 58:8 87:3  
**grading (7)** 48:7 70:11  
 83:8,9 108:16 110:4 129:8  
**gradually (1)** 20:20  
**grant (2)** 22:8,12  
**granted (1)** 20:24  
**grateful (1)** 29:17  
**great (4)** 4:23 13:9 74:21  
 129:15  
**greater (4)** 21:24 53:5 63:14  
 66:18  
**grendon (1)** 22:4  
**groomed (1)** 12:22  
**group (6)** 15:7 20:10 50:8  
 53:20 85:21 87:3  
**groups (2)** 49:10 53:17  
**guard (1)** 3:15  
**guava (1)** 53:15  
**guidance (12)** 3:13 5:22 6:13  
 8:10 10:3 45:20 73:16,19  
 74:9 75:12 133:3 134:2  
**guide (1)** 136:18  
**guidelines (1)** 3:20  
**guildhall (1)** 149:19  
**guiltily (1)** 141:5  
**guilty (1)** 20:23  
**gym (7)** 30:19 42:13,17 63:8  
 64:7 76:20 129:15

**H**

**h (1)** 141:21  
**hadnt (1)** 109:10  
**half (1)** 68:21  
**hall (4)** 40:9 77:22 104:23  
 144:7  
**hand (2)** 14:18 72:20  
**handed (4)** 77:4  
 134:12,13,14  
**handinhand (1)** 129:12  
**handled (1)** 108:17  
**handling (7)** 49:3 87:10  
 96:14 98:11 108:16 110:1  
 116:21  
**handover (4)** 126:7 128:20  
 129:13 130:12  
**happen (2)** 33:9 80:19  
**happened (7)** 10:16 38:5  
 40:14 41:25 102:6 117:18  
 127:13  
**happening (5)** 6:17 89:3  
 104:17 149:9 150:9  
**happy (13)** 29:20 31:19 33:1  
 34:13 35:12 37:13 39:14  
 43:2 44:20 91:17 110:24  
 150:23 152:16  
**harboured (1)** 69:18  
**harm (7)** 3:4,14 39:24 73:3  
 77:15 107:14 128:17  
**harmful (1)** 38:23  
**hartill (9)** 84:2 86:17 90:5,14  
 93:4 100:4 102:2 103:18  
 123:21  
**havent (1)** 147:15  
**having (16)** 29:21 31:5 66:14  
 76:7 77:2 78:5 87:21  
 100:25 108:17 109:20  
 110:4 118:17 123:15  
 128:23 148:12 150:15  
**head (10)** 24:7 25:7 49:25  
 55:1 72:22 95:20,24 96:9  
 106:16 130:11  
**headed (1)** 134:16  
**headquarters (4)** 15:7  
 24:4,17 133:15

**headsup (1)** 110:18  
**hear (1)** 75:7  
**heard (10)** 28:25 40:7 41:23  
 77:21 91:21 121:15 131:19  
 135:4 146:22 148:3  
**hearing (1)** 136:1  
**hearings (1)** 149:22  
**heart (2)** 53:2 92:15  
**hed (2)** 30:9 105:2  
**heightened (1)** 60:16  
**held (6)** 21:21 44:7 66:10  
 69:17 79:4 90:4  
**help (7)** 8:20 12:10 46:1  
 80:20 140:9 149:25 150:12  
**helped (3)** 13:17 114:4  
 129:17  
**helpful (3)** 12:11 62:21 67:9  
**helping (1)** 13:21  
**helps (1)** 5:4  
**hemmings (6)** 30:18 37:11  
 41:11 42:3,21 43:13  
**hence (1)** 57:16  
**here (11)** 7:25 8:19 86:16  
 113:21 117:18 130:5 138:5  
 149:19,23,25 152:16  
**hes (1)** 118:10  
**hessel (10)** 24:8 29:2 30:10  
 42:2 89:24 95:15 100:1  
 108:15,17 117:5  
**hessells (1)** 46:25  
**hide (1)** 60:15  
**high (25)** 3:7 14:25 15:8,24  
 17:1 19:22  
 20:6,7,13,15,18,24 21:7  
 26:11 31:12 70:3 73:3  
 75:19,19 77:14 93:22  
 103:5 104:25 107:13  
 121:19  
**higher (2)** 5:3 12:5  
**highest (1)** 49:24  
**highlevel (1)** 133:15  
**highlight (1)** 34:16  
**highlighted (2)** 12:12 102:14  
**highly (3)** 27:14,15 52:12  
**hii (3)** 2:18 3:25 16:8  
**hill (1)** 22:5  
**himself (15)** 26:9 34:15,25  
 38:15 44:11 45:16  
 46:11,12,19 87:13 90:25  
 91:11 93:8 102:16 113:6  
**hindsight (1)** 92:17  
**historic (1)** 27:17  
**history (3)** 73:6 82:1 86:2  
**hmp (8)** 21:20,20 22:4,4,5  
 29:14 85:1,9  
**hmpps (6)** 7:4 14:25 15:2  
 16:2,4 79:23  
**hoax (1)** 70:1  
**hold (4)** 50:4 101:17 118:21  
 151:2  
**holding (3)** 7:9 55:15 117:12  
**holiday (1)** 89:11  
**home (17)** 7:9,24 8:6,6 16:4  
 64:19 76:22 79:15,15,22  
 80:1 81:4 133:10  
 148:20,24 150:22 151:20  
**honest (1)** 129:20  
**honesty (2)** 28:15 30:21  
**hope (2)** 10:15 80:17  
**hopeful (2)** 67:19 101:1  
**hoping (1)** 34:7  
**hospital (2)** 145:18,23  
**hostility (1)** 69:18  
**hosting (1)** 77:24  
**hough (16)** 71:7,16 72:4,9  
 92:6 93:19 99:6 109:4  
 122:1 124:22 127:12 149:4  
 150:17,21 151:6,12  
**hour (2)** 71:22 72:15  
**hours (2)** 148:17 151:18  
**housing (2)** 5:22 7:20  
**however (11)** 52:5 57:21  
 77:25 85:17 86:25 98:16  
 101:18 121:20 123:2 135:7  
 139:20  
**hub (3)** 5:9,10 70:19

**hubs (1)** 5:2  
**human (1)** 48:1  
**hundreds (1)** 53:13  
**hypothetical (2)** 145:17  
 147:1

**I**

**ian (1)** 29:13  
**iconic (1)** 53:5  
**idea (3)** 6:6 10:4 44:6  
**identification (1)** 112:19  
**identified (12)** 12:4 39:3  
 49:25 53:24 59:4 62:16  
 67:2 70:12,16 83:15 94:14  
 101:3  
**identifies (1)** 118:16  
**identify (2)** 3:6 16:12  
**identifying (4)** 15:21 17:19  
 100:11 114:12  
**ideological (1)** 15:20  
**ideologies (1)** 38:22  
**ideology (1)** 132:19  
**ied (3)** 53:25 55:13 70:1  
**iep (2)** 19:7,8  
**ieva (2)** 4:6 97:23  
**ignorant (1)** 114:1  
**ignore (1)** 135:5  
**ignored (2)** 74:25 118:4  
**ii (1)** 146:6  
**iii (1)** 146:13  
**ill (7)** 71:17 134:13,14  
 148:22 150:15,24 153:5  
 172:9,11,16,17  
**illumni (1)** 102:21  
**im (20)** 1:7 47:14 71:2,23,24  
 72:9,11,16,17  
 148:9,12,13,25 149:8,14  
 150:3,5,10,22 152:8  
**immediate (1)** 68:7  
**immediately (3)** 59:18 89:16  
 120:25  
**imminent (1)** 85:14  
**impact (3)** 27:2 40:10 95:10  
**impacted (2)** 11:12 35:24  
**impediment (1)** 75:4  
**impermeable (1)** 51:11  
**importance (2)** 13:4 79:19  
**important (17)** 10:5 29:8  
 33:6 41:5 44:2 99:8 109:21  
 110:7 116:9 117:16 121:20  
 132:23 135:8 136:3 141:20  
 150:8 151:22  
**imprecise (1)** 58:4  
**impression (1)** 26:25  
**improve (1)** 133:20  
**improvement (1)** 133:8  
**improvements (1)** 23:24  
**inability (1)** 76:25  
**inadequate (1)** 141:15  
**inadvertent (1)** 51:7  
**inadvertently (1)** 31:7  
**inappropriate (1)** 141:14  
**incautious (1)** 34:25  
**incentives (1)** 19:6  
**incident (6)** 8:22 13:14  
 32:17 40:7 97:5 118:6  
**incidents (4)** 54:23 63:1  
 84:25 97:19  
**incitement (1)** 94:16  
**inciting (1)** 104:11  
**include (1)** 88:18  
**included (8)** 5:23 10:17 12:4  
 41:21 54:25 73:23 101:23  
 145:11  
**includes (4)** 5:19 20:7 79:17  
 133:5  
**including (39)** 2:8 3:24 7:19  
 9:5,20 16:16 17:17,25 21:8  
 23:1 24:13 42:2  
 47:23,23,25 52:13 54:23  
 55:10 60:18,22 68:5 73:17  
 81:16 82:8 84:25 93:4,5  
 94:4,15 97:12,19,23  
 104:11 106:1 108:24  
 112:6,10 115:10 134:3  
**incoming (1)** 48:18

**increase (1)** 52:23  
**increased (6)** 23:19 38:17  
 40:3 52:22 64:22 91:1  
**increasing (2)** 38:12 91:9  
**indepth (1)** 41:15  
**index (1)** 154:2  
**indicate (10)** 2:25 60:20  
 65:10 84:12 97:14  
 141:17,20 142:15,20  
 145:13  
**indicated (3)** 59:23 68:2  
 69:23  
**indicates (1)** 116:1  
**indicating (2)** 61:11 113:23  
**indication (3)** 6:110 69:19  
 145:11  
**indications (1)** 56:1  
**indicative (1)** 53:14  
**indicators (3)** 2:24 27:16  
 38:22  
**indirectly (1)** 65:5  
**individual (7)** 4:13 15:15  
 27:1 28:23 41:1 131:9  
 147:12  
**individuals (6)** 7:21 16:17  
 49:10,17,19 133:11  
**influence (6)** 26:8 56:10 60:8  
 63:11 85:1 97:20  
**influenced (1)** 63:4  
**influential (1)** 54:14  
**inform (6)** 3:21 18:7 53:8  
 91:14 98:23 147:23  
**informal (1)** 141:6  
**informants (1)** 112:6  
**information (68)** 1:13  
 7:10,14 9:13 18:20  
 27:18,24 28:5,7 30:6 34:24  
 35:24 37:20 47:7,10,13  
 48:19,21 49:4 50:21  
 51:9 12:13  
 57:1,8,10,12,18,22 58:8  
 62:14 65:15,16,21 67:14  
 68:13 69:1 73:7,18,25 74:6  
 75:1,7,10 82:21 84:11 86:5  
 92:23 102:18 103:8  
 107:4,7 109:8 115:1 118:7  
 119:16 122:2 123:4 124:21  
 127:4 129:4,6 130:2  
 131:7,23 133:5 135:18  
 143:18  
**informationsharing (4)** 5:25  
 50:18 86:13,15  
**informed (12)** 11:7 12:6,21  
 25:17 32:25 60:5 63:12  
 88:4 117:13 120:8 122:16  
 134:3  
**informing (1)** 117:14  
**informs (1)** 3:21  
**infractions (1)** 21:15  
**inherent (2)** 58:12 63:22  
**inherited (1)** 27:12  
**initial (3)** 59:16 100:10  
 119:22  
**initially (9)** 22:4 43:2 44:20  
 56:19 57:14 80:4 95:3  
 96:23 111:7  
**inmate (3)** 54:15,20 55:19  
**innovation (1)** 22:8  
**input (3)** 10:17 31:15 62:25  
**inquest (13)** 135:10,10,11,23  
 136:23,25 137:9 138:14  
 145:17 148:18 151:9,13,19  
**inquests (7)** 88:7 134:23  
 136:4,4 138:13 149:15,23  
**inquiry (1)** 136:2  
**insight (5)** 80:18,25 91:6  
 102:19 124:9  
**insaf (1)** 69:9  
**instead (2)** 1:15 146:17  
**instigating (1)** 8:14  
**institution (1)** 15:6  
**instructions (1)** 19:12  
**insufficient (2)** 12:7 141:16  
**insuring (1)** 100:17  
**integrate (1)** 12:10  
**intel (2)** 118:16,18

**intelligence (180)** 6:15,22,23  
 16:19 17:20,24  
 18:4,8,16,20,24 19:3 24:21  
 25:15 26:5 28:20 40:25  
 41:23 48:1,8,18,22,25  
 49:2,13 50:6,24 52:5 55:14  
 56:3,10 57:5,19 58:2,3,15  
 59:11,20 60:20 61:5 62:20  
 63:16 65:8,10,25 66:9  
 69:11,17 70:6,19 74:16,25  
 81:9,12,13,16,17,23,23,25  
 82:10,20,24 83:3,6,8  
 84:11,18,24 85:3,17,24  
 86:4,7 87:8,10,19,21  
 88:4,18,19,20 89:10,21  
 92:2,20 95:17  
 96:1,5,6,8,18 97:10,15,18  
 98:9,12,18,21 99:17,18,20  
 100:1 104:4 105:24 106:1  
 107:8,18,21,  
 108:3,4,7,9,11,20  
 109:2,11,12 110:3,8,19  
 112:2,6,7,8,9 113:13,21,22  
 114:2  
 116:1,6,11,16,22,22,23  
 117:4,7,16,19,20,22  
 118:1,3,10,23 119:3,

investigating (2) 58:24 98:17  
 investigation (61) 26:15,16  
 48:9,13,16,24 49:2  
 50:7,9,12,15,16,19,23  
 51:6,22 54:8,19 55:25  
 56:5,7,16,18 57:25 58:23  
 59:1 60:24 61:24 64:18  
 65:12 66:12,19 67:16,18  
 69:7 73:12 74:3 81:22  
 82:2,13,20 83:12 89:6  
 92:25 96:7,11,18 97:7  
 106:19 110:21 112:3 113:7  
 115:20,24 117:25 118:8  
 119:1 120:20 121:17  
 126:12 128:21  
 investigations (21) 19:4  
 47:16 48:16 49:10,24 50:1  
 52:18 70:12  
 81:12,17,18,18,20 96:2  
 105:21 112:1,9 114:22  
 123:17 125:10 133:12  
 investigative (6) 48:24 52:21  
 70:14 112:14,24 114:3  
 investigator (1) 48:6  
 investigators (2) 59:21 124:9  
 investment (1) 23:19  
 invitation (2) 77:21 101:11  
 invitations (1) 120:8  
 invite (1) 7:2  
 invited (5) 35:19 64:23 76:5  
 77:25 111:12  
 inviting (2) 11:15 99:23  
 involve (2) 34:21 130:25  
 involved (28) 5:21 15:13  
 40:18 45:14,17 47:16  
 50:16 58:22 59:5 61:6 69:4  
 75:15 79:24 81:25 82:14  
 83:16 92:25 94:15 99:9  
 101:23 105:19 112:18  
 113:6 114:8 116:10 120:17  
 131:3 151:13  
 involvement (7) 15:10 27:3  
 55:19,20 77:10 88:10  
 101:18  
 involves (1) 7:5  
 involving (1) 17:1  
 irrelevant (1) 121:25  
 irrevocable (1) 41:6  
 isil (1) 69:5  
 islam (1) 85:5  
 islamic (1) 54:14  
 islamist (6) 52:13,14,18  
 55:16 94:14 104:10  
 isnt (1) 62:21  
 isolate (1) 91:10  
 isolated (2) 38:15 90:23  
 isolating (4) 38:13 90:23,25  
 102:15  
 isolation (9) 34:16 37:17,18  
 39:14 40:24 64:2,5 76:25  
 123:13  
 issues (13) 12:4 14:8 29:21  
 35:25 42:6 43:3 68:18  
 75:15 104:5 113:9  
 138:9,19 139:18  
 items (1) 68:5  
 its (26) 4:12 22:3 28:25  
 30:19 40:10 49:2 51:4 55:8  
 60:25 61:24 62:2 68:25  
 70:4 72:2 87:11 88:4 94:24  
 109:3 122:19 129:7 145:12  
 146:15 148:14 149:13  
 150:8 152:20  
 itself (2) 73:5 136:3  
 iv (1) 146:23  
 ive (8) 71:7,22,23 72:1,14,15  
 134:11 152:21

J

jack (11) 136:7,23 137:20  
 138:12,15 142:4,11  
 143:1,9,20 144:8  
 jacks (1) 142:12  
 january (16) 13:21 14:17  
 29:19,25 30:1,7 41:14 42:9  
 46:10 95:19,22 98:7

107:25 117:10 119:25  
 125:24  
 jerromes (6) 24:17 38:4  
 94:10 121:9 123:23 125:7  
 jexu (4) 16:3,4,12 22:25  
 job (5) 13:25 14:2,3,11  
 125:12  
 jobcentre (1) 13:20  
 jobs (1) 42:18  
 johal (2) 9:1 12:15  
 jointed (2) 41:11,13  
 joint (9) 16:2,3 49:3  
 50:13,19 70:18 82:20  
 131:2 134:10  
 jointly (3) 82:3 106:19  
 120:25  
 jones (10) 136:7,24 137:19  
 138:12 142:3,18  
 143:1,10,21 144:8  
 jot (22) 50:13 51:19,21  
 59:3,17 64:3,20 66:11  
 82:22 83:13 91:12 94:9,19  
 95:10 99:19 104:1,16  
 118:18 128:22 129:9  
 130:12,18  
 journey (1) 91:18  
 jtat (2) 34:18 101:9  
 judge (9) 1:5 71:17,22  
 72:5,11 149:13 150:21  
 151:11,15  
 judged (2) 87:12 89:7  
 judgment (2) 2:25 62:20  
 judgments (2) 62:22 141:12  
 july (12) 25:6,17 34:9,18  
 35:9 62:23 89:11,19,23  
 101:12 120:15 126:24  
 june (10) 14:1 25:24 34:2,5  
 44:16 100:24 107:3 120:18  
 125:15,18  
 jurors (1) 148:5  
 jury (38) 1:3 47:14  
 71:2,6,8,12,21,24 72:6,10  
 131:19 134:11,16,19,25  
 135:16,25  
 137:10,13,14,17,21 138:4  
 146:22 147:10,21,23  
 148:6,10,11 149:3,7  
 150:7,21 151:7,9,16 153:4  
 jurors (2) 135:19 149:4  
 justification (1) 116:18  
 justified (1) 38:3

K

keen (4) 27:9 84:6 86:22  
 128:4  
 keep (2) 35:1 118:24  
 keeping (2) 46:11 87:13  
 kept (3) 39:4 68:21 97:5  
 key (6) 2:22 59:20 73:17  
 83:15 138:9 141:24  
 keyworkers (2) 8:20 17:18  
 khan (320) 1:16 5:6,16  
 6:4,10,11 8:1,3,14 9:13,16  
 10:24 11:19 12:10,17  
 13:21 14:5,15,19 15:10  
 16:19 17:12 20:24 21:22  
 23:9,14 25:14,18,23  
 26:3,5,10,15,16  
 27:1,4,6,8,14,18  
 28:13,16,18  
 29:5,14,15,19,20,23,24  
 30:7,10,13,19,25  
 31:6,11,18,20,23,25  
 32:2,7,9,13,18,21  
 33:1,4,6,9,12,16,18,19  
 34:3,4,6,6,10,13,16,22  
 35:1,11,13,14,18  
 36:1,5,14,14,18,20  
 37:4,7,11,13,18,23,25  
 38:4,8,13,15  
 39:6,14,17,18,22,23  
 40:6,22 41:1,6  
 42:3,5,11,14,16  
 43:2,4,9,15 44:8,25  
 45:6,21,24 46:6 47:9,16  
 50:11 51:19 53:9,15,19,24

54:1,2,6,9,13,18,23  
 55:4,10,15 56:1,10,13,15  
 57:2 58:15 59:4,25 60:5,17  
 61:6,25 62:24 63:7,9,12  
 64:3,19,23 65:9,19  
 66:12,18 67:4 68:5,20  
 69:1,15,18 72:24,25  
 73:4,9,13,20 74:1,10,14,23  
 75:2 76:5,6,8,12,15,20  
 77:2,7,12,16,25 78:21  
 80:13,15,19 81:2 82:15,24  
 83:1,3,15,23 84:6,10  
 85:9,14,21,23,25 86:1,19  
 87:1,6,17 88:9,9,25  
 89:13,15 90:21,24  
 91:3,4,15,17,17,24,25 92:6  
 93:14,18 96:9,21 97:1,8,20  
 98:3,5,17,18 99:10  
 100:4,25 101:19,25  
 102:4,10,15,19 103:4  
 104:5,10,18,22 105:21  
 106:6,21  
 107:5,11,14,22,25 108:22  
 110:18,25 111:11,19 112:3  
 113:7,15,20 114:8  
 115:21,24 116:1,7  
 118:20,24 120:10,16,20  
 121:3,4,11,21 123:3,7,10  
 124:4,8,12,24  
 125:6,13,14,17  
 126:3,16,17,19 127:8  
 129:14,14,23 130:5,16  
 131:8 132:8 142:24  
 143:7,19 151:9  
 khans (71) 3:18,23 12:1  
 13:13,19 23:6 24:23 25:16  
 26:8,12,20,23 27:3,14 29:3  
 30:16,19,23 32:23 33:3,23  
 34:2,10,16,21 35:22 38:25  
 39:3,10 40:12 41:7  
 44:6,13,17 47:11 51:15,17  
 55:18 59:13,19 60:1  
 61:2,14 62:7 64:1,9 65:24  
 67:20 68:2,8 69:8,19 73:6  
 75:19 76:2 79:4 80:8,23  
 82:1,13 87:14 88:15  
 97:11,25 106:15 107:7  
 113:8 120:2 121:18 128:1  
 130:3  
 kill (1) 55:19  
 killed (2) 137:20 141:8  
 killing (2) 137:6,19  
 kilned (1) 142:4  
 kind (2) 98:19 124:7  
 kitchen (1) 68:6  
 knew (41) 13:22 24:14 25:14  
 26:10,15 29:10 36:5  
 37:7,16 40:24 54:11 60:2  
 73:9,10 75:4 76:12 78:25  
 82:1,1 87:18 90:13,17 92:6  
 95:4 96:13,17 103:11  
 106:20,24 107:7 108:11,21  
 115:20,22 118:7 119:7  
 120:16 123:12,21,23  
 129:24  
 knives (1) 68:6  
 know (44) 1:16 5:16 24:16  
 30:16 36:1 44:14 46:21  
 47:12 58:5,15 62:15  
 65:13,21 72:6,12,25 73:12  
 87:20,24 88:14 91:4 95:3  
 98:18,24 99:10,14,25  
 103:7 105:11 108:10  
 109:22 110:8 114:24  
 119:19,24 122:4,8,18  
 124:24 129:5 149:15  
 150:7,8 151:12  
 knowing (4) 109:1,21 110:3  
 116:19  
 knowledge (9) 5:5 15:23  
 66:24 67:3,15 69:4,22  
 96:21 109:6  
 known (9) 46:2 68:4 79:2  
 90:9 103:15 107:18 121:8  
 123:4 149:8  
 kuffars (1) 55:1

L

labourer (1) 14:2  
 lack (8) 4:23 10:8 34:12  
 35:13 36:9 39:3 102:16  
 129:10  
 lacked (3) 12:15 33:19  
 132:14  
 lacking (2) 102:15 141:17  
 ladies (3) 72:11 148:7 151:17  
 large (3) 42:15 45:3 63:2  
 largely (2) 28:11 52:11  
 largescale (1) 49:16  
 last (9) 6:11 14:15 27:7  
 42:10,25 44:19 91:12 93:3  
 111:10  
 lastminute (1) 65:17  
 late (8) 24:4,10 45:24 64:25  
 65:16 76:13 112:15 148:7  
 later (15) 25:13 32:23 40:8  
 46:18 55:20 69:5 83:4  
 90:6,11 101:19 107:12  
 111:14 117:21 127:12  
 139:15  
 lawful (1) 47:5  
 lawfully (2) 67:24 116:16  
 lawyers (1) 44:25  
 lay (1) 132:7  
 layout (2) 22:16 150:1  
 lead (10) 5:20 21:13 48:6,18  
 50:19 58:23 96:6 118:25  
 126:20 134:4  
 leader (1) 50:14  
 leadership (1) 53:11  
 leads (2) 15:15,16  
 learn (1) 70:22  
 learned (1) 35:18  
 learning (36) 9:8 10:15 16:20  
 21:25 22:6,11 15,18,21  
 27:3 33:24 34:15 41:5  
 44:16 62:1 64:24 65:10  
 68:15 69:16 70:11 76:2  
 77:9 88:11 100:14 103:24  
 110:15 111:12,19 120:5,17  
 121:15 124:19 125:5  
 126:15 127:24 131:12  
 least (4) 71:12,13 105:3  
 140:22  
 leave (8) 39:19 43:15 44:25  
 54:4 85:7 131:11 137:10  
 147:9  
 leaving (3) 33:22 43:7 52:25  
 led (7) 10:23 27:18 49:25  
 70:4 79:22 133:17,18  
 leek (1) 41:2  
 left (7) 8:1 13:1 14:18 43:7  
 71:7 72:15 130:6  
 legal (10) 33:11 38:7 72:5  
 134:16,19,24 135:2,7  
 138:22 141:2  
 legislation (1) 23:4  
 length (1) 20:11  
 lens (1) 122:16  
 less (5) 42:18 52:25 56:22  
 91:2 102:19  
 let (2) 11:22 141:25  
 level (34) 3:1 5:17,24,24  
 6:11 7:16,17 11:24 19:25  
 21:24 22:11 39:11 50:19  
 52:8,11 59:15 61:3 63:14  
 70:3,5 75:2,3 90:21 101:17  
 105:2 112:25 113:21 130:6  
 145:24 146:5,8,19,21  
 147:5  
 levels (15) 3:8 19:7,8,10  
 49:12,22 105:8,9 145:23  
 146:4,7,14,18 20 147:5  
 liability (3) 135:21,22 141:5  
 liaise (3) 1:23 24:9 29:9  
 liaised (1) 24:12  
 liaising (1) 101:6  
 liaison (5) 19:1 50:8 68:7  
 111:23 112:19  
 licence (22) 7:22 8:9 9:19  
 17:9,10,13 31:7 34:22 41:8  
 44:14,23 59:14 60:8,19

62:8 84:17 107:2 119:10  
 121:22 124:7 131:16,18  
 license (1) 3:10  
 lie (1) 88:14  
 lies (1) 85:4  
 lieu (1) 88:8  
 life (12) 8:19 71:1 86:21  
 88:15 119:1 123:16 124:20  
 131:10 133:12 146:20  
 147:6 148:20  
 lifestyle (1) 104:4  
 light (2) 38:12 68:13  
 like (12) 5:6 18:1 33:13,17  
 71:9 72:7 127:11  
 142:15,21 147:19  
 150:14,23  
 liked (2) 46:2 128:7  
 likelihood (1) 3:3  
 likely (18) 28:23 37:23  
 48:11,20 50:9 51:22  
 52:12,14,16 55:9,22 57:20  
 69:15 70:6 78:1 103:20  
 123:24 139:20  
 likewise (1) 145:6  
 limited (3) 14:6,10 26:1  
 limits (2) 5:10 47:6  
 line (1) 24:10  
 lines (1) 58:9  
 link (2) 15:15 111:23  
 linked (6) 49:1,10,14 52:18  
 53:12 112:21  
 links (2) 20:10 112:22  
 list (1) 145:11  
 listed (3) 116:7 138:20 145:1  
 listen (2) 52:4 75:6  
 listening (2) 53:24 152:9  
 lists (2) 6:9 145:4  
 little (5) 12:9 14:21 39:2  
 52:25 73:11  
 lived (1) 14:3  
 lively (1) 64:4  
 livery (1) 104:23  
 living (2) 105:24 132:8  
 liz (1) 13:20  
 local (6) 18:7 21:23 67:1  
 80:10 81:22 132:15  
 locally (2) 21:22 34:13  
 location (11) 40:11 53:3  
 65:1,2,14 68:11 79:1  
 95:1,2,3 122:19  
 log (2) 41:22 115:25  
 logistically (1) 31:5  
 logistics (3) 32:19 39:16  
 100:17  
 london (47) 9:25 11:6 12:25  
 38:1,18 39:16 40:11  
 46:16,20 53:18,19 64:24  
 65:25 66:16 67:5 78:25  
 79:2 90:18 91:18,21,24  
 92:9,15 93:6,7 94:2,13,20  
 102:7,23 103:19  
 104:16,18,24 121:22,24  
 122:5 129:16,18,25  
 130:8,9,24 131:3,11,15  
 149:20  
 lone (2) 52:16 123:17  
 loneactor (1) 61:16  
 long (7) 33:9 71:3 78:10,11  
 91:18 150:15 152:8  
 longdistance (1) 122:3  
 longer (11) 6:12 23:14 36:1  
 38:13 48:12,14 86:21  
 90:25 100:9 112:16 129:15  
 longstanding (1) 65:9  
 longterm (3) 14:25 15:8  
 133:12  
 look (10) 13:21 30:25 37:16  
 70:19 107:16 109:16 121:9  
 126:17 128:8 152:17  
 looked (2) 40:13 129:23  
 looking (12) 11:5 14:16 33:5  
 42:18 71:7 92:18 94:4,22  
 99:11 104:20 105:14 150:3  
 loss (2) 21:13 70:25  
 lost (5) 46:13 72:1 97:22  
 123:11,12

lot (7) 27:6 30:4 35:5 37:14  
 42:16 76:21 123:7  
 low (13) 28:20 58:3,8 59:8  
 64:10,11 74:24 83:20  
 87:7,9 94:18 116:4 146:14  
 lower (1) 7:17  
 lowest (1) 49:19  
 lowsophistication (1) 52:15  
 lucraft (9) 1:5 71:17,22  
 72:5,11 149:13 150:21  
 151:11,15  
 ludlow (1) 35:17  
 lunch (5) 71:11,14,25 72:18  
 148:7  
 lunchtime (1) 31:19  
 lying (3) 85:6 92:9 97:21

M

machin (2) 16:10 18:2  
 main (1) 48:9  
 mainly (3) 53:16 81:18 136:1  
 maintain (2) 18:21 66:15  
 maintained (6) 32:13  
 54:16,20,21 55:2 56:1  
 maintaining (2) 48:7 56:11  
 major (5) 97:5 118:5 121:19  
 122:3 130:8  
 majority (1) 63:8  
 making (9) 41:17 67:12 99:4  
 108:22 109:17,20 119:5  
 122:21 149:8  
 male (1) 19:24  
 man (2) 40:22 92:7  
 manage (8) 1:25 16:12,17  
 51:21 56:17,24 73:9 128:3  
 managed (19) 1:21 5:17  
 7:16 12:2 21:22 24:5,22  
 49:5 51:2 68:19 77:7 96:13  
 109:11 112:16 113:9 115:4  
 130:6 131:16 132:24  
 management (63) 1:14,16  
 3:5,21 6:8 7:5,6 8:10 9:3  
 15:8,17 16:14 18:10 19:14  
 24:10 25:11 38:7  
 40:10,19,24 45:16 46:1  
 49:23 73:15,17 74:23 81:9  
 82:12,15 94:24 95:18  
 96:14 99:9 106:15,21  
 108:20,23 112:6,12 113:7  
 114:1 115:8,12 125:11  
 129:12 131:6 132:5,11,17  
 133:4,13,16,21,22,25  
 134:2,6,7,8,9 142:23  
 143:7,19  
 manager (7) 5:8 6:5 7:18  
 8:22 9:17 47:20 80:22  
 managers (3) 1:25 3:9  
 133:24  
 managing (25) 7:3 21:18,19  
 25:9,18 41:19 43:20,23  
 45:10,15,20 51:3,19,24  
 66:3 91:5 98:18 107:1  
 112:5 113:20 114:9,22  
 115:9 120:21 121:4  
 manchester (1) 21:20  
 mandated (1) 2:4  
 mandatory (2) 2:10 20:2  
 manipulating (2) 92:9 97:21  
 manipulation (3) 3:15 4:13  
 62:17  
 manner (3) 69:14 143:24  
 144:12  
 many (6) 14:19 63:1 100:8  
 131:10 136:4 144:19  
 mappa (158) 5:16,22  
 6:1,3,9,20,22,25 7:8,16,20  
 8:12 20:22 10:9,10,17,19  
 11:3,7 12:12 13:1 16:19,23  
 17:5,9 25:23 26:2,21,24  
 28:2,4,9,13 30:1,22  
 31:10,13 32:16 33:15  
 35:4,7,9,21 36:3,12,16,23  
 38:4 39:13 41:4,6 47:8  
 51:12,15,17,20,23 52:3,6,7  
 58:7,11,17,19 62:16 64:17  
 65:6,20,21 66:6,7,8 67:13

72:25 73:2,5,16,18,19,20  
 74:4,8,13 75:9,10,12 76:4  
 77:14 80:23 86:7,9  
 87:16,17 88:23 88:6  
 89:19,23 90:1,12 91:22  
 92:21 93:3,5,17 94:21  
 98:14,23,24 99:13 100:23  
 101:10,12,15 102:3 103:16  
 106:25 107:16,20  
 108:10,14,21 109:8,13  
 110:11 111:5,9,11,17  
 114:14,17 116:10 117:7,17  
 119:7,12,18 120:13,21  
 121:1,13 123:22,23  
 125:14,18,22,24 126:14,24  
 127:5,15,19 129:2 130:6  
 132:22,24  
 mappas (1) 119:15  
 marc (2) 24:17 125:7  
 march (13) 30:18 31:18  
 44:10 55:9 61:12 87:15,23  
 88:9,16 110:11 1

125:18 132:22  
**meets (1)** 150:10  
**member (4)** 45:7 53:10,20 54:24  
**members (11)** 17:25 36:21 41:10 47:14 53:13,21 69:16 71:2 131:19 134:11 150:4  
**membership (1)** 53:13  
**memorandum (1)** 128:3  
**memory (2)** 43:15 78:7  
**mention (1)** 151:6  
**mentioned (13)** 32:7 33:10 52:20 73:22 83:19 90:15 101:20 103:19 104:12 105:7 110:17 135:25 141:24  
**mentioning (1)** 71:25  
**mentor (17)** 31:22 32:6,17 33:2 37:8,9,15 42:19 80:23 81:5 87:14 89:12 98:1 102:11,18 104:5 106:2  
**mentoring (5)** 35:22 76:13 80:16 81:2 128:1  
**mentors (15)** 4:15 11:24 12:9 32:9 80:1,2,2,7,9,12,14,18,19 102:4  
**mercury (3)** 17:23 18:15,17  
**merritt (10)** 136:7,23 137:20 138:12 142:4,11 143:1,9,20 144:8  
**message (3)** 34:10 71:8 115:23  
**messages (3)** 14:11 29:22 34:11  
**met (8)** 6:3 11:19 29:18,24 44:8 61:18 72:24 93:14  
**metal (1)** 105:14  
**method (1)** 109:9  
**methods (2)** 52:24 67:6  
**metropolitan (1)** 50:4  
**mi5 (103)** 26:15,16,17,19 47:15,18 49:9 50:2,5,14,18,19,24 51:1,11,15 52:3,5,17 54:2,7,11,13,19 55:4,9,11,13,15,18 57:23 58:7,10,15,23 59:3,19,25 60:4,17,23,25 61:14,19 62:2,5,23,25 63:2,3,4,6,12,24 64:1,8,15,20,23 65:2,5,18,22 66:9 67:17 68:4,10,22,25 69:17,21,25 70:9,21 73:13 75:4,9,10 82:3,21 83:13,14 91:13,14 92:24 94:9 95:13 97:16 101:24,25 104:1 106:19 108:19 113:10 115:23,23 118:23,25 130:13,19,22 133:9,10  
**mi5s (5)** 53:9 61:12 62:8,18 75:6  
**mid2018 (1)** 106:16  
**midlands (46)** 24:15 25:3,7 26:18 27:13 29:10 31:17 43:23 57:23 58:23 59:1 70:15 72:23 73:23 82:3,18 83:14 89:20 91:7,13 92:24 95:13 96:2,7,16 97:4 104:2 106:14 108:19 110:13 111:7,24 112:1,13 115:6,10,16,21 119:14 120:13 125:7,12 128:5 131:22,24  
**midoctober (1)** 81:7  
**might (26)** 6:11 11:17,19,22 30:25 45:6 48:10 59:6 66:13 69:1,12 87:9 91:20 96:23 98:21 100:19 103:6 105:13 109:6 110:9 117:16 121:8 124:3 130:24 140:9 152:4  
**million (3)** 23:21,22,23  
**mills (2)** 130:18,19

**mind (7)** 31:13 33:13 66:4 90:8 109:12 123:20 144:2  
**mindset (9)** 53:14 55:2,16 56:2,16 61:14 84:21 106:3,7  
**minimal (1)** 139:11  
**minimum (5)** 8:2 145:24 146:5,8,18  
**minuted (4)** 78:12,13,17 127:25  
**minutes (31)** 6:25 25:25 28:2,15 36:24 43:9 62:16 74:5 75:12,13,16,17,18,23 76:1,4,5,11 77:1,23 86:7 88:6,7 93:6 114:21 125:25 127:11,20,22 133:2 150:16  
**mislead (1)** 58:12  
**missed (4)** 3:17 13:13 117:16 141:14  
**mistakes (2)** 141:13,18  
**mitigate (3)** 58:12 119:6 129:13  
**mitigating (2)** 67:6 122:25  
**mitigation (1)** 10:23  
**mobile (1)** 29:21  
**model (3)** 49:3,3 132:2  
**moderate (1)** 38:24  
**mohibur (1)** 24:23  
**molal (4)** 82:4 89:5 97:17 123:25  
**moment (2)** 67:16 134:18  
**momentarily (1)** 150:11  
**money (1)** 54:4  
**monitor (2)** 8:21 111:16  
**monitored (3)** 21:8,9 60:1  
**monitoring (7)** 12:13 24:24 28:20 59:12 119:25 121:11 143:19  
**month (1)** 50:4  
**months (2)** 3:23 4:4 5:24 13:12 17:8 27:2,23 36:20 38:25 39:1,7 41:7 63:19 64:13 67:24 69:21 73:1 80:17 91:12 100:9 127:12 128:19  
**mood (1)** 31:18  
**more (52)** 1:13 3:7 4:6 5:1 9:12,17 12:5,11,19 13:25 20:7 27:23 28:25 33:13 34:24 37:4 44:1,3 45:12 46:2 48:10 56:14 57:20 59:14 64:18 67:19 76:10 80:18 89:1,3 90:10,13 91:5,23 92:21 98:11,14 101:7,21 102:24 110:6 119:4,8 122:15,16 127:4 135:24 139:10,20 140:15 148:19 151:23  
**morning (13)** 1:5,6 24:13 82:9 96:20 148:21 151:2,8,14,25 152:4,15 153:3  
**mosque (4)** 42:17 76:21 102:11 104:7  
**most (6)** 41:15 47:2 52:14,16 53:6 151:12  
**mostly (1)** 83:8  
**motivation (1)** 33:19  
**motivations (2)** 53:7 62:9  
**move (10)** 3:18 20:20 24:12 54:22 56:12 63:22 68:9 76:24 79:24 139:15  
**moved (7)** 17:21 63:12 76:12 77:19 78:1 82:5 95:23  
**movements (3)** 21:9 61:2 124:11  
**moving (3)** 35:2 94:12 133:11  
**ms (26)** 1:17,23 2:21 3:16,20 4:4,6,8 6:6,10 7:25 8:20 9:11,18 10:9 12:16,25 13:4,23 14:5 28:10 41:2 79:19 80:14 81:5 84:19  
**much (14)** 29:10 32:15 39:9 53:1 54:3 67:10 77:10 80:15 82:4 112:12 123:19

135:24 152:17 153:2  
**multiagency (1)** 133:9  
**multiple (1)** 114:22  
**muslim (2)** 56:11 87:3  
**must (8)** 3:11 4:3 114:23 117:3 134:25 135:3,19 145:9  
**myself (1)** 149:14  


---

**N**

---

**name (1)** 125:16  
**named (2)** 135:21 141:1  
**naming (1)** 141:9  
**national (21)** 5:2 6:21 8:9,16 18:9,13 22:10 47:6,22 48:5 49:5,20 52:8 56:4,6 60:12 61:6 64:14 67:23 81:15 132:15  
**nationally (1)** 128:6  
**nationals (1)** 53:17  
**natural (1)** 42:23  
**nature (4)** 60:3 74:22 75:14 129:8  
**nave (1)** 101:3  
**ncia (1)** 47:6  
**nearly (1)** 41:7  
**necessarily (2)** 20:3 114:4  
**necessary (9)** 9:16 29:12 48:2 51:9 56:17 80:21 119:2 120:9 135:24  
**need (11)** 3:15 5:1 21:8 23:7 72:19 78:2 99:14 119:22 122:21 139:6 148:19  
**needed (27)** 3:9 9:14 10:11,13 12:20,23 28:1 33:20 34:17 36:5,17 38:4,17 53:7 56:23 62:15 64:19 67:15 74:7,22 79:20 84:10 89:1 92:21 99:10,24 119:18  
**needs (1)** 51:25  
**needtoknow (1)** 116:18  
**nefarious (1)** 61:11  
**negative (1)** 39:19  
**negligencenegligent (1)** 141:3  
**neighbourhood (4)** 24:11 41:13 47:1 112:23  
**neighbouring (1)** 128:9  
**neither (4)** 57:18 83:10 86:9 110:13  
**network (4)** 20:10 33:21 41:23 53:16  
**networks (1)** 49:17  
**never (7)** 32:7 39:25,25,25 67:17 118:2 121:2  
**nevertheless (1)** 64:15  
**newly (1)** 48:22  
**next (10)** 24:1 28:3 33:16 47:14 72:11 75:18 81:8 104:23 139:15 143:11  
**nice (1)** 1:5  
**nicholas (1)** 24:6  
**nobody (3)** 35:7 36:8 79:9  
**nominal (6)** 133:24,25 134:2,5,7,9  
**nominals (7)** 115:3,10 128:4,15 133:16,21 134:8  
**nomis (3)** 16:18 17:16 18:18  
**nonetheless (1)** 151:23  
**nonspecialist (1)** 2:17  
**nontechnical (1)** 141:11  
**nor (4)** 4:15 69:3 86:9 110:13  
**normal (2)** 20:19 148:20  
**normally (1)** 17:3  
**north (1)** 69:8  
**notably (1)** 69:20  
**note (11)** 58:3 59:19,23 85:2 97:6 104:2,13 116:3 139:21 147:20 152:22  
**noted (54)** 4:14 6:12 7:25 9:1 10:22 12:2 13:2 14:7,17 27:16 28:16,20 32:6,13,16 33:16 35:13 39:13 42:11,14 52:23 57:19 58:11 59:13 60:17

62:2,16 63:14 64:6,12 66:2 74:25 80:19 85:19 88:16,24 90:1 94:11 97:16 100:18,22 101:16 102:10,21 103:20 104:1,3,9 117:1 118:9 127:23 128:14 129:14 132:22  
**notes (13)** 17:18 64:2 72:13 93:4 97:6,12 101:15 102:8 111:5 118:5 136:18 138:3,22  
**nothing (17)** 34:12 38:5 44:5 45:1 63:18 64:14 66:9,21 68:16 69:3,6 88:11 92:5 107:7 128:21 130:20,23  
**notice (3)** 27:6,10 52:16  
**noticed (1)** 45:1  
**notification (4)** 17:14 24:25 83:23 96:12  
**notifications (2)** 44:23 84:17  
**notified (4)** 37:2 57:23 67:1 68:10  
**noting (7)** 29:5 34:18,21 44:20 63:7 100:13 116:7  
**november (56)** 14:15 27:5,11 35:18 36:3,24 37:22 38:2,11 39:13 40:6 42:10 44:20 46:14 52:10 55:3 57:1,23 59:3 64:1,3,9,17,20 65:2,15 66:11 68:10 77:25 82:2,23 83:13 87:23 90:19 93:7,11 94:9,25 97:7 102:1 103:16 104:1,19 115:17,20 116:15 118:5 121:10,16 127:6 128:22 129:16 132:15 133:3,18  
**nowhere (1)** 130:16  
**ns (1)** 89:7  
**number (15)** 15:14 22:25 42:15 49:9 53:3 60:17 61:16 81:10,19 106:25 111:22 114:14 124:14 138:16 140:18  
**numbers (2)** 19:17,20  


---

**O**

---

**oakley (7)** 29:13,20 34:5 37:11 43:1 44:4,19  
**oasys (15)** 2:8,22 3:10,13,17,21 5:9 12:4 13:12 16:18,22 18:15,18 26:11 97:22  
**oath (4)** 148:10,15 151:5 152:1  
**oaths (1)** 151:24  
**object (1)** 123:3  
**objected (2)** 36:8 79:9  
**objection (3)** 36:9 92:19 137:15  
**objections (3)** 35:20 78:6 121:13  
**objective (3)** 3:2 45:21 92:19  
**objectives (1)** 93:5  
**obliged (1)** 138:19  
**observation (2)** 77:16,19  
**observed (2)** 11:23 22:14  
**obtain (4)** 18:11 59:14 88:8 98:22  
**obtained (2)** 88:8 100:25  
**obtaining (4)** 13:24 26:12 35:14 61:8  
**obvious (3)** 60:11 136:6 151:22  
**obviously (6)** 71:24 92:18 105:8,15 110:1 149:6  
**occasion (2)** 75:18 130:7  
**occasions (2)** 44:8 125:2  
**occupied (2)** 35:1 37:5  
**occur (1)** 90:15  
**occurred (8)** 92:13 93:15 98:20 99:7 108:25 127:13 130:4 140:6  
**october (22)** 26:25 36:23 37:7,11 42:11,14 55:18

63:14 64:7,25 65:3 90:12,20 95:23 102:2,9 107:23 110:12 121:16 123:6 125:18 130:15  
**octobernovember (2)** 115:17 126:7  
**odds (2)** 45:15 103:23  
**offence (4)** 40:2 46:3 92:8 107:5  
**offences (5)** 21:16 23:6 44:6 77:13 85:8  
**offender (43)** 1:22,25 3:5 5:8,17 6:1 7:6,18,22 8:9,22 9:16 12:23 15:6 18:11,13,21,22,23 24:22 31:11 40:19,23 45:25 47:7 51:6,24 73:10 74:12,12 80:4,18,22 84:10 114:1 115:8 129:12 130:5 131:6 132:8,17 142:24 143:7  
**offenders (45)** 1:14 2:15,20 3:8,14 5:7,23 7:4,10,16 8:11 9:9 12:16,19 13:15,16 16:7,13,23,24 17:21 18:3,10 19:15,22,22 20:2 23:13,17 25:11,12 41:19 42:1 43:20 44:5 45:10,15,20 47:4 56:12 57:20 77:7 125:11 132:5 133:4  
**offending (4)** 25:16 28:13 73:6 82:1  
**offer (1)** 14:1  
**offered (2)** 76:7 111:6  
**offer (9)** 7:9 8:5 16:4 79:15,15,22 80:1 81:4 133:10  
**officer (23)** 1:8,20 3:2,22 5:11,13 6:5 7:17,18 8:13 12:20 24:2 45:11 47:15 58:24 68:22 92:14 100:14 106:13 130:18,19,22 134:5  
**officers (49)** 1:10 2:2,3,3,6,7,16 5:3 10:18 12:18 17:5,18 18:24,25 24:5 31:17 42:1,20 51:3,15 52:3 73:14 76:7 81:13 92:25 96:7 107:6 111:8 112:11,14,17,25 113:1,1,5,20,25 114:3,7 115:4,6,19 120:7 123:11 127:1 132:11,12,18,20  
**offices (2)** 24:8,12  
**official (1)** 117:1  
**officials (1)** 10:10  
**often (6)** 42:18 50:12 74:17 110:2 135:23 152:21  
**oimu (8)** 81:10,10 95:22,25 96:8,23 107:6 130:18  
**old (25)** 28:18 31:21 32:21 57:2,12 60:6 63:9 74:15 82:25 83:4,6,7 85:24,24 86:8 87:2,25 88:18 97:13 108:2 117:20,25 118:11 125:20 126:1  
**omission (13)** 139:1,7 140:21 141:16 142:23 143:6,17,22 144:5,10 145:20 146:10 147:2  
**omissions (2)** 145:14 146:23  
**omit (1)** 141:16  
**once (4)** 71:12 84:7 129:13 136:21  
**oneday (2)** 77:24 90:2  
**oneoff (1)** 10:1  
**ones (1)** 51:16  
**ongoing (1)** 127:8  
**online (1)** 2:14  
**onto (4)** 46:5 83:24,25 115:1  
**oomer (1)** 111:20  
**op (1)** 101:25  
**open (4)** 27:9 50:23 56:16 95:3  
**opened (3)** 48:24 54:7 73:13  
**opening (1)** 97:6  
**operates (1)** 1:9

**operating (1)** 132:2  
**operation (22)** 50:13 53:15 82:4 89:5,5 96:11,24 97:17,17 101:24 108:7,8 109:2 113:10 114:8 115:17,22 120:16 121:11 123:25 129:11 145:19  
**operational (6)** 15:3 50:14 95:17 99:16 131:2 133:7  
**operationally (1)** 113:2  
**operations (6)** 50:3 81:9 96:3,6 111:15 112:10  
**opinion (2)** 101:5 127:5  
**opportunities (4)** 9:13 14:14 100:21 102:25  
**opportunity (7)** 3:18 13:14 66:17 112:22 127:16 128:13 141:14  
**opposed (2)** 96:15 122:12  
**option (2)** 138:18 140:1  
**optional (1)** 2:18  
**options (1)** 110:20  
**order (11)** 6:14 15:1 23:8 48:20 60:13 70:3 92:24 103:2 105:20 116:24 145:25  
**ordinary (1)** 141:11  
**organisation (2)** 130:1 144:6  
**organisationally (1)** 122:23  
**organised (3)** 20:10 106:18 131:21  
**organisers (1)** 11:14  
**organising (2)** 33:13 42:7  
**originally (1)** 13:22  
**originating (1)** 59:18  
**others (20)** 5:22 7:2 16:15 29:7 37:20 38:22 50:16 54:16 55:17 72:1 73:11 83:18 84:25 85:1 87:1 94:16 102:2 104:11 120:20 151:7  
**otherwise (6)** 12:22 71:11,25 72:18 98:25 127:2  
**ought (6)** 66:6 75:25 88:3 94:6,22 131:1  
**ourselves (1)** 110:3  
**outcome (5)** 10:14,20 61:21,24 70:10  
**outcomes (1)** 81:14  
**outlook (2)** 27:20 32:14  
**outset (1)** 148:2  
**outside (7)** 6:20 18:6 22:11 27:21 54:17 116:17 128:5  
**over (18)** 20:14 21:24 22:9 27:6 28:17 36:20 41:7 48:14,16 52:22 59:20 61:5 67:24 71:14 83:11 90:14 97:10 128:19  
**overall (6)** 11:25 13:2 14:20 20:16 39:10 40:12  
**overlooked (2)** 39:1 40:10  
**overnight (3)** 31:5 151:1 152:19  
**overriding (1)** 56:15  
**oversaw (1)** 79:15  
**overseas (2)** 49:15 53:21  
**overseen (1)** 3:1  
**oversees (2)** 15:7 111:22  
**oversight (3)** 2:19 3:9 5:13  
**overt (10)** 51:24 52:2 82:11,15 96:14 106:21 125:10 129:12 131:6 133:16  
**overtly (1)** 96:13  
**own (21)** 2:6 8:3 19:9 31:6 34:14 35:12 39:14 42:6 54:18 72:13 77:20 78:2 80:5 92:10 101:20 123:8 135:9 138:21 145:12 146:15 148:4  
**owned (1)** 98:12  
**owner (4)** 30:19,20 98:22 116:23  
**ownership (1)** 119:10

**p3 (5)** 89:6,9 96:10 106:18 108:8  
**pages (5)** 136:17,18 138:5 143:13 144:1  
**pakistan (5)** 33:3 42:8 54:22 56:13 94:17  
**pakistani (1)** 61:8  
**panel (14)** 30:2 73:12,16,23 77:8,10 79:4,6 108:11,14,21 127:16,19 129:2  
**panels (1)** 64:18  
**panicking (1)** 46:19  
**paper (2)** 17:21,25  
**papers (1)** 149:11  
**parallel (2)** 51:18 133:14  
**parameters (1)** 10:11  
**park (1)** 152:4  
**parole (4)** 20:22 23:8,10 113:17  
**part (66)** 17:14 19:5 24:25 25:11,14 27:5 28:12,20 35:25 38:6,16 40:10,17 41:19,20 43:23 44:2,5,13 45:12,23 46:1 47:12 51:2 65:12,22 71:4 73:15 78:20 79:15 106:14 107:1 113:9 114:5,9 115:2,9,13 119:11 121:24 125:7,8,11 127:7 128:4,15 129:16 131:6 132:6,11,17 133:13 137:24 138:14 139:5 146:25 149:18  
**participants (7)** 22:17 36:12 87:24 98:23 108:22 117:7 119:18  
**participative (1)** 125:6  
**particular (15)** 1:12 2:19 19:19 35:20,25 38:19 43:18 59:24 70:1 79:12 110:19 111:19 141:18 145:10,14  
**particularly (6)** 28:19 32:8 45:16 69:10 97:16 150:4  
**particlers (1)** 137:2  
**parties (2)** 59:2 116:7  
**partly (2)** 81:1 99:16  
**partners (5)** 39:8 80:11 89:21 101:23 103:2  
**partnership (1)** 134:9  
**parts (4)** 108:11 134:17 136:17 144:18  
**party (1)** 98:1  
**pass (4)** 52:7 97:3 121:17 147:20  
**passed (8)** 30:14 34:6 38:14 48:23 62:14 71:8 75:5 115:1  
**passing (1)** 86:11  
**passport (1)** 61:8  
**past (1)** 98:6  
**pathfinder (5)** 7:3,8 15:16 16:11 18:23  
**patient (1)** 145:18  
**pattern (1)** 53:4  
**pause (2)** 72:21 152:12  
**pc (15)** 29:13,20 30:18 34:5 41:11 42:3,21 43:1,13 44:4,19 46:1,12,24 47:8 111:1  
**people (13)** 11:8,15 41:17 74:22 78:5 109:1,17,20 110:7 123:14 149:10 150:12 152:21  
**perform (1)** 25

**permit (1)** 65:19  
**permitted (8)** 19:17 63:5  
 76:9 104:22 129:24 130:7  
 140:16 149:5  
**person (17)** 4:12 27:25 32:15  
 35:11 65:24 66:2 69:4  
 92:14 110:7 116:8 121:18  
 124:6 135:13,21 137:16  
 141:1,9  
**personal (4)** 2:25 17:18 53:7  
 80:6  
**personally (4)** 36:19 47:15  
 103:9 150:14  
**persons (3)** 86:20 138:8  
 151:12  
**perspective (6)** 78:19 95:14  
 111:9 119:8 121:6 122:4  
**phone (5)** 14:10 19:17,20  
 34:6,10  
**phones (1)** 19:18  
**photograph (1)** 39:17  
**photographs (8)**  
 43:1,5,8,11,16,18 44:21  
 149:6  
**phrase (2)** 98:10 137:8  
**phrased (1)** 111:2  
**phrases (1)** 141:3  
**physical (1)** 22:16  
**physically (2)** 82:6 113:2  
**pick (2)** 1:7 32:4  
**picture (5)** 29:7 56:14 61:1  
 69:11 107:24  
**piece (6)** 48:19 83:3 88:4  
 108:13 109:2 116:21  
**pieces (6)** 57:10,18 87:24  
 108:7 114:2 117:22  
**pin (1)** 19:18  
**pipe (1)** 53:25  
**pitchers (8)** 40:16 43:13  
 46:24 62:17 66:23 74:8,20  
 113:14  
**place (31)** 6:20 7:8 8:23  
 13:8,16 16:17 25:3 31:1  
 46:21 66:25 78:23 80:7,8  
 81:6 83:13,22 93:17 95:9  
 96:12,25 105:4,6,9,13  
 110:16 117:3 122:22  
 126:18 132:4,25 151:14  
**placed (1)** 149:11  
**places (1)** 79:19  
**plan (5)** 59:17 118:11 123:22  
 128:18 133:17  
**planned (3)** 95:8 152:11,14  
**planning (9)** 61:10 69:2  
 74:24 83:1 87:2 93:18  
 94:13 106:15 118:11  
**plans (7)** 16:17 53:25 73:17  
 83:22 85:15 86:5 128:3  
**plate (1)** 77:4  
**play (3)** 51:12 69:8 96:23  
**played (2)** 25:14 52:1  
**playing (1)** 63:8  
**please (12)** 72:19 134:18  
 139:21 140:2 147:15,20  
 148:9,16,21,25 151:23  
 152:18  
**pleased (1)** 30:8  
**plemley (2)** 94:10 95:7  
**plot (1)** 55:19  
**plots (2)** 53:13,18  
**pm (6)** 71:18,20 149:2  
 150:18,20 153:6  
**poem (1)** 54:25  
**pointing (1)** 124:24  
**points (8)** 9:8 70:11 91:13  
 104:21 127:21,23 138:2  
 144:25  
**police (68)** 5:20 6:5,7,14,24  
 7:15 8:15 10:3,18 16:15  
 17:13 18:12,16,25 19:1,16  
 21:17 23:15 24:3,6 27:13  
 29:18 41:11 47:6  
 50:4,19,21,22 51:4,14  
 52:2,7 58:11,18 59:1,18  
 62:12,14,25 63:24 67:1  
 68:8 70:15,15 74:1 75:8,11

76:7 80:10 82:3 84:19  
 94:11 98:16 106:1,12  
 111:7,9,21,23 112:12  
 116:17 118:25 119:2  
 131:22,24 133:8,10,14  
**policeman (1)** 130:9  
**policies (2)** 16:6 132:16  
**policing (14)** 4:15 19:2 24:11  
 38:9 41:12,13 49:4  
 57:12,15 67:13 112:23  
 131:24 132:16 133:23  
**policy (5)** 15:8 25:5,6 99:2  
 118:6  
**polite (2)** 14:23 124:13  
**polygraph (1)** 13:15  
**population (1)** 22:21  
**pose (6)** 20:8 48:21 49:18  
 84:22 103:6 106:10  
**posed (6)** 36:13 48:3 49:20  
 58:21 61:4 66:5  
**poses (2)** 103:3 118:24  
**posing (2)** 23:17 48:5  
**position (9)** 13:18 20:9,19  
 23:6 25:11 104:5 110:2  
 117:10 126:9  
**positive (18)** 27:2 30:21  
 32:13 35:14 38:14,18  
 68:15 79:9 88:10 92:4  
 117:11 121:7 124:19,20  
 127:9,24 130:3 131:14  
**positively (5)** 63:21 85:16  
 117:13 120:4 124:16  
**positives (1)** 78:17  
**possessed (2)** 52:5 70:6  
**possessing (1)** 54:23  
**possession (1)** 65:21  
**possibility (8)** 30:10 33:11  
 46:16 52:10 139:7,23  
 140:22 147:2  
**possible (5)** 31:10 36:11 53:3  
 62:16 67:20  
**possibly (2)** 68:6 105:15  
**postattack (3)** 61:22 70:8,22  
**postcourse (1)** 16:25  
**posting (1)** 95:21  
**postrelease (1)** 60:17  
**posts (1)** 133:24  
**potential (16)** 4:4 32:12  
 55:18 56:17,24 58:20  
 61:16 63:22 66:17,20,22  
 67:4 95:9 112:19 114:12  
 118:17  
**potentially (16)** 10:2 26:8  
 28:18 32:21 53:22 54:15  
 55:11 60:7 63:11,15 66:12  
 68:9 69:12 91:24 92:12  
 101:8  
**powell (10)** 24:6 25:21 87:16  
 88:25 95:20,23 106:12  
 116:7,9 117:5  
**powells (3)** 26:23 116:20,25  
**power (1)** 23:15  
**powers (3)** 38:7,9 48:1  
**practical (4)** 3:4 37:8 79:25  
 80:12  
**practice (2)** 11:1 106:22  
**practices (1)** 140:11  
**pragmatically (1)** 148:14  
**prayers (1)** 87:2  
**preached (1)** 54:12  
**preaching (1)** 54:15  
**prebribering (1)** 107:3  
**precompleted (1)** 137:2  
**predominantly (2)** 7:11  
 112:18  
**preempt (1)** 123:10  
**preemptive (1)** 123:18  
**preempt (1)** 6:14  
**premeeting (1)** 6:19  
**premeetings (1)** 73:19  
**premises (13)** 3:19 8:1,17,18  
 17:15 29:15 33:22 46:12  
 76:13 77:17,20 78:1  
 131:11  
**preparation (2)** 52:25 97:8  
**preparatory (1)** 54:2

**prepare (2)** 18:7 144:19  
**prepared (11)** 4:5,18 6:1 9:3  
 27:11 28:10 84:14 107:6  
 108:1 138:6 147:24  
**preparedness (1)** 85:14  
**preparing (1)** 69:2  
**prereading (1)** 107:3  
**prescribed (1)** 7:1  
**presence (7)** 1:3 20:7 72:10  
 75:6 99:19 145:12 151:16  
**present (12)** 75:5,6,14,21  
 76:24 83:14 104:12 114:15  
 116:11 118:13 120:13  
 127:15  
**presentation (3)** 39:10  
 119:22 120:2  
**presented (6)** 33:17 74:9  
 92:15 126:22 127:7 129:19  
**presenting (3)** 77:3,14 120:4  
**press (6)** 103:9,10 149:16,21  
 150:7 152:12  
**pressed (1)** 92:6  
**pressing (1)** 152:21  
**pressups (1)** 14:19  
**pressure (1)** 111:1  
**prestigious (1)** 130:1  
**pretty (1)** 82:4  
**prevent (75)** 2:13 15:11,15  
 23:16 24:1,2,17 25:22  
 29:6,24 39:3 40:23  
 41:13,14 43:22 44:1,4 45:7  
 47:1 51:10 60:2,4,5 62:19  
 64:21 70:21 79:14,17  
 80:11 82:5,14,18 83:24  
 84:8 89:3,20 90:20 91:1,9  
 92:4 96:13,19 97:4  
 98:2,5,23 99:14,15  
 100:15,24 101:6 102:9  
 103:1 107:1 111:1  
 112:15,17,20,25  
 113:9,15,19 114:3,7 119:9  
 120:1 123:6 127:1,7  
 129:20 131:5 132:11,18  
 134:1 141:7  
**prevented (3)** 70:25 98:11  
 131:8  
**preventing (1)** 66:2  
**prevents (2)** 45:14 51:7  
**previous (3)** 18:12 28:2  
 43:19  
**previously (7)** 26:3 39:7 40:9  
 49:19 92:1 103:24 129:18  
**primary (1)** 119:2  
**primary (4)** 24:20 40:17  
 56:20 135:11  
**principal (1)** 59:4  
**printed (2)** 72:7 88:16  
**prior (10)** 42:10 47:16 52:10  
 59:19 67:20 69:12,27  
 106:9 129:9 132:5  
**priority (36)** 9:10 26:16  
 49:12,12,14,16,18,24  
 50:7,12 54:19 56:19,24  
 58:1 59:10 61:23  
 61:6,18,22 82:2  
 96:3,6,10,24 97:7  
 101:24,25 106:18 108:6,8  
 109:3 110:21 113:10  
 115:22 120:16 121:11  
**prison (81)** 1:11,19,22 5:21  
 6:23 7:4,7,10 15:11,14  
 16:15  
 17:3,8,12,20,22,22,24  
 18:8,11,21,24 19:12,13  
 21:4,9,13 22:7,8,10 23:20  
 26:3,5,22 27:1 28:7,17  
 29:17 30:9 40:25 44:8,18  
 50:23 54:6,10,13,17,20,24  
 55:17,19,23 56:11,21 73:7  
 77:9 84:21,24 85:7 86:3  
 87:3,19 88:15,17 93:21  
 97:10,18 98:13,25 105:23  
 106:1,6,8 107:8,8,18  
 124:15,16 126:21 128:24  
 130:22  
**prisoner (5)** 20:8,19,25 22:17

85:10  
**prisoners (14)** 15:12 17:16  
 19:17,19,24 20:13,15,16  
 21:20,21 22:1 49:22 85:3  
 87:4  
**prisons (14)**  
 15:3,4,5,5,9,15,24 16:6,9  
 19:1 22:13 23:2 70:18  
 107:20  
**private (5)** 63:12,23 79:20  
 152:5,7  
**privileges (2)** 19:7 21:13  
**proactively (1)** 91:11  
**probabilities (2)** 139:20  
 146:3  
**probably (11)** 70:7 72:2,14  
 139:1 142:25 143:19 144:7  
 146:14,19,24 147:7  
**probation (64)**  
 1:8,9,10,19,20,21  
 2:2,3,3,6,7,12,16,23 3:2,22  
 5:3,11,12,13,20 6:5  
 7:6,11,11,17,17 8:5,13,16  
 12:18 16:6,10,15 17:5  
 30:25 31:9,14,16  
 35:4,21,23 42:20 51:1,10  
 62:19 68:19 70:18 84:8,9  
 86:12,16 89:17 92:5  
 100:13 102:17 103:1,21  
 106:1 126:21 127:7  
 129:3,20 131:17  
**problem (2)** 35:6 117:15  
**problematic (1)** 27:1  
**procedural (1)** 70:13  
**procedure (1)** 21:11  
**procedures (7)** 12:2 16:7  
 17:5 19:20 70:23 83:24  
 132:16  
**proceedings (1)** 117:23  
**process (30)** 2:23 4:9,11 7:3  
 16:23,24 22:12 25:5  
 51:19,20,21 58:17 80:1  
 83:23 87:20 92:21 99:13  
 100:9 116:10 117:3,7  
 119:11,15 120:22 130:13  
 132:25 133:5 136:1 145:25  
 150:3  
**processes (7)** 51:19,20 70:23  
 84:4 133:11 134:2,3  
**produce (1)** 144:16  
**produced (6)** 6:25 10:21  
 26:13 30:13 59:19 128:2  
**produces (1)** 16:7  
**producing (3)** 2:9 25:5  
 105:19  
**production (1)** 59:22  
**productive (1)** 123:8  
**productively (1)** 37:5  
**products (1)** 16:8  
**professional (2)** 2:4 117:9  
**professionals (2)** 10:5 11:1  
**profile (24)** 54:20 65:24  
 84:14 85:13,19 86:1  
 88:17,21 97:9,11,12,19  
 103:5 105:1,24 106:11  
 108:1,3 116:6,10 117:2,4  
 121:19 126:3  
**profoundly (1)** 113:18  
**programme (7)** 22:1,11,19  
 77:9 79:21 80:13 88:11  
**programmes (1)** 17:2  
**progress (6)** 32:24 35:13  
 37:6 85:6 87:14 97:25  
**progressed (1)** 33:7  
**progressing (3)** 26:20 42:5  
 85:12  
**progression (1)** 36:17  
**project (5)** 128:10,10 132:1  
 133:18,19  
**prolonged (1)** 63:20  
**promised (1)** 151:17  
**prompted (1)** 11:23  
**propensity (3)** 55:3 56:2  
 58:12  
**proper (3)** 71:9 142:6 145:5  
**proportion (1)** 48:2

**proportionality (1)** 49:6  
**proportionate (1)** 61:3  
**proposal (5)** 102:24 103:13  
 105:2 115:7 120:10  
**proposals (1)** 128:18  
**propose (1)** 150:21  
**proposed (8)** 62:5 66:13  
 90:8,13,16,17 127:6 141:8  
**pros (1)** 122:10  
**prosecution (2)** 50:10 54:8  
**prospect (1)** 92:11  
**prospective (3)** 104:16  
 122:9,13  
**prospects (1)** 34:9  
**protected (1)** 53:6  
**protecting (1)** 65:13  
**protection (4)** 47:22 72:22  
 93:12 110:22  
**protective (4)** 41:5 68:16  
 77:11 79:18  
**protocols (2)** 86:13,15  
**prove (2)** 67:20 107:4  
**proved (14)** 2:17 18:16 28:6  
 32:19 50:2 80:3 81:22  
 112:8 114:15 116:8 135:11  
 136:13,24 143:2  
**provided (16)** 1:24 6:13,15  
 58:1 61:1,25 80:11,14  
 90:14 95:25 109:7,8 112:2  
 131:22 138:21 147:13  
**providers (1)** 80:5  
**provides (3)** 15:23 23:15  
 142:17  
**providing (8)** 15:16 43:14  
 79:18 80:24 81:12 82:20  
 93:13 96:8  
**provision (3)** 15:17 145:20  
 146:11  
**provisions (1)** 149:23  
**provoked (1)** 105:5  
**ps (39)** 10:2 24:2 30:14 31:1  
 32:13 33:11,16 37:24  
 40:21 42:21 43:5,11,17  
 44:7,10,24 46:15,18 47:3  
 64:10 66:13 82:8 87:16  
 88:20,21 89:12,17 90:24  
 91:17 96:13 99:19,22,25  
 100:2 101:6,7,10 106:20  
 125:12  
**psis (1)** 19:12  
**psychological (4)** 4:21 9:17  
 15:20 17:1  
**psychologically (1)** 12:21  
**psychologist (9)** 3:22  
 4:6,16,19 5:6,10,15 55:20  
 85:10  
**psychologists (2)** 9:5 17:4  
**psychology (1)** 16:16  
**pub (1)** 53:25  
**public (14)** 15:3 20:5 23:18  
 39:24 65:13 72:22 73:3  
 77:15 93:12 103:4,6  
 110:22 118:24 136:2  
**publication (1)** 70:2  
**publicity (1)** 149:14  
**purchased (1)** 68:5  
**purchases (3)** 60:18 68:6  
 70:4  
**purpose (6)** 11:3 44:17 73:16  
 99:23 135:10,11  
**purposes (3)** 61:11 82:16  
 92:1  
**pursue (3)** 19:5 25:13 86:24  
**push (1)** 103:13  
**pushed (1)** 122:1  
**putting (2)** 123:15 151:1

109:5,13,15,19,24 110:6  
 124:23 135:21,22 136:6,8  
 137:5,23 138:1,11,16  
 139:5,12,14,15  
 140:5,8,18,18 141:7,9,22  
 142:2,5,9,16,22  
 143:5,11,15,16,16,21,24  
 144:3,4,4,9,12  
 145:13,15,19  
 146:1,6,10,21 147:1  
**questioned (2)** 51:8 66:23  
**questionnaire (18)** 134:17  
 136:12,16,19,22  
 137:4,23,25 138:2,4,6,14  
 144:18,19,22 145:22  
 147:11,23  
**questions (19)** 10:23 11:17  
 41:2 47:4 88:22 100:18  
 135:12,25 136:5,20  
 138:8,24,24 141:24 142:1  
 144:23 145:2,6,8  
**quiter (1)** 34:3  
**quite (11)** 14:16 35:6 46:7  
 51:20 57:9,9 71:2 80:23  
 124:13 125:4 150:1  
**quotation (1)** 97:14  


---

**R**


---

**radicalisation (3)** 94:16  
 112:19 114:13  
**radicalise (2)** 55:17 87:1  
**radicalising (6)** 26:5 54:16  
 83:18 84:25 97:20 104:11  
**radio (1)** 55:4  
**rahman (3)** 24:23 25:9 45:23  
**rahmans (1)** 24:24  
**raise (9)** 25:19 29:9 42:19  
 54:4 55:6 64:14 78:6 88:21  
 127:16  
**raised (25)** 20:8 25:9 29:21  
 33:7 36:4 43:6 44:22 59:9  
 64:2 74:7 78:23 79:5,8  
 88:24 89:20 90:9 94:6,23  
 99:12,24 101:2 120:25  
 127:3 130:14 131:15  
**raises (1)** 15:19  
**raising (5)** 32:21 33:11 77:17  
 99:6 130:24  
**ramifications (1)** 66:3  
**rang (1)** 30:15  
**range (9)** 7:13,18 10:19  
 17:17 52:13 53:7 68:24  
 124:16 128:3  
**rank (1)** 111:21  
**rapport (3)** 44:14 45:17  
 80:17  
**rather (13)** 31:24 38:1 63:7  
 70:13 72:3 75:7,15,19  
 100:17 106:21 112:23  
 150:13,15  
**rating (6)** 22:2 31:12  
 56:19,25 64:9,11  
**rational (4)** 9:22 67:22  
 112:17 115:11  
**reach (1)** 135:1  
**reached (4)** 67:17 74:11  
 136:21 144:20  
**reaction (1)** 42:23  
**read (13)** 19:23 28:10 37:12  
 39:20 54:25 69:8 84:15  
 89:14 90:20 102:10 105:17  
 126:2 134:20  
**reading (2)** 106:5 108:12  
**reads (1)** 85:2  
**ready (1)** 134:12  
**real (3)** 6:21 28:1 39:24  
**realistic (5)** 13:25 139:6,23  
 140:22 147:1  
**realistically (1)** 147:6  
**really (7)** 12:9 13:13 109:21  
 113:4 125:3 150:5 152:20  
**reason (4)** 42:17 99:17  
 119:24 129:1  
**reasonable (2)** 12:8 21:12  
**reasonably (2)** 61:1 129:25

**reasons (6)** 100:16 124:4  
 143:3,11,25 144:12  
**reassurance (1)** 63:10  
**reassured (2)** 33:8 114:25  
**rebuild (1)** 86:21  
**recall (36)** 8:14 26:1,19,20  
 28:5,7 32:20 36:4,6,25  
 37:2,3 43:6,18 47:8,17  
 78:4,8 79:12 88:13 89:25  
 90:4,17 93:8 99:18,20,22  
 100:10 103:10,18 125:20  
 127:9,17 128:24 129:7  
 130:23  
**recalled (27)** 26:7,21 27:2  
 28:17 31:2 36:8 42:4  
 43:17,19 76:14 77:1 78:4  
 88:12 98:7,9 101:4,17  
 103:22 107:10,13  
 110:14,24 126:15 127:4,6  
 128:22 129:18  
**receipt (1)** 96:4  
**receive (9)** 53:21 56:9  
 65:1,15,16 81:13 88:5  
 112:17 128:20  
**received (22)** 2:10 6:22  
 13:25 23:20 25:24 28:4  
 40:6 41:18 48:22 49:1  
 50:24 57:1,12 64:8 69:7  
 73:4 87:5 89:24 95:1 97:3  
 101:15 116:6  
**receiving (2)** 26:1 138:7  
**recent (10)** 28:17 38:14  
 70:18 84:18 86:3,5,25  
 91:16 100:24 116:1  
**recently (3)** 15:1 31:

<p>131:23 regards (7) 64:17 69:14,19 92:22 130:3 131:14,17 region (4) 5:7 115:12 128:5 134:6 regional (3) 15:15 24:17 106:18 regionalisation (1) 128:11 regions (1) 128:6 registered (1) 132:7 registration (1) 135:18 regular (15) 1:25 7:5 16:14 24:19 32:1 39:8 41:21 50:17,24 59:3 82:7,9,16 123:15 124:25 regularly (5) 3:12 7:23 49:22 123:14 124:25 rehabilitate (1) 79:23 rehabilitated (1) 57:21 rehabilitation (8) 8:21 12:23 15:13 63:21 64:13 100:8 130:4 131:13 reiterated (1) 131:7 relate (1) 28:11 related (1) 16:5 relating (3) 18:20 25:23 70:11 relation (13) 6:8 38:2 50:11 52:6 75:1,22 78:6 83:4 89:10 94:21 104:15 110:9 124:3 relations (1) 113:4 relationship (7) 1:12 41:3 65:9,11 68:14 70:14 81:1 relatively (4) 59:8 65:16 97:25 104:25 release (52) 4:4 5:24 7:7 11:17 13:13 17:8,12 21:1 23:5,11,17 25:18 28:19 29:18 38:25 46:6 50:25 56:17,19 57:2,4 59:5,19 63:19 64:5 73:1,21 82:13 83:16 84:23 85:14,18,23 86:1,19 87:3,5,7 90:22 92:3 98:19 100:10 106:9,15 108:4 113:8,23 116:2 118:12 126:5 130:20 151:24 released (18) 5:7 20:19,25 23:8 31:11 42:4 45:25 49:21 56:21 59:25 84:7 91:3 96:9 105:22 106:11 107:25 113:16 115:21 releases (2) 20:21,22 relevant (4) 48:23 110:9 134:4 140:12 reliability (1) 83:11 reliable (3) 9:9 28:22 83:9 relied (1) 39:9 relieved (1) 33:8 rely (1) 145:25 remain (2) 60:24 120:3 remained (11) 26:4 38:24 56:7,15 60:6 62:9 64:15 77:12,13 82:6 104:9 remaining (1) 136:18 remains (2) 74:12 84:21 remand (1) 54:6 remember (1) 129:21 reminded (2) 147:20 148:1 remorse (1) 106:8 remove (1) 149:9 removed (1) 31:20 renounce (1) 61:9 reoffending (2) 3:3 64:10 reopen (1) 115:24 reopened (3) 26:16 56:18 57:25 reopening (1) 56:20 repeat (1) 136:15 repeated (1) 31:20 replace (1) 9:10 replaced (1) 81:3 replicated (1) 70:16 replied (1) 92:16 report (19) 8:21 18:1 22:6</p>	<p>26:10 27:2 32:3 34:18 37:4 38:14 39:20 42:22 46:4 87:10 90:20 91:8 100:24 102:10 117:4 120:5 reported (8) 21:16 25:1 30:23 33:19 85:8 91:17 119:13 123:7 reporting (15) 15:22 39:2 45:18 49:1 56:13 83:22,23 86:25 87:5 89:7 116:3 118:19 129:10 130:20 reports (30) 2:9 7:23 10:22 17:21,25 29:8 30:2 32:6 37:10 39:8 41:25 44:9 80:3,23 83:24 87:15 89:13,13,15 97:3,22 98:1,2,2,5,9 105:19 106:2 120:2 124:14 representation (3) 5:18 114:20,21 representative (1) 8:19 representatives (2) 142:12,19 represented (2) 39:23 149:21 request (1) 43:16 requested (3) 88:21 107:4,17 require (3) 17:5 19:21 49:17 required (11) 2:12 3:23 10:4 49:8 70:3 75:12 116:24 119:21 132:13 135:18 138:17 requirement (7) 3:10 5:23 7:24 46:22 98:25 99:15 119:15 requirements (8) 17:14 24:25 28:12 29:24 41:19 96:12 97:1 114:10 requires (1) 48:19 requiring (3) 5:17 8:4 52:24 research (4) 22:24 42:6 148:4 152:24 resistance (1) 127:18 resolved (2) 96:25 97:2 92:3 98:19 100:10 resolving (1) 139:18 resonance (1) 53:5 resources (4) 5:1 38:3 48:11 128:12 resourcing (1) 67:22 respect (2) 40:2 145:1 responded (3) 34:20 65:14 85:16 responding (4) 32:12 41:2 145:6,9 response (13) 18:8,9 25:8 39:20 40:16 41:12 59:10 61:18 62:17 70:17 124:21 126:8 127:15 responses (2) 140:3,4 responsibilities (3) 7:19 9:2 24:15 responsibility (11) 22:14 29:16 35:3,8 40:17 65:13 69:5 82:17 92:23 115:13 117:12 responsible (22) 5:9,18,19 8:13,17 15:2 17:6 24:24 40:12 48:6 50:14 74:1 79:18 81:15 115:8 120:21 131:21 134:4,5,24 141:10 143:18 rest (2) 152:11,14 restricted (1) 124:11 restrictions (3) 14:6 29:3 129:6 result (6) 21:10 50:10 70:23 88:7 108:12 128:18 resume (2) 150:24 151:3 retained (1) 55:6 retake (1) 151:25 retaken (1) 151:4 retire (3) 147:9 148:8,25 retired (1) 149:3 return (17) 53:22 57:2 82:25 83:4 85:23 87:25 97:13 108:2 118:11 125:20</p>	<p>137:11,13,14,17,21 139:15 147:17 returning (7) 28:18 31:21 74:15 86:8 87:2 107:25 126:1 returns (1) 3:11 revealed (3) 53:18 54:11 55:12 reverted (1) 95:21 review (17) 8:23 9:24 10:12,13 12:1,14 16:24 51:17 59:12 61:22 62:6 63:13 70:9,12 118:25 133:8,15 reviewed (5) 3:11 49:22 68:25 108:1 118:18 reviewer (2) 9:1,4 reviewers (1) 9:11 reviewing (2) 48:7 122:16 reviews (4) 5:1 18:19 19:10 70:22 revisit (1) 109:12 revisited (2) 27:22 41:7 rhetoric (1) 86:22 richard (1) 14:24 rigorous (1) 136:2 ring (1) 37:5 rise (6) 71:17 100:21 120:1 121:12 150:11 153:5 risk (12) 2:21,22 3:1,3,7,14,21 4:13 6:8 9:4,9 10:1,12,20 11:1,8 12:22 16:18,22,25 19:22 20:5,6,8,14,15,19,24 21:3,7 22:2,2 25:10 26:9,11 27:11 31:12,14 32:20 33:25 34:23 35:3,8 36:5,13 37:3,17 38:2,19,20 39:1,11,24 40:3,12 41:18 49:5,20 56:17 58:21 59:4,8 60:23 62:17 63:15,22 64:10,11 65:23 66:5,21,22 67:3,4,6,8 68:2,12 73:2,17 74:6,23 75:19 76:24 77:4,14 78:19 80:3 83:18,19 86:17 92:15,17 93:16,22 94:18,24 95:13 100:12,17 102:25 103:3,4,6 104:9 106:10 107:13 110:23 118:17,24 119:4 120:21 122:4,24,24 123:5 128:14 130:25 131:3,4,17 134:3 riskbased (1) 128:19 risks (18) 11:7 37:21 38:20 60:11 67:11 74:9 75:24 78:15,15,16 83:15 94:14,19,20 100:11 118:14 121:18 129:14 risky (1) 11:22 robustly (1) 25:22 role (25) 10:10 25:21 28:11 32:2 35:2 37:19 41:21 43:25 45:12,15 51:12 52:1 72:23 73:23 81:21 90:10 95:16,21 96:4,23 105:19 112:18 114:6 120:3 125:8 roles (2) 47:18 114:13 rolled (2) 15:18 22:19 room (6) 109:17 147:10 148:6 149:6 150:13 151:10 route (1) 11:19 routine (1) 59:23 routinely (3) 63:24 132:22 133:2 rude (1) 11:23 ruled (2) 55:20 100:5 rules (2) 21:6,13 run (4) 30:11 79:22 96:2 141:25 running (2) 6:13 52:17 ryan (3) 29:11 57:16 115:15</p>	<p>safely (4) 40:7 137:11,13,17 safety (1) 80:6 sally (1) 22:7 same (14) 16:11 30:22 38:19 58:9 80:11 90:21 101:5 107:24 112:25 116:12 128:10 139:3 143:24 144:12 sandford (1) 149:15 sanitised (1) 51:10 saskia (11) 136:7,24 137:19 138:12,15 142:3,18 143:1,10,21 144:8 sat (3) 31:15 113:21 131:4 satisfied (1) 60:25 satisfy (1) 23:8 satisfying (1) 23:10 save (1) 67:21 saved (2) 146:19 147:6 saw (22) 30:6,14 32:6 34:12 35:23 37:19 38:18 46:6 56:6 61:10 76:3 87:15 97:10,22 98:1,5 107:12 116:11 124:21 128:7,12 129:11 saying (12) 35:11 32:4 40:6 43:19 57:8 85:16 89:20 91:8 116:25 122:23 124:23 150:5 scale (1) 52:21 sceptical (5) 32:1 60:7,24 64:15 120:3 scepticism (5) 12:21 62:8,12 122:17 123:11 science (1) 61:13 scored (2) 27:14,15 scrutiny (4) 60:14,21 62:10 107:11 seamless (1) 72:7 search (6) 54:11 55:12 68:17 76:16 95:4 105:13 searches (2) 11:14 93:13 seasoned (1) 92:13 second (11) 73:10 74:17 107:15 108:13 116:21 123:9 126:4 128:25 139:5 143:5 146:25 seconded (1) 47:11 secondly (4) 83:17 124:12 145:10 146:13 secondment (5) 106:14,17 107:24 108:5 111:10 secret (2) 50:6 113:21 secretary (1) 23:16 section (3) 85:2 88:12 138:4 sections (1) 137:3 sector (1) 15:3 secure (2) 75:16 89:14 securing (2) 12:11 28:12 security (40) 5:2,3 6:21,23 10:24 11:12 14:25 15:1,8,24,25 16:20 18:20 23:24 26:22 28:7 47:21,22 48:5 49:5,20 56:4,6 60:12 61:7 64:14 66:24 67:24 78:24 79:14,19 81:16 93:13 105:9,12 107:20 116:12 122:19,22 144:6 see (27) 1:5 6:16 9:19 22:16 30:8 33:25 36:17,19 37:4,6,13 40:13 46:13 64:6 72:21 75:3 77:16 84:2 90:10 105:12 121:20 126:9 128:6 129:13 136:19 143:5 153:3 seeing (5) 28:7 32:21 82:15 95:9 152:18 seek (9) 16:17 59:6 60:11 61:19 65:5 66:17 70:22 103:25 127:4 seeking (12) 35:15 38:13,16 54:4 60:14 62:10 69:16 89:14 90:25 91:11 103:12 149:14 seem (1) 89:15 seemed (14) 14:16 27:9</p>	<p>29:17 30:7 33:8 35:14 36:12 37:13 42:15,23 88:10 126:20,21 128:8 seemingly (1) 64:13 seems (2) 27:20 111:2 seen (18) 22:17 28:9 42:22 43:10 66:20,21 67:23 68:15 74:15 77:10 78:20 97:8,20 107:11 112:23 124:19 125:25 135:4 segregation (2) 30:17 88:13 selection (1) 151:9 selfbriefing (1) 96:22 selfdisclosed (1) 30:20 selfisolated (1) 130:16 semper (1) 133:18 send (5) 8:19 46:4 53:21 150:22 151:20 sending (2) 92:14 103:5 senior (16) 1:20 2:3 3:1 5:12,17 6:5,5 10:10 47:20 49:23 54:24 55:16 58:24 59:1 115:19 122:7 sense (3) 40:19 128:8 149:17 sensitive (5) 6:15 51:9 75:1 82:10 117:2 sensitivities (1) 108:13 sensitivity (2) 6:21 18:5 sent (12) 29:11 34:19 43:12 47:13 88:20 89:19 91:7 93:23 94:2 95:1 100:4 151:8 sentence (4) 11:16 20:11 21:15 23:14 sentenced (2) 97:9 107:5 sentences (1) 85:6 sentencing (3) 3:23 23:12,15 separate (3) 57:4 82:24 140:16 separately (1) 136:17 september (10) 14:7 46:14 63:13 76:13 95:19,19 105:22 111:14 115:6 128:2 sergeant (2) 95:16,22 series (5) 42:9 44:12 46:5 133:19 143:13 series (16) 3:4,14 8:23 35:6 51:17 53:12 73:3 77:13,15 92:7,15 101:13 107:13 128:17 130:5 141:19 seriously (5) 57:22 68:3 108:10 118:4,23 serve (1) 23:13 served (1) 27:5 service (18) 1:9 2:2,7,12,23 5:20,21 8:10,16 15:11 19:12 22:8,10 23:20 47:22 50:6 51:2 126:21 services (3) 5:22 7:13,18 serving (1) 11:16 session (1) 71:3 set (23) 3:20 10:10 17:9 19:17 26:9 31:6 39:11 50:9,20 54:4 75:24 79:19 82:2 84:19 86:11 93:6,10 125:15 132:1 138:5 144:1,16,20 sets (7) 8:17 73:16 84:16 93:4 113:4 115:25 142:10 setting (4) 27:22 86:15 115:23 134:7 several (1) 91:12 severe (1) 52:11 sex (1) 25:12 sexual (1) 13:16 shall (4) 136:12,24 139:17 144:21 shallow (1) 81:2 shape (1) 152:20 share (13) 6:15 9:13 21:5 51:12,14 58:18 62:21 73:18 86:22 92:23 99:1 103:2 117:6 shared (22) 16:20 18:6 49:3 51:9,13 57:11 60:9 62:12 70:19 81:24 87:21 89:21</p>	<p>98:11,14,24 102:14 108:18 116:17 128:25 129:4 133:1,2 sharing (6) 1:13 19:3 86:11 96:5 133:5 143:18 sheet (2) 140:17,17 shocked (2) 40:15 46:7 short (9) 52:16 71:7 89:11 106:8 137:7 142:10 149:5 150:14,19 shortform (7) 137:5,7,10,12,16,21,24 shortly (3) 98:19 109:16 113:22 should (57) 3:6 6:25 8:14 9:25 12:12,25 13:1,10 28:14 36:7 43:23 44:3 62:18 66:1 67:7 72:7 78:13,17 91:13 99:5 112:16 115:9 118:20 120:10 122:20,24 126:16 131:8 134:15 135:4,7,9,16 137:13 138:21 139:12,18,22 140:4,6,14,17,20,24 141:2 142:7 143:10 144:16,25 146:9 147:9,22 148:3,4,12 149:13 151:6 shouldnt (1) 121:1 show (1) 114:21 showed (3) 22:22 32:7 106:7 showing (2) 14:20 85:11 shown (2) 21:2 128:16 sight (1) 28:2 sighted (3) 84:11 88:1 124:1 sign (2) 40:25 136:22 significance (1) 74:21 significant (13) 3:19 9:21 10:6 21:2 28:19 77:6,17 78:8 81:19 96:17 97:16 104:22 106:24 significantly (2) 52:22 94:12 signing (1) 31:19 signon (1) 108:24 signs (1) 12:13 similar (5) 58:5 64:2 74:4 120:8 143:16 similarly (1) 142:17 simple (1) 117:21 since (15) 4:3,22 13:14 22:25 23:3 24:2 70:24 91:12 92:3 94:12 100:10 110:12 111:21 125:8 133:3 72:25 sincere (1) 148:9 single (3) 136:25 144:18,22 sio (18) 29:11 50:15 59:24 81:22 99:3,12 110:13 114:18,18 115:1,16,19 117:8 121:6 125:9 132:24 133:1 sios (3) 114:22 119:12 132:21 sir (3) 71:16 149:4 150:17 sit (3) 127:3 148:17 151:18 sites (1) 53:5 sitting (1) 109:16 situation (2) 78:21 91:14 six (5) 4:4 5:24 6:4 15:4 72:25 size (2) 11:11,21 skelton (42) 1:17 2:10 4:14,18,20 7:25 9:1,18,22 10:2 12:3,7,14,16,20 13:2 14:13 26:9 27:4 30:12,22,23 31:2,4,9 32:16 35:16,19 36:6 37:1,22 40:14,20 73:2,9 84:3,6 86:4 10 91:16 122:13 126:16 skeltons (6) 4:7 13:18 27:2 32:24 38:14 64:9 18:5,21,22 23:1 54:24 124:16 skills (1) 132:13 slight (1) 42:24 slightly (2) 8:6 121:25 slot (1) 6:10 slow (1) 18:14</p>	<p>small (3) 21:21 25:14 53:3 social (7) 5:22 33:20 37:16 64:4 76:25 102:15 125:2 soi (3) 48:3,6 50:23 sois (5) 48:8,12,15 52:19,20 sole (1) 56:20 solely (2) 40:11 135:3 solitary (3) 35:11 41:1 63:7 somebody (3) 8:4,7 46:16 someone (25) 3:10 5:6 9:15 13:17 18:1 21:1,4,7 23:6 28:14,24 32:4 37:22 47:17 48:4 51:22 67:25 75:14 77:12 86:2 91:19 92:9 111:4 114:25 147:16 someones (1) 8:19 something (14) 48:4 58:5 66:2 74:21 77:11 88:5 99:8 109:21 117:15 119:19 123:19 126:6 139:9,21 sometimes (2) 17:4 31:3 somewhere (1) 120:11 sonia (1) 1:8 soon (7) 30:24 31:24 43:7 82:4 100:8 110:15 127:25 sort (3) 11:18 94:23 122:19 sorts (1) 86:11 sought (5) 61:12 62:25 66:14 101:11 133:11 source (8) 18:4 24:20 66:21,22 78:2 83:10 95:4 112:5 sources (5) 34:17 48:1 105:25 106:4 112:6 space (1) 140:15 speak (4) 44:24 46:15 110:8 147:17 speaking (5) 89:13 91:9 98:7 110:24 150:15 special (75) 24:4,6,7,12,21 25:1,7 26:13,18 29:2,4,12 30:3,4,14 31:16 37:2 38:6 39:21 41:24 42:1,22 43:12,16 46:4 47:1,11 50:3 57:24 58:25 73:14 81:11,11,14,21 82:5,6 83:25 84:9 89:4 95:12,17,20,24 96:1,9,15,20 97:3 105:18,20 106:12,17,21 107:16 108:2 111:14 112:2,4,11,16,21,24 113:1,3,12 119:9 120:7,24 126:3,10 131:5 132:3,25 134:1 specialist (5) 5:9 9:16 16:1 23:1 132:12 specialists (2) 16:9,15 specific (16) 18:16 33:25 41:18 44:5 45:10,12 70:13 99:20 110:16 111:13 114:10 125:20 127:9 128:25 129:7 133:1 specifically (4) 67:2 68:20 110:22 132:16 spending (4) 37:14 63:7 76:21 123:7 spent (2) 41:12 47:2 spin (5) 41:23 44:9 46:5 47:6 83:25 spirits (1) 42:12 split (1) 1:16 spoke (11) 30:8 31:21 33:14 34:6 43:3 46:8,14,18 64:1 101:8 130:18 spoken (4) 85:15 99:21 130:17 152:13 spot (3) 36:13 69:23 70:4 staff (16) 1:19,21 2:12,17,18 3:6 15:19,21 17:17,25 21:21,22 23:1 54:24 124:16 staffed (1) 5:2 staffing (7) 145:23 146:3,7,14,18,20 147:5 stafford (6) 13:20 45:25</p>
--	--	--	---	---	--	--

S

safeguarding (3) 2:5 15:12  
131:4

46:11 93:24 94:1 130:7  
**staffordshire (36)** 7:15  
 24:6,16,21,22 31:16 41:11  
 57:24 58:25 60:2 70:15  
 73:14 74:1 81:24 95:16  
 105:18 106:12 111:1,21,23  
 112:2,4,12 115:5,11  
 119:9 120:7,24 126:2,10  
 128:13 129:3 131:5,5  
 132:9  
**stage (8)** 25:20 39:23 67:17  
 72:19 95:19 100:11 126:20  
 140:9  
**stages (1)** 83:2  
**stance (1)** 34:23  
**standard (9)** 3:9 8:10 11:1  
 17:10,15 19:8 20:6 119:11  
 134:8  
**standardise (1)** 133:11  
**standing (2)** 7:2 73:23  
**stands (1)** 118:18  
**stapled (1)** 136:17  
**start (4)** 3:10 54:13 71:14  
 74:10  
**started (3)** 16:11 95:15  
 128:20  
**starting (2)** 14:17 24:1  
**stated (2)** 85:10 86:21  
**statement (3)** 43:14 105:17  
 140:7  
**statements (1)** 86:5  
**states (1)** 85:13  
**static (1)** 2:24  
**station (3)** 91:19 94:4 130:8  
**status (2)** 21:4,7  
**stay (1)** 46:11  
**stayed (1)** 82:10  
**steam (1)** 101:20  
**step (3)** 9:21 23:21 100:7  
**stephenson (1)** 64:5  
**stephenson (27)** 24:14 29:1  
 32:11 34:19,23 38:3,11  
 42:2 61:12,25 64:1 81:8  
 91:19 93:19 98:8 99:6,11  
 101:4,6 102:14,24  
 103:12,17 104:3,14 123:21  
 130:14  
**steps (3)** 57:17 61:7 88:8  
**sterile (2)** 66:16 82:9  
**still (10)** 21:1 24:12 35:15  
 37:9 55:2 56:10 62:9  
 107:19 118:21 130:1  
**stock (1)** 53:19  
**stoke (4)** 53:17,20 94:1  
 130:6  
**stood (1)** 128:21  
**stop (1)** 123:1  
**stopped (2)** 42:16 70:24  
**stopping (1)** 35:22  
**strain (1)** 126:4  
**strand (9)** 74:17 79:23,24  
 83:5,9 88:2 98:8 108:4  
 128:25  
**strands (12)** 57:4,7,11 58:1  
 59:10 82:24 83:2 116:11  
 117:7,19 118:4 119:23  
**strategic (3)** 50:7 133:17  
 134:9  
**strategy (8)** 2:13 19:5 21:18  
 44:4 50:9,20 79:17 112:20  
**stream (1)** 50:24  
**strength (1)** 141:20  
**stressing (2)** 118:22 121:24  
**strict (3)** 59:13 98:10 124:7  
**strike (3)** 45:5 109:19 110:12  
**striking (1)** 45:2  
**strong (1)** 52:9  
**strongly (1)** 117:9  
**structure (4)** 6:20 25:3  
 111:25 131:23  
**structured (1)** 7:3  
**structures (1)** 131:25  
**struggling (2)** 37:16 102:12  
**strudies (1)** 84:7  
**subject (21)** 2:4 4:1 8:9 10:1  
 16:1 22:8 41:19 48:3 84:14

86:12 96:10 97:1,9,11  
 105:24 108:1 116:6,10  
 124:7 126:3 135:7  
**submitted (1)** 25:7  
**subsequent (1)** 36:22  
**subsequently (2)** 63:3 86:6  
**substantial (2)** 52:9 97:18  
**succeeded (1)** 23:10  
**successful (2)** 53:4 121:14  
**successor (1)** 24:7  
**suddenly (1)** 130:7  
**sufficient (1)** 12:17  
**sufficiently (3)** 68:3 92:10  
 101:13  
**suggest (15)** 56:3 60:9 61:5  
 63:16,18 66:1,22 68:16  
 69:18 93:16 111:3 131:8  
 150:10 152:4,12  
**suggested (10)** 27:25 28:23  
 41:1 56:1,13 57:1 58:13,20  
 119:3 152:21  
**suggesting (2)** 20:8 69:1  
**suggestion (2)** 69:3 103:22  
**suggestions (1)** 14:6  
**suggests (4)** 85:3,17 118:10  
 123:13  
**suitability (1)** 100:22  
**suitable (3)** 3:6 96:5 101:8  
 119:3 152:21  
**summarises (2)** 97:9 127:21  
**summarise (2)** 74:9 106:11  
**summarised (3)** 100:24  
 104:4 135:6  
**summarising (1)** 59:20  
**summary (6)** 79:8 104:13  
 142:10,13,17,20  
**summer (1)** 62:7  
**summingup (4)** 1:4 138:23  
 151:18 154:4  
**superintendent (1)** 111:20  
**supervise (1)** 3:7  
**supervised (1)** 36:2  
**supervising (2)** 4:12 96:4  
**supervision (3)** 2:1 9:3 76:16  
**supervisor (5)** 6:1 18:13,22  
 74:13 107:1  
**supervisors (1)** 1:22  
**supplement (2)** 9:10 18:17  
**supplier (1)** 80:2  
**supplier (2)** 80:2,5  
**support (26)** 1:24 4:21,22  
 9:17 12:15,20 25:10 34:17  
 44:3 54:8 62:21 69:6 79:20  
 81:12,21 90:22 96:1  
 102:16 112:3,8 114:16  
 121:1,3,5 126:11 132:21  
**supported (7)** 5:10,14 34:14  
 58:25 77:11 81:17 132:10  
**supporting (3)** 15:7 83:3,5  
**supportive (1)** 89:18  
**supports (3)** 15:21 23:24  
 81:11  
**sure (10)** 19:16 38:5  
 62:13,13 63:21 72:9 78:11  
 79:1 99:8 130:13  
**surprise (3)** 45:1 93:14 120:9  
**surprised (3)** 6:18 8:3 101:2  
**surveillance (4)** 47:24 59:16  
 60:16 68:23  
**susceptible (1)** 39:5  
**suspected (2)** 48:5 49:11  
**suspiciously (1)** 38:9  
**sustenance (1)** 72:13  
**sworn (2)** 148:11,13  
**system (12)** 7:9,23 8:25  
 17:23,24 18:15,15 19:6  
 41:23 83:25 122:7 128:20  
**systems (4)** 3:10 68:25  
 105:20 140:10

T

**tackle (1)** 15:23  
**tact (2)** 2:20 3:13 4:21  
 5:7,23 8:11 9:9 12:16  
 13:15 18:3,10 19:15,21  
 20:1 23:5,13 24:22 41:19

45:10,15,20,24 57:19  
 73:10,11 77:7,8 84:10 85:3  
**tactical (3)** 18:7,8,9  
**tag (3)** 33:10 98:2,4  
**tagging (3)** 104:5 106:2  
 122:2  
**tags (1)** 47:2  
**taken (20)** 8:23 11:7 17:15  
 36:10 41:16 42:9 44:12  
 46:5 57:17 65:19 68:3  
 69:20 70:9 93:17 108:9  
 112:15 124:2 125:17  
 127:10,20  
**takes (2)** 7:8 50:25  
**taking (12)** 6:19 43:4,7  
 78:23 92:1 96:11 115:12  
 117:14 118:4,22 149:18  
 151:14  
**talk (2)** 27:9 100:5  
**talkative (3)** 29:15 42:12,14  
**talked (1)** 33:18  
**tape (1)** 68:6  
**taqiyya (1)** 85:4  
**target (2)** 48:9 69:16  
**targeted (1)** 2:19  
**targets (2)** 53:8,19  
**task (2)** 147:11,22  
**tasked (4)** 25:4 26:12 28:24  
 43:1  
**tasking (1)** 112:13  
**team (81)** 1:24,25 5:5 16:10  
 20:3 21:23,23  
 24:1,5,10,16,23 25:3,17  
 29:10,18,24 36:21 37:24  
 39:17 40:19,23 41:10,13  
 42:22 43:23,25 44:1 45:8  
 48:24 50:13,14,14 51:10  
 59:2 60:2,4,5 62:19 65:12  
 68:18 69:7,16 70:9,14  
 82:5,10,14,18,21,23 83:24  
 84:9 96:13,14,17,19 97:4  
 98:2,5 99:1,8 100:15  
 101:24,25 103:2 106:20  
 107:1 108:17 110:25  
 111:1,16 112:16 113:9,15  
 115:7,12 121:9 125:8  
 131:2 134:1  
**teams (7)** 4:21 5:4 7:7 24:9  
 25:21 41:20 58:22  
**teenager (2)** 33:17 77:3  
**telephone (2)** 29:21 63:24  
**telephoned (1)** 39:22  
**television (1)** 19:9  
**telling (1)** 85:4  
**temporary (2)** 11:16 95:20  
**tempted (2)** 152:19,23  
**tend (1)** 53:6  
**term (1)** 23:13  
**terminated (1)** 81:4  
**terms (7)** 3:4 13:18 108:23  
 110:3 112:20 113:19 129:7  
**terrible (2)** 38:5 93:21  
**terror (2)** 63:1 133:16  
**terrorism (11)** 15:12,14,21  
 47:23 52:14,15,18 54:2  
 79:24 85:8 86:25  
**terrorismrelated (1)** 57:3  
**terrorist (2)** 21:5 13:22  
 20:10 31:11 35:3,8 42:8  
 49:11,21 52:13 53:12 54:5  
 55:10 56:12 77:13 89:16  
 93:21 125:11 130:5 132:8  
 133:4,7  
**terroristrelated (1)** 51:23  
**terrorists (1)** 52:24  
**terrorrelated (1)** 69:12  
**test (1)** 8:5  
**tested (1)** 41:8  
**testing (2)** 7:21 28:25  
**tests (1)** 13:15  
**thank (6)** 71:5 148:12  
 151:15 152:17 153:2,3  
**thats (6)** 92:20 110:4 148:15  
 149:9,12 150:5  
**themselves (3)** 98:13 123:15  
 149:10

**theological (5)** 15:19 33:2  
 37:9 79:25 80:9  
**thereby (1)** 70:25  
**therefore (2)** 122:24 137:20  
**theres (3)** 105:8 118:16  
 125:4  
**theyre (4)** 124:10,10 149:22  
 150:23  
**theyve (4)** 13:14 21:2 148:15  
 151:3  
**thing (6)** 72:14 73:17 121:7  
 139:3 148:16 152:3  
**thinking (5)** 13:19 29:23  
 88:13 124:10 131:23  
**thinks (2)** 26:13 100:1  
**third (2)** 26:24 107:23  
**thirdly (2)** 124:18 146:23  
**though (6)** 37:9 47:9 55:20  
 62:9 146:18 147:6  
**thought (62)** 6:11 9:12  
 10:14,20 12:25 14:16  
 22:20 28:5,21,24 30:15,21  
 31:4,9,23 32:4 34:8  
**target (2)** 48:9 69:16  
 43:25 45:11 58:4,9,19  
 65:12 66:3,5,7 68:18,23  
 70:2 76:10 78:20,25  
 80:16,24 83:2 88:3,19 89:8  
 90:18,21 91:12,20 99:14  
 100:8 101:3,7,12 105:1,3  
 108:16 109:6 113:14  
 117:17 121:7 126:21  
 145:25 152:21  
**thoughts (4)** 31:3 152:5,7,19  
**threat (13)** 48:3,5,21,25  
 49:18,20 52:8 56:24 61:4  
 84:22 101:9 119:1,6  
**threats (1)** 52:13  
**three (12)** 2:14 15:4 22:14  
 27:23 39:1 46:6 58:22  
 80:17 127:12 134:15 136:5  
 148:13  
**threeday (1)** 41:16  
**threshold (1)** 48:13  
**through (34)** 1:25 5:3 14:2  
 22:4 28:13 42:9 44:12 46:5  
 49:2 51:3,14 65:19 67:13  
 74:11 75:11 76:2 80:2,9  
 82:11 85:6 86:9 92:20  
 96:22 100:3 103:1 112:22  
 119:19 126:22 130:10  
 134:14,20 138:3 141:25  
 145:24  
**throughout (4)** 60:24 64:16  
 86:2 149:21  
**thursday (1)** 1:1  
**ticking (2)** 85:11,17  
**tier (4)** 48:9,10,11,12  
**tiers (1)** 48:8  
**ties (2)** 27:7 60:6  
**time (74)** 1:20 3:7 4:14 6:13  
 9:17 12:7,8,17,19 13:16  
 14:23 16:11 31:23 37:14  
 38:17 40:3,5 43:10 49:9,23  
 52:8,17 53:1 54:3,13 55:8  
 60:10 61:5 62:4 63:8,10  
 66:24 67:10,16 69:11 70:6  
 72:2 74:2,5 75:1 76:21  
 78:21 84:16 85:20 86:3  
 88:14 90:17 91:20 92:5  
 97:10 103:11 104:16  
 106:13 107:12  
 108:10,20,25 115:15  
 123:8,9 124:15 125:17  
 126:2,24 128:10 129:1  
 139:16 148:17,19,22  
 150:15,16 151:19 152:6  
**timely (1)** 1:13  
**times (10)** 7:25 22:14 28:17  
 59:22 77:3 84:15 94:25  
 97:6 108:24 149:24  
**today (2)** 152:8 153:2  
**together (13)** 10:15 21:25  
 22:6,11,15,18,21 27:3  
 33:24 34:15 41:5 44:16  
 52:1 62:1 64:24 65:10

68:15 69:16 76:2 77:9  
 88:11 100:14 103:24  
 105:23 110:15 111:12,19  
 113:11 120:5,17 121:15  
 124:19 125:5 126:15  
 127:24 131:12 136:14  
 137:1 147:9 148:6,15  
 152:6,25  
**told (26)** 20:12 27:6 30:12  
 40:14 42:3,5 44:7 45:24  
 46:18 84:9 86:19 101:21  
 103:24 104:21 113:8,10  
 116:5 117:25 119:13  
 121:13,14 122:12,13  
 130:19,22 150:22  
**tomorrow (10)** 148:20,21  
 150:24 151:2,8,14,25  
 152:15 153:1,3  
**too (17)** 11:21 14:19 30:24  
 31:24 39:9 51:6 72:6,15  
 76:14 80:21 82:10 94:11  
 100:8,8 110:15 114:18  
 134:10  
**took (13)** 9:2 13:8 34:23  
 43:12,20 44:21 57:21 61:7  
 72:23 83:13 88:8 117:10  
 131:9  
**tool (2)** 9:9 39:11  
**tools (2)** 16:7 47:23  
**total (1)** 51:4  
**towards (9)** 12:18 32:8,17  
 55:3 61:8 68:9 69:18  
 118:21 129:11  
**toxicology (1)** 69:19  
**trace (1)** 48:21  
**traced (1)** 48:23  
**track (1)** 72:1  
**trail (1)** 13:10  
**train (4)** 37:25 46:19 94:25  
 121:24  
**trained (5)** 3:22 4:19 43:24  
 80:5 92:14  
**training (38)**  
 2:5,6,7,8,11,14,18 4:10  
 15:18 16:1 23:3 24:19  
 25:10,12,20 36:15,18  
 41:15,18 42:8 44:3,4,5  
 45:8,9,10,13 53:22 54:5  
 62:24 75:22 80:7,8,12  
 89:14 132:18,19 133:25  
**trajectory (1)** 91:15  
**transfers (1)** 128:19  
**transformation (1)** 30:9  
**transition (1)** 72:8  
**transpiring (1)** 83:5  
**transport (1)** 100:16  
**travel (10)** 9:25 29:3 39:16  
 49:15 61:10 68:11 78:2  
 94:17 122:3 131:15  
**travelled (1)** 90:2  
**travelling (1)** 122:5  
**triaged (1)** 48:18  
**trial (1)** 25:15  
**tried (1)** 14:8  
**tries (1)** 87:1  
**trigger (3)** 56:20 59:17 83:22  
**triggered (1)** 61:17  
**trip (2)** 10:9 32:12 33:5  
 34:2 62:5 67:11,12  
 68:11,14 90:14,17 91:24  
 93:7,9,10,23 95:8,8  
 103:20,22 111:14 121:15  
**truck (17)** 34:8,20 36:15  
 62:24 65:7 75:22 89:14  
 92:11,19 101:1,2,16  
 111:16 120:23 121:14  
 127:2,21  
**true (1)** 60:15  
**trust (1)** 58:6  
**trusted (1)** 57:7  
**truth (1)** 18:5  
**try (2)** 119:6 140:14  
**trying (3)** 60:7,13 83:17  
**tui (1)** 81:4  
**turn (3)** 47:14 72:11 133:18  
**turned (1)** 14:22

**turning (5)** 16:22 18:10 24:1  
 41:10 81:8  
**twice (1)** 57:13  
**type (2)** 21:4 36:17  
**types (2)** 15:22 17:19  
**typical (1)** 60:23  
**typically (2)** 50:15,17

U

**uk (3)** 52:12 118:21 132:1  
**ultimate (1)** 25:18  
**ultimately (3)** 35:21 57:18  
 111:8  
**unable (4)** 10:18 63:25  
 105:14 139:14  
**unacceptable (1)** 141:16  
**unaccompanied (2)** 11:22  
 93:23  
**unaware (2)** 93:15 132:13  
**uncertain (1)** 141:21  
**unclear (1)** 28:21  
**uncomfortable (1)** 30:15  
**uncompliant (1)** 44:8  
**unconcorated (5)** 57:5  
 89:6 116:3 118:3,10  
**underestimated (1)** 128:15  
**undergoing (1)** 30:8  
**understand (12)** 4:9 61:14  
 75:14 92:21 93:6 100:19  
 101:7 103:3 122:15 149:4  
 150:1,7  
**understanding (13)** 5:5  
 13:18 29:4 43:25 56:23  
 58:20 73:6 75:21 76:17  
 83:7 98:3 106:3 125:5  
**understood (19)** 10:5  
 22:1,23 26:17 30:4 37:25  
 43:9 45:21 46:22 82:14  
 87:11 100:7 101:5 108:6,9  
 111:7 116:12,16 117:19  
**undertake (2)** 2:13 49:15  
**undertaken (4)** 4:12 12:7  
 13:7 125:12  
**undertaking (1)** 62:24  
**understood (5)** 90:7 91:22,25  
 92:14 104:24  
**unfamiliar (1)** 26:11  
**unfolded (1)** 92:18  
**unfolding (1)** 40:8  
**unfortunately (1)** 105:11  
**unhappy (2)** 39:18 43:4  
**unique (1)** 149:19  
**unit (20)** 16:3 24:18 30:5  
 45:9 57:24 61:13 79:14,15  
 81:10,13,15 82:19 92:24  
 95:18 106:18 112:5,7,8  
 114:21 115:7  
**united (2)** 1:14,18  
**unites (1)** 81:10  
**units (2)** 7:6 21:21  
**university (7)** 30:12 77:24  
 84:7 86:24 90:2,16 101:18  
 112:3 113:3 121:5  
**unjustified (1)** 70:7  
**unknown (3)** 57:5,6 58:10  
**unlawfully (3)** 137:20 141:8  
 142:4  
**unless (2)** 23:6 140:21  
**unlike (1)** 25:11  
**unlikely (2)** 10:14 37:8  
**unrealistic (1)** 77:2  
**unreliable (1)** 28:14  
**unremarkable (1)** 98:4  
**unsatisfactory (2)** 109:25  
 141:15  
**unsighted (1)** 93:16  
**unsuitable (2)** 101:11 141:15  
**unsure (1)** 96:23  
**untested (4)** 27:21 28:22  
 83:10 87:11  
**until (13)** 3:17 17:20 24:4  
 56:7 58:8 64:7 65:1 74:18  
 129:17 130:15,24 131:3,11  
 153:7  
**untrue (1)** 30:17  
**unusual (4)** 8:2 20:18 45:5  
 65:16

**upbeat (1)** 14:16  
**update (19)** 26:12,22,23  
 29:4 35:11 83:15 90:1,14  
 101:15 102:3,6 103:22  
 104:2,14,17 107:9,19,20  
 129:20  
**updated (5)** 30:1 38:20  
 84:15 87:13 105:25  
**updates (3)** 28:6 29:11 63:6  
**upgraded (2)** 108:8 109:3  
**upon (7)** 27:5 28:18 85:22  
 87:4 92:20 114:13 139:13  
**upper (2)** 143:2,4  
**upset (2)** 43:9,10  
**upodate (1)** 27:24  
**upward (1)** 91:15  
**used (10)** 7:11 8:25 16:12  
 18:6 19:4 29:8 48:2  
 55:5,13 106:9  
**useful (1)** 61:14  
**usher (2)** 136:12,24  
**using (5)** 19:18 53:25 63:1  
 92:12 141:3

visits (23) 7:24 8:2,6 19:13  
 21:6 25:1 30:7 36:22 38:12  
 39:12 42:9,10 44:12,15  
 46:6 60:3 76:20 88:25 89:1  
 91:1.10 102:17 111:19  
 visor (14) 7:9,12 8:25 25:25  
 29:8 30:2,4 37:12 39:21  
 41:24 44:10,11 75:17  
 83:25  
 void (1) 102:18  
 vulnerability (1) 38:21  
 vulnerable (3) 16:13 33:21  
 39:4

W

wage (1) 34:9  
 wait (1) 152:5  
 wales (1) 1:9  
 wanting (3) 37:4 77:3 98:6  
 ward (3) 131:20 132:10,21  
 warning (3) 12:13 40:24  
 148:1  
 warped (1) 8:7  
 warren (1) 22:5  
 wasnt (8) 4:23 14:11 34:11  
 66:7 67:21 78:10 114:7  
 124:25  
 watch (1) 30:15  
 watched (1) 28:14  
 watching (1) 28:1  
 way (13) 14:4 31:6 34:3  
 75:13 92:8 111:2 121:23  
 122:25 125:1 134:22  
 135:20 150:6 152:20  
 ways (24) 28:18 31:21 54:4  
 57:2,12 74:15 82:19,25  
 83:4,6,8 85:24,24 86:8  
 87:2 88:1,18 97:13 108:2  
 117:20 118:1,11 125:20  
 126:1  
 weapon (1) 92:12  
 weapons (2) 34:19 63:2  
 wear (1) 33:10  
 wearing (1) 68:20  
 week (1) 40:4  
 weeklong (1) 41:14  
 weekly (4) 8:2 29:19 49:24  
 50:2  
 weeks (4) 6:4 29:19 69:20  
 72:25  
 welfare (1) 44:17  
 wellbeing (1) 42:25  
 went (9) 14:18 29:20 30:2  
 84:2 87:16 99:12 107:15  
 125:24 130:10  
 west (47) 8:20 24:15 25:3,7  
 26:18 27:12 29:10 31:17  
 43:23 57:23 58:23 59:1  
 70:15 72:23 73:23 82:3,18  
 83:14 89:20 91:7,13 92:23  
 95:13 96:2,7,16 97:4 104:2  
 106:14 108:19 110:13  
 111:7,24 112:1,13  
 115:6,8,10,16,21 119:14  
 120:13 125:7,12 128:5  
 131:22,24  
 weve (1) 129:23  
 whatever (2) 152:11,13  
 whatsoever (1) 122:11  
 whereabouts (1) 107:17  
 whereas (1) 51:23  
 whilst (9) 25:9 27:19 44:15  
 54:6 74:12 84:21 96:11  
 106:5,17  
 whitemoor (16) 22:5,15 27:4  
 32:12,18 33:5,15 34:2  
 44:16 62:5 76:5 85:1  
 100:15 111:6 120:18  
 126:25  
 whole (4) 17:24 23:13 64:16  
 68:24  
 whose (2) 48:16 73:23  
 wide (1) 17:17  
 widely (3) 98:12,14 115:3  
 wideranging (1) 135:24

williams (6) 94:10 121:9,17  
 123:12 128:2,23  
 willing (1) 66:7  
 wing (2) 18:22 124:18  
 wires (1) 55:5  
 wisdom (1) 65:23  
 wish (11) 32:18 140:15  
 143:14 144:2,15,19  
 146:2,13 149:9,17 150:4  
 wished (2) 56:12 66:15  
 wishes (3) 86:20,24 150:2  
 wishing (1) 121:5  
 withdrawn (1) 94:12  
 witness (6) 40:16 43:14  
 47:15 104:8 124:6 131:19  
 woodhill (3) 21:20 29:14  
 85:9  
 wording (2) 89:8 111:2  
 work (28) 5:4 9:10  
 13:20,21,23 14:9 23:24  
 37:16,17 38:16 48:20  
 49:7,17 50:20 52:21 53:2  
 75:4 76:17,18,25 81:17  
 84:8 95:18 97:2 112:13  
 124:25 127:8 133:25  
 worked (4) 45:23 47:17 85:9  
 96:19  
 working (9) 7:19 41:3 47:3  
 95:17 106:19 113:1,11  
 129:11 134:10  
 works (1) 15:4  
 workshop (2) 2:13 22:15  
 worlds (1) 52:3  
 worried (1) 130:10  
 worrying (1) 86:3  
 write (4) 46:3 140:15,17  
 152:22  
 writer (1) 86:23  
 writing (6) 84:5 124:25  
 140:2 141:2,22 142:14  
 written (5) 62:11 75:13  
 118:14 141:21 143:10  
 wrong (4) 28:24 100:2  
 113:18 117:1

X

x (1) 140:19  
 xbox (5) 37:15 39:17 42:15  
 44:22 60:18

Y

year (3) 22:14 101:19 125:2  
 years (4) 2:14 41:12 42:4  
 47:18  
 yesterday (1) 1:7  
 yet (2) 27:21 98:9  
 young (4) 13:20,23 14:5 15:5  
 youre (1) 148:8  
 yourself (1) 152:22  
 yourselves (1) 139:14  
 youth (1) 13:23  
 youve (4) 148:3 152:5,11,14

1

1 (9) 37:22 48:9 49:12  
 134:23 137:5,23 141:7  
 142:2 154:4  
 10 (7) 33:4 43:9 63:19 64:13  
 73:1 137:9 143:13  
 100 (2) 8:17 23:23  
 1000 (1) 20:14  
 1015 (1) 5:12  
 1036 (1) 1:2  
 11 (12) 13:12 26:25 32:11  
 35:9 38:25 39:7 67:24  
 73:22 89:4,19 137:15  
 144:1  
 1148 (1) 45:4  
 12 (9) 3:23 23:21 34:2 41:7  
 44:16 61:12 73:20 137:23  
 144:1  
 1215 (1) 71:18  
 1238 (1) 71:20  
 13 (6) 15:3 30:7,9 31:18  
 138:3 144:1

14 (10) 20:14 29:24 39:13  
 44:20 64:17 93:3 116:15  
 138:6 144:4,13  
 15 (7) 20:21 26:21 33:6  
 35:13 41:12 138:13 144:14  
 150 (1) 133:24  
 16 (2) 47:18 138:16  
 17 (2) 32:16 138:24  
 18 (7) 27:7 64:20 66:11 94:9  
 104:1 128:22 139:9  
 18andahalfyear (1) 47:3  
 18th (1) 95:10  
 19 (3) 20:12 59:17 139:12  
 1s (1) 48:11

2

2 (5) 5:24 7:16 34:9 49:14  
 135:3  
 20 (3) 35:16 94:25 139:18  
 200000 (1) 22:9  
 2002 (1) 41:11  
 2006 (1) 53:11  
 2008 (2) 53:9 84:19  
 2010 (3) 24:2 53:18 54:7  
 2011 (2) 54:9,11  
 2012 (2) 54:7,18  
 2013 (4) 17:20,22 47:19 55:9  
 2014 (5) 53:12 55:3,18,21  
 72:23  
 2015 (7) 24:3,23 25:6 27:13  
 47:19 55:24 56:9  
 2016 (2) 22:7 56:13  
 2017 (9) 15:18 16:2 22:25  
 25:17 70:24 95:15 111:22  
 125:8 133:7  
 2018 (37) 20:21 22:9 24:5,10  
 25:14,19,24 26:17,25 27:5  
 28:9 29:1,13 45:24 52:1  
 56:8,9 57:1,23 59:9,13  
 60:22 74:14 82:2 84:2  
 95:19 97:7,23 105:22  
 107:3,23 110:12 112:15  
 115:17,20 116:15 125:18  
 20182020 (1) 111:25  
 2019 (58) 13:18,21 17:3 24:3  
 32:11 33:14 34:9 36:14  
 37:7 39:13 41:14 42:11  
 44:10 46:14 48:15 52:1,10  
 60:22 61:12 62:6,7,23  
 63:13 64:3,9 66:11 68:10  
 69:9 76:4,23 82:5  
 87:13,15,23 88:9 89:4 90:6  
 94:25 95:19,22,23 100:4  
 107:25 110:11 115:2,6,18  
 117:10 119:25 120:15  
 121:10 122:13 125:24  
 126:14 128:22 132:15  
 133:3,18  
 2020 (2) 132:4 133:19  
 2021 (8) 1:1 4:22 20:14,17  
 23:12,20,22 153:8  
 2022 (1) 23:22  
 21 (3) 29:25 100:13 139:25  
 217 (1) 149:2  
 22 (9) 36:3 57:23 65:2,15  
 68:10 77:23 82:23 121:12  
 141:24  
 220 (1) 150:18  
 23 (3) 30:1 46:10 142:2  
 24 (5) 29:13 46:14 59:25  
 138:5 142:9  
 247 (1) 69:24  
 25 (1) 142:16  
 26 (3) 14:15 33:1 142:22  
 27 (3) 1:1 20:21 143:13  
 28 (6) 27:5 34:5 59:3 83:13  
 143:16 153:8  
 28th (1) 95:6  
 29 (10) 33:14 35:18 40:6  
 88:16 93:7 102:1 104:19  
 118:5 129:16 144:4  
 2a (1) 142:9  
 2b (1) 142:16

3

3 (18) 5:16,17,24 6:11 7:16  
 34:18 36:23 48:10 49:16  
 59:10 89:11 100:24 130:6  
 135:6 142:22 143:15,16  
 145:2  
 30 (6) 23:22 27:11 30:7  
 36:14 70:25 144:16  
 3000 (2) 48:15 52:19  
 31 (7) 37:11 42:11,14 90:20  
 102:9 123:6 144:25  
 32 (1) 147:9  
 33 (1) 147:15  
 34 (1) 147:19  
 35 (3) 138:16,25 147:22  
 36 (1) 148:1  
 3s (1) 48:12

4

4 (50) 17:14 24:25 25:11,17  
 27:5 28:12,20 35:25  
 38:2,6,16 40:10,17 41:19  
 44:2,5,13 45:12 46:1 47:12  
 49:18 51:2 54:19 56:19,24  
 58:1 83:22 84:17 88:24  
 96:12 97:1 102:2 107:1  
 113:9 114:5,9 115:2,9  
 119:11 125:11 128:4,15  
 132:6,11,17 133:13 135:11  
 143:16 144:3 145:2  
 40000 (2) 48:16 52:20  
 428 (1) 150:20  
 433 (1) 153:6  
 45minute (1) 6:10  
 4s (2) 43:23 115:13

5

5 (7) 20:22 28:9 135:23  
 137:23 142:2 144:4 145:2

6

6 (6) 38:11 59:9 64:1 93:11  
 136:4 142:9  
 600 (1) 52:18  
 65 (1) 20:15  
 68 (1) 17:7

7

7 (18) 24:16 29:1,10,19  
 30:18 43:23,25 44:1 87:15  
 110:11 115:7,12 120:5  
 125:8 126:14 134:1 136:11  
 142:16  
 70 (1) 20:13  
 78000 (1) 20:16  
 7s (1) 121:9

8

8 (3) 56:8 136:21 142:22

9

9 (2) 137:7 143:13  
 945 (5) 20:12 150:23 151:8  
 152:16 153:7